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PREFACE
Since it began operations in 1960, the Inter-American Development Bank has
shown particular concern for the income levels of the beneficiaries of the
projects it helps to finance. Until 1979, this concern was expressed mainly
through the sectorial composition of its portfolio and the importance attributed
to projects for low-income beneficiaries.1 In effect, the Bank played a pio-
neering role among multilateral finance institutions by supporting "social
infrastructure" projects.
Since 1979, in response to a resolution by its Board of Governors (IDB,
1978), Bank economists have been estimating the distribution of income
changes brought about by projects for three main categories of beneficiaries:
the public sector, low-income people and the remainder of the private sector.
In accordance with Bank policy, this distributional effect does not form part of
the criteria for taking decisions at the level of individual projects, but it is
recorded for all projects and constitutes the main source of information for
reporting to the Board of Governors on the overall distributional effect of all
operations approved within a particular period. These estimates, which are
also innovative among multilateral finance organizations, are carried out for
1. See, for example, Herrera et al. (1970) and Dell (1972).
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PREFACE
all projects for which a cost-benefit analysis is made, and of which they form
an integral part. Current practice at the Bank was developed along with the
methodological effort, which the author has endeavored to report on in this
study.
Chapter 1 shows that many criteria can be devised to obtain a net "total"
benefits figure, corresponding to different distributional value judgments. The
most widespread of these criteria, which has come to be known as the "effi-
ciency criterion," corresponds to the following distributional value judgment:
one additional unit of income is equally valuable (for the purpose of calculat-
ing "total" benefits) whatever the recipient's income level. Consequently, in
this approach, the distribution of those income changes among beneficiaries is
not a relevant aspect of the analysis and this is why most studies on cost-
benefit analysis disregard it. In other approaches, in which the distributional
aspects are relevant, more emphasis has been placed on deducing and estimat-
ing accounting prices incorporating distributional value judgments different
from those in the "efficiency" analysis, and less emphasis on estimating the
distributional effects proper.
The objective of this study is to present the distributional aspects involved
in cost-benefit analysis, to provide guidelines for quantifying the distribu-
tional effects of an investment project within such an analysis, and to point
out the main difficulties encountered. It is directed towards professionals in
the field of applied economic analysis and students interested in a more
detailed approach to such topics than that offered in the most widely used
textbooks, which it may serve to supplement. An effort has been made to
explain topics by giving a summary presentation of the basic principles of
cost-benefit analysis, rather than evaluating it as an investment planning tool.
The reader will therefore also find numerous references to specialized litera-
ture where he or she may find the main topics discussed in more detail.
The first part of this study is devoted to basic principles, their application to
deducing expressions for accounting prices, identifying the most important
distributional effects and applying them to two examples of investment analy-
sis, all within a framework that has been simplified from various points of
view. In the first place, the analysis has been made in a partial equilibrium
context which is maintained throughout the text. Secondly, some topics are
touched on only indirectly, without being given all the attention they deserve;
this is the case for the discount rate. Thirdly, drastic simplifications have been
made in regard to the accounting prices of non-traded goods, dealt with in
more detail in Part II. Finally, the complications introduced by inter-personal
distributional weights and accounting prices of investment have been avoided,
these topics being dealt with briefly in Part III.
The three parts in which the subject matter has been organized were in-
tended to be as independent from the other as possible. Therefore, the reader
IV
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PREFACE
may skip Part II without hindering his comprehension of Part III. While Parts
II and III may be perused according to the reader's interest, he may find it
difficult to tackle them without previous knowledge of the subjects presented
in Part I.
Parts of this study are the result of a joint effort made at the Bank to which
the following, among others, contributed: E. Castagnino, J. Fernandez, E.
Howard, L. Morales Bayro, T. Powers, J. Tejada and the economists of the
Project Analysis Department. The author benefited from the experience of E.
Howard, C. MacDonald and S. Schmukler, with whom he shared the learning
process accompanying the technical supervision of the first stages of applica-
tion.
The comments of E. Barbieri, J. Coker, X. Comas, R. Fernandez, M.
Flament and, particularly, A. Thieme helped to improve the presentation of
various aspects of the work.
It was T. Powers' suggestion that the section on implementation be added to
Chapter 16. E. Mishan made some useful remarks about the first three chap-
ters and A. Harberger commented in detail on several aspects throughout the
book. The typing of several drafts was done by S. Zurbaran, L. Romero, N.
Lee and P. Wharton. The author sincerely thanks all these people and, since
he did not always follow their advice, remains the sole person responsible for
the final result.
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
This second edition is essentially the same as the first. While the original
text seems to have withstood the test of time reasonably well, corrections to
improve accuracy and to clarify the presentation have been made in re-
sponse to comments by several attentive readers, especially A. Sciara. In
Chapter Six, more substantive changes were made to correct the presenta-
tion of the compensating variations of entering into and leaving employ-
ment by unskilled workers.
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CHAPTER 1
PRINCIPLES AND DISTRIBUTIONAL
VALUE JUDGMENTS
1.1 Principles
Any method used to obtain a single measure of the various effects resulting
from a particular action requires that the objective of measuring be clearly
identified, in order to define how a measure of each one of those effects can
be obtained, and how such measures compare with one another in order to
reach the single measure sought. If the objective of measuring is to judge the
result of the effects as beneficial or harmful, it is also necessary to define who
does the judging and how relevant the measure chosen and the criterion for
comparison are for such purposes.
Cost-benefit analysis is a method for comparing alternative resource alloca-
tion and providing answers as to which is "preferable." Since such allocations
are the result of "doing" or "not doing," cost-benefit analysis includes the
criteria for defining who judges the effects of alternative allocations, how the
effects of such actions on the people affected (whether benefiting from or
harmed by it) are measured, and how the resulting measures are compared.
Each of these criteria colors the final result achieved by using this type of
analysis and, consequently, the use made of such results.
3
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PRINCIPLES AND DISTRIBUTIONAL VALUE JUDGMENTS
The first criterion defines who judges the nature of the effects, and specifies
that each person affected is the one who will evaluate the effects on him of the
actions being examined. In practice, however, the criterion is used in a social
context that determines who is included and in which circumstances. The
appointing of "ex officio" defending lawyers and the regulating of narcotics
production and marketing are examples of cases where the judgment of effects
is not left to individual preferences. Another related problem is whether all
those affected are taken into account, or only a subset. For example, foreign
investment affects the inhabitants of both the investing and recipient coun-
tries, and defining the subset of all those affected and considered will depend
on the objectives of whoever carries out, or commissions, the analysis.
The second criterion is the measurement criterion, known as the compensat-
ing variation (CV). This consists of measuring the effects of an action on a
person through the sum of money by which his income needs to be changed so
that he is in a situation equivalent to the one he was in before the course of
action whose effects we are trying to measure. For example, and by way of a
preface to more detailed treatment in Chapter 2, if the result of one allocation
of resources in relation to another is an increase in the price of a certain
product to a certain person, the CV will be the sum of money which, follow-
ing that increase, needs to be given to that person so that he is in a situation
that he considers equivalent to the previous one. Thus if the CV of the price
increase for that person is $100, that person is said to have incurred a loss of
$100 or a benefit of —$100. Logically, the measurement criterion is critically
dependent not only on the above premise regarding who decides whether a
person has been affected, but also on a second one, i.e., that the affected
person can fully appreciate the effect and convert it into a compensating sum
of money.
Once the subset of persons constituting the field of analysis has been de-
fined, and the members of that group affected have been identified, their
corresponding CVs need to be known. Since the effects of the actions exam-
ined take place over a period of time, a criterion for intertemporal compari-
sons will be needed. And since a basic principle of cost-benefit analysis is to
accept the preferences revealed by individuals, the logically consistent crite-
rion appears to be the intertemporal preferences revealed by individuals. The
criterion for comparing CVs corresponding to effects at different times, or the
criterion for intertemporal welfare comparisons, is the one that corresponds to
the definition and quantification of the discount rate and will be dealt with in
more detail in Chapter 8. It is useful, however, to present the basic reasoning
underlying the concept of an individual discount rate in summary form. Con-
sider, for example, a course of action A that affects only two persons P and R
at two moments in time (t = 0,1) and whose CVs are CVpt(A) and CVt(A)
respectively. Following course of action A implies foregoing course of action
B, which also affects only P and R and whose effects are measured by CVpt (E)
4
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PRINCIPLES
and CV,(E). The welfare change or net benefits (NB) for each person may be
expressed as
in which v[ is the subjective valuation by the individual i of an additional unit
of income at time t. The same expressions can be written in shorter form as
It is assumed that individuals prefer an additional unit of present consumption
to one of future consumption, i.e. that the intertemporal weights v{ diminish
with time. If for the sake of simplification, the assumption is made that for
each individual i these weights decrease at a constant rate df, it follows that:
This can be expressed in equivalent form as
in which d' is the so-called individual discount rate. If now the intertemporal
valuations of individual i are expressed in accordance with his valuation in
year zero, i.e. using the weight at the initial time as a numeraire or unit of
account, which is current practice, we have
which is the individual discount factor. The expressions for individual net
benefits can now be rewritten by dividing both sides by v'0, since this will not
alter the sign forNB'(A - B), and replacing the quotients between the weights
vt by the expression just obtained. Thus we arrive at
5
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PRINCIPLES AND DISTRIBUTIONAL VALUE JUDGMENTS
which is the standard expression for calculating present value, except that up
to now the calculation has been made for each person separately and using the
discount rate of each individual.
Each of these individual net benefits NB'(A — B) will be considered the
measure of the effect on the respective person, and logically, there will be
those who gain and those who lose. But cost-benefit analysis seeks to find an
answer for the "total" effect, an answer that would enable us to determine
whether the action concerned is "preferable" to another alternative, "prefera-
ble" for the group of persons defined. Since the purpose is to answer the
question of how "total" welfare varies when that of some of its members
changes because of a certain action, it is necessary to have a criterion that
relates the measures of the individual's welfare changes (CV) to a change in
"total" welfare. This criterion is known as that of interpersonal welfare
comparisons. Obviously each person will have his own criterion in this re-
spect, which will reflect his judgments on how much the loss of some and the
gain of others is "worth" for the total, which is why it comes as no surprise
that this is a controversial topic. In practice, the criterion for comparing
individual measures against one another and obtaining the single measure
sought consists of a weighted sum of individual net benefits.
Thus the change in "total" welfare or total net benefits (NB) which can be
attributed to following course of action A instead of B will be
where WP and wr are the weights which the CVs of Messrs. P and R receive in
the comparison criterion and which reflect the value judgments inherent in it.
Thus, if the effect of courses of action A and B is to reduce the prices of the
products bread and jewels respectively, using the same resources, and P does
not wear jewels and R does not consume bread, course of action A — B will
benefit P and be harmful to R, so that NBP(A — B) will be positive and
CVr(A — B) will be negative. Assuming, for example, that
"total" net benefits will be
The result will depend on the weights wp and wr, and course of action (A - B)
will be considered preferable to (B - A) ifNB(A - B) is positive. If the result
6
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PRINCIPLES
is negative, (B — A) will be preferred to (A — B). It should be pointed out that
until the value judgment implicit in the interpersonal aggregation criterion is
introduced, it is not possible to speak of "costs" or "benefits" in a given year
beyond the level of each individual. In such cases, speaking of changes in the
income of people (or CVs) is a more appropriate way of referring to the
information available, keeping the expressions "total benefits" or their equiv-
alents for the next step, which involves introducing the interpersonal aggrega-
tion criterion.
Almost all the versions of cost-benefit analysis have the same criteria re-
garding who defines the nature of effects and how they are measured, and any
differences concern mainly the criteria for comparison.' As an introduction to
this topic, it is useful to begin with the most widespread version of cost-
benefit analysis known as "efficiency" analysis. This corresponds to the
interpersonal comparison criterion, or distributional value judgment as it will
also be called later, which is summarized below: the interpersonal comparison
weights, representations of an interpersonal distributional value judgment, are
the same for all concerned.2 In terms of the notation used, this means that
wr = wp = w. This value judgment can also be expressed by saying that one
additional unit of income is equally "valuable" whatever the beneficiary's
income level. In terms of the previous example of Messrs. P and R, the net
benefits from course of action A — B would be
Since w is positive and the same for all concerned, its value will not affect the
sign ofNB(A — B) and can be ignored. In practice therefore, the interpersonal
comparison criterion of efficiency analysis can be expressed simply as the
sum of present values of changes in net individual income.
Finally, most operational versions of efficiency analysis assume that it is
possible to have a single discount rate d based on individual discount rates,
and that the rate of return of marginal investment at efficiency prices is equal
to discount rate d, which would be valid if the amount of investment made
each period is what is required to include all the projects whose sum total of
present values of changes in individual incomes is positive at rate d. For the
moment, the reader need not be concerned with these assumptions, which will
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8, but it is useful to remember an
1. An exception is UNIDO's (1972) "merit wants."
2. Mishan (1981a, p. 317n) has pointed out that interpersonal comparison weights could also
be based upon judgments of fact. This can only refer to the relation between individual real
income changes and individual welfare changes, but not to that between the latter and total
welfare changes. Since no factual information supports the use of equal weights, they can only be
regarded as representing a value judgment. See Appendix B and Ray (1984, Ch. 2 and 3).
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PRINCIPLES AND DISTRIBUTIONAL VALUE JUDGMENTS
important consequence stemming from them: since the amount of investment
is sufficient to include all projects whose present value of net benefits (at
efficiency prices) is greater than zero, the present value of net economic
benefits of marginally displaced investment is nil.3
If it is possible to have a single discount rate d for all individuals, and
recalling that the present value has distributional property as regards the sum,
in efficiency analysis, the NB(A — B) can also be written as the present value
(PV) of the sum of the CVs corresponding to following course of action A less
the present value of the sum of the CVs corresponding to following the
alternative course of action:
Note that this expression enables us to calculate the net benefits at efficiency
prices from following course of action A, as well as the distribution of the
respective changes in net incomes, since it can be rewritten as
Now if B is a marginal course of action, the present value of the correspond-
ing CVs will be equal to zero and net benefits at efficiency prices from
following course of action A will be
which is the conventional expression for the present value of net benefits at
efficiency prices. However, this latter expression does not enable us to know
the distribution of net benefits; for that it is also necessary to know the
distribution of changes in income generated by the alternative course of
action.
Since the interpersonal comparison criterion of efficiency analysis is only
one of many possible, and since it is not always made explicit, the following
sections of this chapter deal with those interpersonal comparison criteria that
are most widespread in the literature on cost-benefit analysis.
3. This implies that it is indifferent (is equally valuable) to use an additional peso for consump-
tion or investment. See Chapters 8 and 15.
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STRICT PARETO IMPROVEMENTS
1.2 Pareto Optima and Strict Pareto Improvements
The Pareto optimum is a static equilibrium situation in which it is impossible
to improve the welfare of one of the persons involved without necessarily
reducing the welfare of at least one of the other persons. Classifying a situa-
tion as optimum in Pareto's sense does not involve any distributional value
judgment per se. There are as many Pareto optima as there are distributions of
resources between the persons involved, and none of them can be preferred to
any other without this automatically implying preference for one distribution
of resources compared with another or, in other words, without the introduc-
tion of distributional value judgments. These are deliberately excluded from
the qualification of optimality, but at the price of making any attempt at
practical application impossible, since Pareto optima cannot be compared
with one another without introducing such value judgments. If by chance a
situation corresponded to a Pareto optimum, it would not be possible within
the Paretian rules to propose any change since this would involve harming at
least one of the participants.
The above need not be cause for concern per se, since nobody ever expects
to actually be in an optimum defined in this way. But, what happens if the
situation is not a Pareto optimum? In this case the Paretian rules define
possible changes that would allow the situation to move closer to an optimum
situation, changes that will here be called strict Pareto improvements (SPI).
An SPI is an action that improves the welfare of least one of those involved
while none of the remainder sees his situation worsen. Thus, a Pareto opti-
mum can be defined as a situation in which it is not possible to effect an SPI.
However, although there are infinite Pareto optima that constitute points of
arrival, it is not possible to choose any of them without a. distributional value
judgment; the SPI criterion automatically eliminates those optima that corres-
pond to situations in which one of the persons involved is worse off compared
with the sub-optimal situation. It follows then that, given a distribution of
resources and an associated sub-optimal situation, the SPI criterion will limit
the field of choice to situations that are very close to the existing distribution.
This may be clarified with a hypothetical example of two persons, P and R,
the various combinations possible for distributing resources between them and
the different "welfare levels" brought about by these distributions. Such a
situation is set out in Figure 1.1, where each point on the line that goes
through /, A and B represents the maximum level of welfare that one of them
can reach given the level of welfare of the other, or, in other words, each point
on the line is a Pareto optimum. Point S shows the sub-optimum situation
which they are in and SAB the area in which it is possible to effect SPIs,
illustrating what was pointed out earlier, that is, that the field of action defined
9
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PRINCIPLES AND DISTRIBUTIONAL VALUE JUDGMENTS
Figure 1.1. Maximum Levels of Welfare Attainable by P and R
does not allow for substantial changes in distribution. The SPI criterion is
conservative and excludes such possibilities as point 7, which although it
allows P to improve, requires R's welfare level to be reduced. As a reference
point, the reader may consider point / as the one corresponding to an equal
distribution of resources.4
It should be pointed out that although the Paretian rules proper do not allow
a particular point such as / to be preferred to others such as A or 5, the SPI
criterion in fact results in only those optima included between A and B consti-
tuting objectives that can be reached without introducing distributional value
judgments. Then however, if the SPI criterion is the one used for taking
decisions, the range of possible alternatives tends to perpetuate a distribution
similar to the existing one. Any economic policy recommendation based on
the SPI criterion can only be based on a value judgment with regard to such
distribution, viz: that it is desirable, and so should not be departed from too
radically.
Let us now consider four mutually exclusive actions (Y,, X2, X3, X4) which
can be carried out to bring about a change in situation 5. For this purpose,
Figure 1.2 shows an enlarged area SAB already considered where the arrows
SXV to SX4 show the four possible actions.
The rules of play determine that the action must be chosen according to the
SPI criterion. As a result, action SX4 is eliminated since it results in a worsen-
ing of the situation for P whereas the remaining alternatives are SPIs in
4. Which does not necessarily correspond to an equal distribution of monetary income.
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SPIs AND PROJECT COMPARISONS
Figure 1.2. Four Mutually Exclusive Actions Xt
relation to S. If now the same criterion is applied to the remaining three, the
result is that SX2 and SX3 are SPIs in relation to SX{ since from a point like Xl
it is possible to improve both P and R by going to points X2 or X3. However, it
is not possible to choose between SX2 and SX3, since adopting either of them
always involves someone being better off with the other. The SPI criterion
does not enable us to obtain a complete preference order among alternatives.
This would only be possible by exercising interpersonal welfare comparisons,
for example by stating that what R loses when going from X2 to X3 is "worth"
less than what P gains. Interpersonal welfare comparisons would not only
make it possible to choose between X2 and X3, but in addition would not allow
X4 to be excluded, since what P loses could be considered "less valuable"
than what R gains. Even more, for the same reason it would be possible to
compare any two situations, including Pareto optima such as points /and A in
Figure 1.1.
1.3 Strict Pareto Improvements and Project Comparisons
Let us suppose that we are not in a Pareto optimum and that as a result SPIs
can be effected. Let X{,X2, X^ and X4 in Figure 1.1 be the mutually exclusive
alternatives for a project whose beneficiaries are persons P and R. The project
would be carried out by the Government, which would pay investment costs
for a total of 100. Operating and maintenance costs would be borne by the
beneficiaries P and R, whose CVs of the "output" of the project exceed such
11
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PRINCIPLES AND DISTRIBUTIONAL VALUE JUDGMENTS
Table 1.1. Mutually Exclusive Alternatives for Project "X"
Alternative
X,
X2
X3
X4
Government
-100
-100
-100
-100
p
20
25
23
10
R
90
95
96
130
Total
10
20
19
40
costs (what they pay) by the amount shown for each alternative. Henceforth,
this distribution will be called the income changes generated by the project. If
the project were not carried out, the Government would pay back the amount
of 100 in taxes to P and R in the proportions 20% and 80% respectively, since
it has no other alternative investment. As can be seen in Table 1.1, P and R
receive different amounts of income from each alternative. We want to know:
a) whether it is desirable to carry out the project in any of its alternatives; and
b) if it is carried out, what the best alternative is. In addition, any recommen-
dation must be based on the SPI criterion. To this end, the situations will first
be compared with and without the project and then the alternatives compared.
Alternative X, is an SPI, since with the project R would gain 90 in compari-
son with 80 in taxes repaid, whereas P would receive from the project the
same as he would get back as a refund. Consequently, R can be better off
without P being worse off. The reader will be able to check by using a similar
process that X2 and X3 are also SPIs in relation to the situation without a
project. X4, on the other hand, is not an SPI since with the project P would
gain only 10, less than the 20 he would receive in tax refunds if the project
were not carried out.5 Consequently, it is worth carrying out the project in any
of its alternative forms with the exception of X4. Now we can go on to the
problem of choosing the best alternative according to the SPI criterion. For
this purpose, the alternatives are compared, from which it is seen that both X2
and X3 are SPIs in relation to X, since with both of them P and R gain
compared with X,. X2 now needs to be compared with X3, from which we
conclude that it is not possible to recommend one over the other. If X3 is
carried out (foregoing X2) P loses 2 for R to gain 1, whereas if X2 is carried out
(foregoing X3) it is R who loses 1 for P to gain 2. To conclude, the SPI
criterion excludes X, and X4, but does not allow a complete preference order
to be established for the remaining alternatives.
Let us now compare the above with the result of using the following
distributional value judgment: 1 peso more (less) of income is equally valu-
able for P and for R. The first consequence of the above is that now X4 is not
5. The reader can check that a change in the proportions in which taxes are refunded can turn
Xt into an SPI. Furthermore, X4 could lead to a Pareto optimum and, nevertheless, not be an SPI.
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POTENTIAL PARETO IMPROVEMENTS
only acceptable in relation to the situation without a project but is the best
alternative, since its net "total" benefits are greater than those of any of the
others. In fact, what P loses (10 - 20 = —10) is "worth" less than what R
gains (130 - 80 = 50) leaving a net balance of 50 — 10 = 40, more than the
net balance of any other alternative. The distributional value judgment also
enables all the alternatives to be compared and put in order, which results in
the following: X4 is preferable to all the others, X2 is preferable to X3 and X,,
and X3 is preferable only to Xl.
1.4 Potential Pareto Improvements
In the real world, SPIs are very unlikely. The execution of a project will
normally involve the displacing of other projects with different beneficiaries.
Moreover, in the section above it was concluded that the SPI criterion might
not provide one single solution (alternatives X2 and X3). This situation gave
rise to the proposal for another criterion related to the Pareto analysis: that of
the potential Pareto improvement (PPI). This is an action in which it is
possible for at least one to gain without anybody losing. It should be noted
that possible does not mean that nobody actually loses. In a PPI there may be
winners and losers but the gains of the former must be enough to compensate
the latter by means of (costless) transfers, which enable them to be brought
back to their previous situation, and even leave a surplus. Note that the fact
that the gains are sufficient to compensate the losers does not mean that they
are actually compensated. In that sense it is a potential Pareto improvement,
since it is possible that some will improve their position without anybody
being worse off, even though in fact some may gain and others lose. If a
course of action constituting a PPI is supplemented by another that makes
compensation effective at no cost, then the situation of some will have im-
proved without anybody being worse off and all the measures together will
constitute a strict Pareto improvement. In the view of some authors, the
potential Pareto improvement criterion ought to be the basis of cost-benefit
analysis, and the choice of a project in contrast to following an alternative
course of action ought to be based on it.6 That is why, in the following pages
this criterion will be applied to the choice of projects, which will allow us to
make explicit the value judgments incorporated in this analysis.
An example will show how to utilize the potential Pareto improvement
criterion in cost-benefit analysis and the distributional value judgments in-
volved in it. In Table 1.2, A\ and A2 are the mutually exclusive alternatives for
a project to be carried out by the Government, which would be financed with
6. Mishan(1982, Part IV)
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PRINCIPLES AND DISTRIBUTIONAL VALUE JUDGMENTS
Table 1.2. Mutually Exclusive Alternatives for Project "A'
Alternative
A,
A2
Government
-100
-100
p
20
90
R
90
20
Total
10
10
taxes already paid. It is also assumed that if the project is not carried out, the
taxes would be refunded to the beneficiaries of the project (P and R), in the
proportions 20% and 80% respectively, which cannot be altered.
Knowing which alternatives it faces, the Government can now ask itself
whether it is advisable to cany out the project in either of its two alternative
forms. The answer is obtained by comparing the situations with and without
the project for each of the alternatives. In the case of A}, P will receive an
additional income of 20 with the project, equal to what he would receive in
the situation without the project, and so he neither gains nor loses. In other
words the net additional income he obtains from the project is nil. R, on the
other hand, will receive an additional income of 90 with the project compared
with the 80 that he would receive without it, resulting in a net additional
income of 10. Alternative A j is therefore a strict Pareto improvement: R gains
10 without anybody losing. In the case of A2, the same reasoning shows us
that the net additional income of P is 70 whereas that of R is -60. This
alternative is a potential Pareto improvement because there is somebody who
loses (7?) but his loss can be compensated for (assuming that the cost of
compensation is nil) and thus even leave a gain for P of 10. To conclude,
based on the potential Pareto improvement criterion, both alternatives are
desirable and the Government decides to carry out the project in one of its two
alternatives, but it wishes to know which one. In answer to this second
question, there is no difference between the two alternatives because neither
of them is a PPI in relation to the other. In other words, both projects differ
only in the distribution of the additional income they generate. This means
that for this "economic" analysis
in which wp and wr are the valuations (implicit in the answer that there is no
difference between A, and A2) that the additional incomes of P and R receive
when the PPI criterion is applied. From this it follows that
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REACTION TO EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
or in other words, the additional income is considered equally valuable re-
gardless of who receives it. For this reason, cost-benefit analysis based on the
potential Pareto improvement criterion is not concerned with determining
who benefits from and who loses from a project, and provides for the pur-
poses of decision-making only the algebraic sum of the income changes
generated by the project (10 in the case of the example), the only result
required for the application of this criterion.
Clearly there is no change in the result if the same value judgment
(wp = w') is introduced at an earlier stage of the analysis. That will allow for
the net income (in comparison with the without project situation) that each
alternative provides for each person to be totalled. Then the ensuing totals for
each alternative can be compared. In this way the "net economic benefits" of
Al and A2 will be
1.5 The Reaction to Efficiency Analysis
Cost-benefit analysis in its "efficiency prices" version uses the PPI as the
criterion for quantifying changes in "social welfare". In this section, a sum-
mary of the various positions maintained in this regard will pave the way for
those topics that are dealt with in later chapters. For that purpose, the example
of alternatives A\ andA2 of project^, presented above, will be used, together
with an additional one summarized in Table 1.3. There, B{ and B2 are also
mutually exclusive alternatives for a project carried out by the Government,
which would be financed by imposing additional taxes on the beneficiaries P
and R for amounts of 20 and 80 respectively. In the situation without the
project such taxes would not be levied, from which we deduce that B, is a
strict Pareto improvement and B2 is a potential Pareto improvement, in both
cases compared with the project not being carried out.
The first position, supported only implicitly in most cases, recommends
using the distributional value judgment that attaches equal weights to the
marginal income variations of all persons.7 In other words, presenting the
results in the form of a single present value figure of net economic benefits
valued at efficiency prices (the Total column). It is enough to know that the
gainers receive more than enough to compensate the losers. In such cases,
there is no need to worry about who the beneficiaries (losers) are nor, as a
7. The distributional problems would be tackled through fiscal policy. This is the position
adopted by Harberger (1971b and 1973). However, see also Harberger (1978).
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PRINCIPLES AND DISTRIBUTIONAL VALUE JUDGMENTS
Table 1.3. Mutually Exclusive Alternatives for Project "B"
Alternative
0i
B2
B2C
Government
-100.0
-100.0
-100.0
p
25.0
15.0
25.0
R
85.0
96.0
85.9
Total
10.0
11.0
10.9
result, what their net benefit (loss) is. Thus, in the case of project B the
analyst would recommend that it be carried out, since both Bl and B2 are
potential Pareto improvements. He would however go a step further and
recommend that alternative B2 be carried out, since this represents a potential
Pareto improvement in relation to B1. To do this, in his report he would only
need to show the present value of the net economic benefits of both alterna-
tives. In the case of project A (Table 1.2) he would recommend that the
project be carried out and would say that both alternatives are equal from the
"economic" point of view. What is important to point out here is that even if
the analyst agreed with Harberger (1971b) that economists are not profession-
ally qualified to pronounce on the distributional aspects, he could not share
that author's opinion that the interpersonal sum of the present values of indi-
vidual CVs should be presented as the result of the analysis, since this would
imply precisely what he would be trying to avoid.
A second position suggests that the gainers and the losers be identified and
that the figure for the present value of changes in income, calculated the same
way as in the previous case, be given together with the respective distribution.
In this way, this distributional effect would not remain hidden behind a single
figure for the present value of the changes in net income. On the contrary, it
would represent additional information for decision makers.8 Thus, in the
case of project A, the analyst would present the results in a form similar to that
given in Table 1.2, indicating that the alternatives differ only in the distribu-
tion of the changes in income brought about between P and & In the case of
project B, the analyst would restrict himself to submitting the results of Table
1.3 without recommending one alternative over the other, but leaving open
the options of the decision maker to exercise distributional value judgments.
However, the reader must note that this procedure involves an infringement of
8. For example, Meade (1972) and Mishan (1982, Chapters 24 & 27, Section 2). However,
making distributional effects explicit does not allow us to concur with Mishan (1982, p. 164) that
"the quantitative outcome of a cost-benefit calculation (based on the PPI, author's note) itself
carries no distributional significance. It shows that the total of gains exceeds the total of losses, no
more." As pointed out at the beginning of the chapter, calculating "total gains" requires a value
judgment on which the aggregation criterion is based. Furthermore, given two situations without
the project, which differ only in income distribution, the total of CVs of a project will depend on
which of the two situations without the project is used as a basis for comparison.
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REACTION TO EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
the potential Pareto improvement criterion, since B2 is one of these in relation
to 5,.
A derivative of the position above, based on the principle of compensation
implied in the concept of potential Pareto improvement, goes a step further by
opening up the possibility for the project analyst to propose procedures that
make compensation effective in order to convert the project into a strict Pareto
improvement.9 In this way, the losers in both alternatives of project A (A\ and
A2) can be compensated and the choice will depend probably on the compen-
sation mechanism. In the case of project B, the analyst would recommend
carrying out alternative B2, but at the same time he could propose compensa-
tion mechanisms whose implementation costs would be less than 1. In other
words, open up the possibility that a strict Pareto improvement be carried out.
However, once again this means an infringement of the potential Pareto
improvement criterion each time that the cost of effecting compensation is
positive. In the case of project B, alternative B2 is recommended as a potential
Pareto improvement in relation to B,.
Let us now suppose that an exact compensation procedure is proposed
whose cost is 0.10, with this alternative being indicated by B2C in Table
1.3.Then it is necessary for^? to transfer 10.1, of which 10 is used to compen-
sate P and 0.1 to cover the costs of compensation. Since the potential Pareto
improvement criterion does not require compensation to be made, B2 is one of
these improvements in relation to B2C. In addition, it must be noted that there
is no reason why compensation for the losers (P) should be exact (10), since
one or more "over-compensation" mechanisms could also be proposed and
two or more B2C{ obtained, each one of which would be an SPI whenever the
cost of compensation was less than 1. Once again, it is impossible to avoid
bringing distributional value judgments into: a) the definition of the compen-
sation mechanisms; and b) the choice between PPIs and compensated PPIs. In
a later work, Hicks (1975, Section 1) appears inclined to restrict the choice set
to all the SPI and the compensated PPI which does not, as already mentioned,
avoid distributional value judgments either. All this is without even consider-
ing the possibility of discussing redistribution mechanisms within SPIs.
In summary, it is not generally possible to effect a single ordering of
alternatives without introducing distributional value judgments, among which
is included "I don't care what happens with distribution." What has been
presented so far has led to the discussion of ways of explicitly including
distributional value judgments in, inter alia, the field of cost-benefit analysis.
Two of the best known ones will be presented here with the discussion being
limited to project appraisal.
9. Hicks (1939, Section 7) and Mishan (1982, Chapter 27, Section 2).
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PRINCIPLES AND DISTRIBUTIONAL VALUE JUDGMENTS
The first approach within this second group proposes that either of the
previous two be used, together with the task of identifying and explaining the
value judgments revealed by the political authority in making decisions.10 If
between At and A2 the second were chosen, it would be inferred that
meaning that wp > wr and consequently wp/wr > 1. If then fi, and B2 were
considered and B2 were chosen, it could be inferred that
meaning that llw r > lOvv^ and consequently wp/wr < 1.1. In other words,
and assuming that the decision had been taken for distributional reasons, after
considering these two projects, the analyst would know that one additional
unit of income for P is more valuable than for/?, but not by more than 10%. If
the political authority is consistent in its distributional value judgments, after
a number of decisions—not too many—the interval in which wp/wr would lie
would have narrowed enough for all practical purposes to around a certain
number u. From then on, the value found in this way could be used by the
analyst, who would simply report the value of the net economic benefits
calculated for wp/wr = u.
Finally, a welfare function W could be made explicit, depending on the
utility functions of P and R,
in which C is the person's level of consumption, or, directly on individual
consumption, W = f(Cr; Cp). In this way it would be possible to define how
much "social welfare" increases by, when small changes occur in the income
of each person or group of persons:
From this the values u = wp/wr would be extracted, which the analyst would
use, then proceeding just as in the previous case."
10. See Weisbrod (1968), UNIDO (1972) and critiques by Stewart (1975) and Kornai (1979).
11. For example, Little and Mirrlees (1974), Squire and van der Tak (1977) and Lai (1980).
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SUMMARY
1.6 Summary
At the beginning of this chapter, we suggested that efficiency analysis is based
on a distributional value judgment that can be summarized as follows: an
additional unit of income is equally valuable whatever the income level of the
beneficiary. By using simple examples of the distribution of costs and benefits
of hypothetical projects, it has proved possible to demonstrate this, and also to
show, though only in outline form, the most widespread alternative criteria.
In Part III we shall return to the topic of distributional value judgments that
are different from the one that assigns the same weights to the marginal
income changes of all persons.
What is of interest to point out, is that all the alternatives to efficiency
analysis require that the distribution of the income changes brought about by
the project in question be estimated. This estimate is based on the principles
of economic valuation used in cost-benefit analysis. In the following chapters
the reasoning on which this valuation process is based will be discussed in
some detail, with particular attention to those topics that are more often
neglected in texts on efficiency analysis.
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CHAPTER 2
COMPENSATING VARIATION,
CONSUMER SURPLUS CHANGE
AND WILLINGNESS TO PAY
2.1 Compensating and Equivalent Variations
Cost-benefit analysis sees investment as a way to increase future consump-
tion, which raises the problem of how to measure changes in the "economic
welfare" of individuals as a result of changes in their consumption of goods
and services. In this sense, the objective of this chapter is to answer the
following questions: (a) how does "welfare economics" go about obtaining a
monetary measure of the changes in individual economic welfare; (b) in the
case of changes in the prices of goods and services, what is the relation
between such a measure and the demand functions for such goods and serv-
ices; and (c) what is the relationship between the distributional value judg-
ment of efficiency analysis and the use of willingness to pay as a valuation
criteria?
From an analytical point of view, changes in the consumption of goods and
services by an individual may originate in the following situations or combi-
nations of situations: i) changes in the availability of goods that are received
20
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COMPENSATING AND EQUIVALENT VARIATIONS
free; ii) changes in monetary income for given prices; or iii) changes in prices
for a given monetary income. If we wish to obtain a measure of the changes in
a consumer's welfare brought about by any of the three alternatives, we have
to have a measuring criterion. For this purpose, "welfare economics" pro-
vides two alternative measuring criteria; the compensating variation and the
equivalent variation. The first criterion considers the situation resulting after
the change has taken place in order to ask the following question: how much
does the consumer's monetary income need to be changed by for him to be at
the same level of welfare as before the change whose contribution to his
economic welfare we want to measure? The answer to this question is a
certain sum of money called the compensating variation of the change con-
cerned, and it is used as the monetary measure of the change in his economic
welfare. Thus, for example, the consumer will increase his level of welfare by
obtaining free access to a park. The compensating variation of such access
will be the reduction in his monetary income required to cancel (compensate)
the increase in his welfare resulting from access to the park. This reduction in
his income will be regarded as the monetary measure of the increase in his
economic welfare resulting from free access to the park.
The second criterion, the equivalent variation, considers the situation be-
fore the change whose contribution to economic welfare we wish to measure
in order to ask the following question: how much would the consumer's
monetary income need to be altered by in order to bring about a change in his
economic welfare equivalent to what would result from the change whose
contribution to his economic welfare we want to measure? The sum of money
that corresponds to the former question is the so-called equivalent variation of
the change whose contribution to the welfare of the consumer we want to
measure. In the example of access to the park, the equivalent variation of such
access will be the sum of money necessary to give the consumer in order for
him, starting from an initial situation without access to the park, to have the
same level of welfare as he would have without that sum but with access to the
park.
If the change in question is an increase in monetary income (which does not
affect relative prices) the problem is simpler. If a person receives a transfer of
$100, the corresponding compensating variation is obviously equal to $100.
At the same time, by definition, the equivalent variation of such a transfer is
also $100.
The situation is not as simple when price changes are involved. In this case
measuring the compensating and equivalent variations is based on the as-
sumptions of the consumer equilibrium theory. Let us consider the consumer's
map of indifference curves between good q and all the other goods. If the
relative prices between the goods excluding q are not affected by changes in
the price pi of the latter, the remaining goods can be dealt with as a single
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CV, CONSUMER SURPLUS AND WILLINGNESS TO PAY
commodity m.' Figure 2.1 (a) illustrates this indifference curves map and the
initial budgetary constraint
represented by the line m0A', so that his monetary income is
With monetary income yo and the existing relative prices, the consumer will
be situated at point A', consuming q0 units of q at price p^. Consequently, this
point is situated on his demand function for q as shown in Figure 2.1(b). If
now the price of q is reduced to p\ the consumer will be situated at point B'',
consuming q{. If we wish to obtain a monetary measure of the increase
£7, - U0 in the consumer's welfare, the following question can be asked: after
the reduction in pq, how much would the consumer's income need to be
reduced by to cancel out the increase £/, — C/0 in his welfare? This reduction
in his income is his compensating variation of the price reduction p\ — p\,
Thus, in Figure 2. l(a), if his income is reduced to
the consumer will be at point C' with the same level of welfare as before the
price reduction. It can be shown that the compensating variation Yc is approxi-
mately equal to the change in the consumer's surplus measured over the
demand function Dy in Figure 2.1 (b) ,2 that is
A second possible measure of the increase in welfare Ut — U0 of the
consumer due to the reduction in pq could be made by asking the following
question: if the reduction in pq were not made, how much would the con-
sumer's income need to be increased by to achieve an equivalent effect? This
increase is called the equivalent variation (Ye) to the reduction p\ — p\ and is
represented in Figure 2. l(a) by the quantity
1. See Hicks (1946, Chapter II, Section 4).
2. See demonstration in Appendix A.
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Figure 2.1. Compensating and Equivalent Variations
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CV, CONSUMER SURPLUS AND WILLINGNESS TO PAY
Table 2.1. Relationship between the Compensating and
Equivalent Variations for a Given Change in Price
Price increase
Price reduction
£qy>0
YS<YC
Ye>Yc
EQV = 0
Y — Y
>s — 'c
Y — Y
's — 'c
Ev<0
Ye>Yc
Ye<Yc
of basket of goods m, from which
It can be demonstrated that Ye is also approximately equal to the change in the
consumer surplus over the demand function in Figure 2. l(b), that is
In general, Yc will be different from Ye and the sign and the size of the
difference will depend on: (a) whether there is a reduction or increase in the
price; and (b) the income elasticity of demand E^ of the good whose price
varies (see Table 2.1).
To summarize, given a price change pQ — p\, the CV criterion will in
general give a different measure than that of the equivalent variation (EV) and
the change in the consumer surplus is only an approximate measure of them.
Consequently, two problems arise. The first is which of the two measures, CV
or EV, should be used. The second, is what the error involved is in using the
change in the consumer surplus as an approximation of the measure chosen.
The first problem goes beyond the objectives of this study and consequently
will not be discussed. Suffice it to say that the prevailing criterion is the use of
the CV as a measure of changes in economic welfare.3 As for the second
problem, Appendix A demonstrates that the change in consumer surplus
deriving from a change in the price of a good is, from a practical point of
view, a good approximation of the respective CV.
2.2 The Aggregation of Compensating Variations and the Concept of
Willingness to Pay
From here on, we will consider that, for all practical purposes, the compensat-
ing variation of the change in the price of consumer good q can be measured
by the area between the two prices and the respective individual demand
3. The interested reader may consult Meade (1972), Mishan (1982, Chapters 23-26) and the
references therein.
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WILLINGNESS TO PAY
function (area p\AEp\ in Figure 2.1(b)). However, in practice, cost-benefit
analysis is carried out in relation to the market demand functions, which are
the "horizontal" aggregation of individual demand functions. In Figure 2.2,
Dr is the demand function of R for consumer good q and Dr+p is the aggregate
demand function of R and P. When the price is p0, R consumes <fQ and P, by
construction of the aggregate demand function, consumes
When the price is reduced to pl, R increases his consumption to q\ and P to
since by construction of the aggregate demand function, q\+p is the sum of the
quantities demanded by both consumers at price p}. The change in the con-
sumers' (of q) surplus can be estimated as
Regrouping the terms in convenient form, we arrive at
Figure 2.2. The Aggregate Demand Function
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CV, CONSUMER SURPLUS AND WILLINGNESS TO PAY
But since qr and qp are both points on the individual demand functions, the
first two terms on the right-hand side of the previous equation correspond to
the estimate of the CV of R and the second two, to that of P. As a result, it
may be stated that
ACSs = CVT + CVP
The change in the consumers' surplus of q resulting from a price change is
(approximately) equal to the sum of the corresponding compensating vari-
ations. In other words, if after price reduction p0 — p\ the income of R is
reduced by CV and that of P by CV, with their new incomes Yl - CV'
(i = r,p) both consumers will be in the same situation as before the price
reduction.
However, these are not all the changes that have taken place. As a conse-
quence of the reduction in the price of q, the incomes of other people have
also been affected and their respective CVs also have to be considered.
Suppose for the sake of simplicity that the supply of consumer good q is
completely inelastic (fixed supply)4 and that the reduction in the price of q is
due to the increase in an import quota granted entirely to businessman h, that
is, with reference to Figure 2.2
Consequently, businessman h will receive additional income from the sale of
Aqh equal to ^ qhpl whereas each businessman./ who sells q (including H) will
see his income reduced by Ap q^. Logically,
the sum of the quantities sold by each businessman is equal to the total
quantity sold and, consequently, the reduction in the income of the remaining
businessmen will be
Table 2.2 outlines the effects on the only two groups affected in this simpli-
fied example: the businessmen and the consumers. The total in the first
4. For example, a tax-free import quota that the Government sells at cost price. This avoids
taking into consideration changes in income beyond the businessmen who sell q.
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WILLINGNESS TO PAY
Table 2.2. Effects of an Increase in the Quota of q
Sale of Aq
Price Reduction
Total
Businessman
h
A<7"pi
-A/J(7g
CV
Businessman
J*h
-Apq'0
CVi
Consumer
/
;Afltop
ApQ'o
CV
column shows the change in the income of businessman h (excluding the
purchase of A#) and the total in the second shows the reduction in the income
of each of the remaining businessmen. By definition, such totals are also the
CVs of the businessmen (CVj) corresponding to the additional supply A<?.
Finally, the total in the last column is the CV of consumer i (CV). Now since
the CV is the criterion chosen to "measure" the changes in people's economic
welfare, the totals in the columns show the changes in the economic welfare
of each one of those affected by the sale of Aq units. If now we want to obtain
a measure of the change in "total economic welfare" starting from the
changes in "economic welfare" of each of those affected, an interpersonal
aggregation criterion obviously has to be defined that shows the change in
total welfare as a function of changes in the economic welfare of the individ-
uals, so that
change in "total welfare" = f(CV'; O")
If the interpersonal aggregation criterion is the sum of the CVs of those
affected, it is obvious that one unit of change in the income of any of them has
the same value, which without any doubt constitutes a value judgment by
whoever bases the decision on that criterion. Applying this criterion to the
example of Table 2.2 yields
But as the additional sales are equal to the additional purchases
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CV, CONSUMER SURPLUS AND WILLINGNESS TO PAY
and the original sales are equal to the original purchases
The right-hand side of this equality is the willingness to pay for Aqh which,
according to the criterion chosen, is the contribution to "total welfare" result-
ing from the sale of Aqh and is by definition the value at efficiency prices of
that quantity.5
However, the advocates of the "new welfare economics" would argue that
the sum of the CVs does not aim to obtain a measure of the change in "total
welfare" but is merely the procedure for bringing into operation the criterion
of the potential Pareto improvement (PPI) discussed in Chapter 1. Let us
assume that the sum of the CVs from increasing the supply of q is
and that the same resources can be used to increase the quota of another
commodity k, so that
As a result, it will be possible to reduce the income of the beneficiaries from
Aq by $100, transfer this sum to those who no longer benefit from Afc and then
even be left with a net benefit of
However, the fact that compensation is possible does not mean that it is
effected and no conclusion can be drawn from the application of the PPI
without introducing a distributional value judgment. It would therefore be
necessary to show how much those affected gain and lose, which would only
move the point at which the value judgment is made. This in turn could make
5. See Appendix B for a demonstration from a "utilitarian" point of view.
28
it follows that
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 b
y 
th
e 
In
te
r-
A
m
er
ic
an
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t B
an
k.
 A
ll 
ri
gh
ts
 r
es
er
ve
d.
Fo
r 
m
or
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
vi
si
t o
ur
 w
eb
si
te
: w
w
w
.ia
db
.o
rg
/p
ub
WILLINGNESS TO PAY
desirable, projects that do not meet the PPI criterion, when the weight for the
income changes of the losers is greater than that of the gainers. Only if the
weights of all those affected are equal, does the indicator of changes in the
resulting "total welfare," in the sense given to this expression in Section 1.1,
show the same result as the PPI criterion.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ACCOUNTING PRICE
OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
3.1 Accounting Prices and Efficiency Prices
Starting from an equilibrium position or without project situation, the project
will generate changes in the supply and demand of goods and services whose
effects on people will be measured by means of the corresponding CVs. The
value at accounting prices of supply (demand) change Aq at a certain time t,
will be equal to £( u\ CV't(Aq), i.e., the interpersonal aggregation of the CVs
attributable to supply change Aq. The accounting price of good q will be the
value at accounting prices of a unitary supply (demand) change. Although
from a theoretical point of view, the value at accounting prices of a certain
supply change Aq expressed per unit of the latter is distinct from the value at
accounting prices of a unitary supply change, i.e.,
in practice, for a "small" Aq its value at accounting prices approximates Aq
multiplied by its accounting price. In terms of the notation used,
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ACCOUNTING AND EFFICIENCY PRICES
When the distributional value judgment permitting interpersonal aggrega-
tion assigns the same weight to the marginal income changes of all persons,
an accounting price is expressed at efficiency level or, more concisely, is an
"efficiency price". Consequently, the concept of accounting price is more
general than that of efficiency price. The change in "total economic welfare"
per unit of change in the good or service in question is referred to without
specifying the interpersonal aggregation criterion used. Since the most wide-
spread operational version of cost-benefit analysis is that of efficiency prices,
assuming equality between the discount rate and the rate of return at effi-
ciency prices of marginal investments, the specialists usually use the expres-
sion accounting (or shadow) price of foreign exchange when they in fact refer
to its efficiency price. In this study, this imprecision in the use of language
will continue to be used.
This chapter is devoted to deducing the most widespread expression for the
accounting (efficiency) price of foreign exchange. For this purpose, the same
sequence of steps will be followed as in theoretical reasoning. Thus once
supply or demand changes and their immediate effects have been identified,
the latter will be followed to the point at which they affect persons so that
these effects can then be quantified by means of the corresponding CVs.
Only when this process has been completed, will the interpersonal aggrega-
tion criterion of efficiency analysis be introduced in order to obtain a quanti-
fiable expression for the accounting (efficiency) price of foreign exchange.
This will make it possible to clarify the relation between the concept of
compensating variation, the verification that the potential compensation crite-
rion has been fulfilled and the use of willingness to pay as a valuation crite-
rion in efficiency analysis.
equilibrium exchange rate. That is why it is necessary to digress briefly on
what is meant by "equilibrium" before going into further detail. An appropri-
ate start would be to consider which market prices should be used when
preparing a project's final financial flows: the prevailing prices at a given time
(short run), or those that reflect long-run conditions. When a project is pre-
pared, the execution starting date is unknown. Taking that into account and
considering that the project's flows will be spread over several years, it is
advisable to value the financial flows at long-run prices, separately consider-
ing the relevant short-run effects. Consequently, the project's input and output
prices will generally reflect the long-run prices of primary inputs such as
foreign exchange and labor.
In a cost benefit analysis, it is also interesting to know whether the project
represents a "total welfare improvement" under long-run equilibrium condi-
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ACCOUNTING PRICE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
dons and, if necessary, to consider separately short-run conditions that may
affect the final results (as, for example, short-run unemployment). Therefore,
when any further mention is made of the equilibrium exchange rate, this must
be interpreted as a long-run one. However, the exchange rate must be defined
for a given set of foreign trade incentives and disincentives (and interest rates)
because if these change, the long-run equilibrium exchange rate will also
change. From here on, the expression "equilibrium exchange rate" refers to
the long-run one, for a given set of foreign trade incentives and disincentives
(and interest rates), therefore the accounting price of foreign exchange will
also refer to these conditions. These considerations are implied in the follow-
ing chapters.
3.2 A Simple Example
Consider an investment project that increases the supply of foreign exchange
by increasing exports, which are not subject to any foreign trade tax. To begin
with a simple example, which will gradually become more complicated, let us
initially assume that the supply of foreign exchange (exports) is completely
inelastic with respect to price, that the exchange rate is determined by the
market, that only final consumer goods are imported and that these goods are
not produced domestically. The assumption of a fixed supply of foreign
exchange will be abandoned in Section 3.5 and imported goods that compete
with domestic production will be considered in Section 3.6. Thus, in Figure
3.1, SQ is the foreign exchange supply in the situation without the project, S, is
that supply in the situation with the project and D is the demand for foreign
Figure 3.1. The Foreign Exchange Market
foreign exchange
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A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
exchange. This is used to import consumer goods a and b, which are not
produced domestically, at international prices expressed in foreign exchange
CIFa and CIFb.
Assuming that the domestic transport and trade margins are nil, the domes-
tic prices of such goods in the situation without the project will be
in which EER0 is the equilibrium exchange rate and ?; is the (ad valorem)
import tariff. Since the adjustment to the additional supply of foreign ex-
change will be made by means of a reduction in the (long term) equilibrium
exchange rate to EER}, the domestic prices of a and b will be reduced to:
in which it is supposed that the international prices C/F, are constant in
relation to small variations in the domestic demand of a country.
The compensating variation of the reduction in the price of the goods
imported can be approximated by the increase in consumers' surplus (ACS),
equal to the sum of the shaded areas in Figure 3.2(a) and (b). These areas can
be approximated linearly as1
that is, the reduction in the domestic value of the quantity that they consumed
before the reduction in the exchange rate, plus their willingness to pay for
additional consumption less what they actually pay for this consumption. It
will now be useful to analyze each of the terms ACS is comprised of. Substi-
tuting the expressions [3.1] and [3.2] in the first term of expressions [3.3]
yields the following:
1. Henceforth, to simplify the presentation, the areas below demand functions will always be
approximated linearly.
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ACCOUNTING PRICE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
Figure 3.2. The Effects of an Increase in the Supply of Foreign
Exchange on the Markets of Imported Goods
In turn, each of the above expressions can be broken down into two parts. The
first is the reduction in Government revenue—by way of receipts from the
import tariffs corresponding to imports in the situation without the project—
because of the reduction in the EER:
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A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
The second part is the reduction in the exporters' revenue from the sale of
the same quantity of foreign exchange (S0 in Figure 3.1) at a lower exchange
rate:
The second term of expression [3.3] is willingness to pay for the additional
quantity of goods a and b, which expresses the maximum quantity of other
goods that the consumers would be prepared to forgo rather than do without
such quantities. In this sense, this is not an actual income flow but a measure
of income equivalent to such quantities. Finally, what is paid by the con-
sumers for additional consumption
can be broken down by replacing the prices by expressions [3.2]. From this
we see that what the consumers pay is equal to what the project receives from
the sale of foreign exchange S\ — So generated by exports, equal to the value
of the additional imports before taxes
plus the increase in receipts from import tariffs by the Government
A summary of the direct effects of the additional supply of foreign exchange
appears in Table 3.1.
It is now possible to interpret the information contained in this table from
two points of view: (a) that of the potential compensation criterion; and (b)
that of the distributional value judgment assigning equal weights to all income
changes. From the perspective of the potential compensation criterion, what
we want to know is whether the additional income (effective or equivalent)
received by those who benefit is sufficient to compensate the losers and leave
a remainder. To do this, it is necessary to examine the table column by
column. The first contains the sum of the CVs of the consumers benefiting
from the effect of the greater supply of foreign exchange on consumer goods
prices, an effect that, strictly speaking, ought to be subdivided into one
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A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
column for each consumer.2 In other words, the total in the first column is the
reduction in the income of the consumers, which would leave them at the
same level of welfare as before the increase in the supply of foreign exchange
(fall in the price of consumer goods). The second column records the project's
revenue from the sale of exported goods. As the excess supply of foreign
exchange causes a reduction in the EER, the remaining exporters see their
incomes reduced by the extent shown in the third column. The fourth column
shows the changes in tax revenue brought about by the project. Although the
sign of the net effect on the Government is not defined, we will assume that it
is positive.3
Consequently, there are three groups of gainers (the consumers, the project
and the Government) whose additional income must be enough to compensate
the losers (exporters) and leave a remainder to compensate the loss implicit in
the project costs, which are not shown in Table 3.1. As can be seen in this
table, the balance in question is the willingness to pay for the consumption
made possible by the increase in the supply of foreign exchange. This sum is
the income remaining after the (potential) compensation of those affected by
the increase in the supply of foreign exchange, available to compensate those
who are net losers as a result of the project costs. Thus, valuing the additional
foreign exchange according to willingness to pay for the consumption which it
makes possible ensures that the potential compensation criterion is complied
with for those affected by the additional supply of foreign exchange. Since
the compensation is only potential, this valuation is all that is required by the
application of the potential Pareto improvement criterion.
The same result can be achieved by assigning the same weight to all mar-
ginal income changes. In fact, this value judgment allows the columns in
Table 3.1 to be added up horizontally. Thus, for example, in the first row, the
gain by consumers is equal to the loss of the remaining exporters and the
Government. As a result, the respective net effect on total welfare is nil. The
net result of the horizontal sum of the columns is willingness to pay for the
consumption made possible by the increase in the foreign exchange supply.
We may therefore conclude that both from the point of view of the potential
Pareto improvement criterion and from that of "efficiency analysis," the
accounting price of foreign exchange is as follows:
Willingness to pay for the consumption made possible
A RET by the additional foreign exchange (Si - S0)ArrtL =
Additional foreign exchange (S\ — 50)
2. The reader will recall that to add CVs, judgments are required concerning the "value" of
changes in income for each consumer affected.
3. This is consistent with the approximation EER0 = EER\ which will be incorporated in the
analysis later (see expressions [3.8] and [3.9]).
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ACCOUNTING PRICE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
The fact that both approaches yield the same result is not surprising. In
Chapter 1, we saw that both are based on the same distributional value
judgment.
What has been explained so far enables us to write a simple formula for the
accounting price of foreign exchange when the exchange rate adjusts the
supply and demand of foreign exchange. In the simple example explained up
to now, expression [3.3] shows that the sum of the compensating variations of
the additional supply of foreign exchange will be the sum of the willingness to
pay of each individual consumer for the additional consumption made possible.
Now defining
and substituting [3.1] in [3.4] we obtain
By rearranging the terms, the above expressions can be reduced to
and the accounting price of foreign exchange will be
But as foreign exchange S, - S0 is used entirely to import quantities Aa and
Afc,
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A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
Substituting [3.5] and [3.7] in [3.6] the accounting price of foreign exchange
will be
If now we consider that normally the increase in the supply of foreign ex-
change generated by a project has a minimum influence on the exchange rate,
we can say that for all practical purposes,
and expression [3.8] can be written as
However, the formula for the APFE is normally expressed as the relation
between this accounting price and its market price (the HER). By calling this
relation the accounting price ratio of foreign exchange (APRFE) we obtain
Generalizing expression [3.10] for n imported consumer goods m, we obtain
in which
is the share of each good / in additional imports. It should be pointed out that
the weights <p{ refer to the additional imports generated exclusively by the
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ACCOUNTING PRICE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
change in the exchange rate brought about by the increase in the supply of
foreign exchange.4 Consequently, they cannot be estimated by simply com-
paring the lists of imports between two periods since the Aw, thus observed
incorporate the effect of income changes.
The reader will recognize the expression [3.11] as the traditional formula
for the APRFE as presented in UNIDO (1972) or Harberger (1973), except
that in these two works (1 + ?,) is replaced by a more general expression in
order to allow for other forms of protection to be included such as an import
quota, sold at a domestic price determined by the market and which will be
expanded in accordance with the increase in the supply of foreign exchange.
If, for example, imports were subject to a domestic "sales" tax of -tj, the
formula for the foreign exchange accounting price ratio would be
Elsewhere, the same expression [3.11] is shown in terms of the price elasticity
of the demand functions of imported goods.
3.3 Income Transfers Generated by an Additional Supply of Exports
The simple example developed so far also enables us to present the income
transfers generated by the additional supply of exports. The identification and
quantification of these transfers, as will be seen later, is an important part of
estimating the distribution of the income changes generated by a project. To
do this, it is useful to begin with the direct effects of the increase in the
supply of foreign exchange presented in Table 3.1. This will allow us to
explain a series of assumptions implied in the subsequent analysis.
We have already mentioned that, for practical purposes, the effect of the
change in the supply of foreign exchange on the HER is assumed to be small
enough to be ignored. Thus,
4. This is how Aa and A& were defined in Figure 3.2. Strictly speaking, the weights will be:
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INCOME TRANSFERS
and the values corresponding to the first line of Table 3.1 will be nil. But if
this is the case, from [3.1] and [3.2] it follows that
and consequently consumers' willingness to pay will be estimated simply as
From this it follows that the difference between consumers' willingness to pay
and what is actually paid for the consumption that additional foreign exchange
makes possible will be nil. To summarize, the only effect considered is the
value of additional consumption, equal to the total income from the project
plus the change in the Government's receipts from foreign trade taxes. Since
the Government will not in practice alter its foreign trade tax policy as a result
of a marginal increase in receipts, this will result in (most likely) an increase
in expenditure, a reduction in the deficit, or (least likely) a reduction in other
taxes, all of which will affect people's economic welfare.5
We can now give an example of the transfers caused by an increase in the
supply of foreign exchange. Let us suppose that the project concerned gener-
ates exports (foreign exchange) whose value in the national currency is $100,6
and that this foreign exchange is used to import $60 worth of additional units
of a and $40 worth of additional units of b so that
Furthermore, assume that ta = 0.10 and 4 = 0.20, from which
in which the total shows the sum of the compensating variations of the $100 of
foreign exchange. Consequently (see Table 3.2), what is income of $100 for
the project is additional consumption of $114 for the economy as a whole and
the difference is the $14 of additional taxes received by the Government.
Logically, the accounting price ratio of foreign exchange is equal to 1.14.
The assumptions made in order to present this simple example will be the
5. These effects will not be discussed for the time being.
6. Henceforth the $ sign will always be used to refer to the national currency.
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ACCOUNTING PRICE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
Table 3.2. Valuation at Efficiency Prices of Additional Exports, in
Consumptjon Units
Economic
Project Government Valuation
Exports 100 14 114
same as those implied in the analyses given in subsequent chapters, where
they will not be repeated. Later in this chapter, we introduce the import of
intermediate goods, exports and the domestic production of imports, none of
which alters what has been stated so far.
By the end of this chapter, the reader will realize that the difference between
$100 and $100 X APRFE is explained, under the assumptions presented in
this chapter, by the additional taxes for the import of consumer and intermedi-
ate goods, less the taxes lost through the reduction in exports plus the subsi-
dies saved through this reduction. The corresponding numerical example is
left for the reader.
3.4 The Accounting Price of Foreign Exchange When Intermediate
Goods Are Imported
The simple example in Section 3.2 enabled us to present the derivation of the
accounting price of foreign exchange in a direct and uncomplicated way, since
we assumed that only consumer goods were imported. In this case, the sum of
the CVs of the additional supply of foreign exchange can be calculated di-
rectly according to consumers' willingness to pay. When the import of inter-
mediate goods (which are not produced domestically) is introduced, valuation
is indirect through consumers' willingness to pay for the consumer goods that
can be produced with these intermediate goods. According to the neo-classi-
cal formulation, under perfect competition, the demand function for an inter-
mediate input (Db in Figure 3.2(b)) will be a reasonable approximation of the
value of the marginal product of that input, i.e. of the additional quantity that
can be obtained from the good in whose production the input is used per
additional unit of the input when the quantity of all the other inputs remains
constant, the additional quantity of product being valued at its market price.7
Thus, the market price of b will be
7. See Ferguson and Gould (1975) for an explanation of why it would only be an approxima-
tion.
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IMPORTED INTERMEDIATE GOODS
in which c is the consumer good in the production of which input b comes in.
Under these circumstances, substituting [3.13] in [3.4] yields
and we see that the willingness to pay for quantity A& of the imported input
would be equal to the willingness to pay for the additional consumption that it
makes possible. Thus the formulas [3.11] or [3.12] for calculating the
APRFE can be extended to the case of intermediate goods. By a similar
process, again under conditions of perfect competition, this reasoning can be
extended to "capital goods".
In the case of intermediate goods, it may not be enough to suppose that
demand for the imported input is equal to the value of the marginal product,
since the latter assumes that the quantities of all the other inputs used remain
constant. If the quantities of the remaining inputs were also to change, will-
ingness to pay for intermediate good b could be expressed as
that is, as willingness to pay for the change in the consumption of good c in
the production of which it is used, less the value at market prices of the
change in the quantities used of the remaining inputs (2 Ag,c/?,), i.e. exclud-
ing input b. If the (constant) market prices of the remaining inputs (/?,) can be
accepted as reasonable approximations of the respective efficiency prices,
willingness to pay for A& will adequately reflect the sum of the CVs of Ab and
the formula [3.11] or [3.12] for the APRFE will continue to be valid.
3.5 The Accounting Price of Foreign Exchange When Exports Are
Taken into Account
In previous sections, it was assumed that the supply of foreign exchange
(exports) was completely inelastic with respect to (small) variations in the
exchange rate. However, this was only for the sake of simplification. In
general, the supply of exports will be an increasing function of the exchange
rate (Figure 3.3), reflecting the price elasticity of both domestic supply and
demand of the goods exported.
Let us consider first the case in which only consumer goods are exported.
The project under consideration will increase the supply of foreign exchange
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ACCOUNTING PRICE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
Figure 3.3. The Effects of an Increase in the Supply of
Foreign Exchange
by d\ — ds, of which only d\ — do will be additional net availability, whereas
d0 — ds will replace the supply of other producers who will reduce their sales
abroad because of the reduction in the exchange rate from EER0 to EER\. The
additional net supply d\ — d0 will allow for additional imports of the same
magnitude to be made and the sum of CVs per additional unit of foreign
exchange can be calculated, for example, as
bearing in mind that the weights <PI have to be calculated with respect to the
project's additional supply of foreign exchange. In algebraic form, the
weights will be
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EXPORTS
that is, the GIF value of the additional imports of good / as a proportion of the
additional foreign exchange produced by the project.
To arrive at the sum of the CVs of foreign exchange d0 - ds, it is necessary
to turn to the markets of the only two export (and domestic consumption)
goods e and h. Let us suppose that e is the good whose production increases,
and that the firm will export all its additional production. Figure 3.4(a) and
(b) show the long-term equilibrium positions in the markets of e and h. In
Figure 3.4(a) it can be seen that additional production e, - e\ will increase the
net supply of the exports of e by
since due to the effect on the exchange rate, it will replace other sources by
ef> - e\ and increase domestic consumption (reduce the exports of other
producers) by ef - e$. If the domestic prices of the resources released by the
reduction es$ - e\ are acceptable approximations of their efficiency prices (in
the consumption numeraire), the sum of the CVs in the market of e will be the
willingness to pay for additional consumption
[3.17]
plus the value at efficiency prices of the resources released
[3.18]
In the market of h, Figure 3.4(b), the reduction in the equilibrium exchange
rate will reduce the domestic price, increasing consumption by a total value of
[3.19]
and, on the assumption that the domestic market price of the good exported is
equal to its long-run marginal cost at efficiency prices,8 it will release re-
sources by
[3.20]
Consequently, the foreign exchange produced by the project will be
8. If the assumption were not acceptable, the APRFE could be calculated by using input-
output techniques through a process similar to that described in Chapter 13. See Londero (1994).
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ACCOUNTING PRICE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
Figure 3.4. The Effects of the Reduction in the Exchange Rate
on the Market for Exported Goods
in which FOBe is the f.o.b. price expressed in foreign exchange. This is
partially compensated by the reduction in exports from other producers for a
total of
FOBe [(4 - <?|) + (el - 4)] + FOBh ((hs0 - h\) + (hd{ - hd0)]
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EXPORTS
and the difference between both quantities of foreign exchange is used to
increase imports, i.e.
I
To summarize, from [3.17] and [3.18] we can see that the value of additional
consumption in the market of e will be
[3.21]
and, from [3.19] and [3.20], that in the market of h will be
[3.22]
Following the same procedure as in the case of imports, and assuming again
that the domestic transport and trade margins are nil, we can express the
domestic prices of the two exported consumer goods as
[3.23]
[3.24]
in which FOBi and tt (i = e, h) are the FOB prices in foreign exchange and the
export tax rates, respectively.9 Substituting [3.23] and [3.24] in [3.21] and
[3.22] we get
[3.25]
Since for small changes in the supply of foreign exchange
9. Export incentives, such as drawbacks or credits at interest rates lower than the discount rate,
will be treated as "negative" taxes.
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ACCOUNTING PRICE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
expressions [3.25] can be written as
[3.26]
As a result, the value of the additional consumption made possible by the
increase in the supply of foreign exchange d\ — ds would be equal to:
(a) that resulting from additional imports for an amount in foreign exchange
equal to d} — d0, whose value, according to the example in Section 3.2,
will be
(b) that resulting from the increase in the domestic consumption of exported
goods, the value of which, according to expressions [3.26], will be
(c) the value of the resources made available for the additional production of
other goods, because of the reduction in the production of export goods
The increase in the supply of foreign exchange produced by the project being
analyzed will consist of:
(a) the net addition to foreign exchange availability (d\ - d0), which is used
entirely for additional imports; and
(b) the reduction in exports from other producers due to the increase in the
domestic quantity demanded (&ed and Ahd) and the reduction in domestic
production (Ae5 and Ahs)
Consequently, since the APFE has been defined as the sum of the CVs of the
additional supply of foreign exchange per unit thereof, and in keeping with
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EXPORTS
the assumptions already mentioned, this sum of CVs will be equal to total
willingness to pay plus the value of the resources released, expression [3.6]
can be redefined as
and calculated in accordance with expressions [3.9] and [3.26]. Defining
CIFi Am, as the increase in the value of the imports of good i per additional
unit of foreign exchange d\ — ds produced by the project and FOBj AJC,- as the
reduction in the value of the exports of goody per unit of d\ — ds, the APFE
will be
[3.27]
Finally, since the accounting price ratio of foreign exchange has been defined
as
defining
[3.28]
[3.29]
and substituting [3.28] and [3.29] in [3.27], the APRFE can be presented as
[3.30]
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ACCOUNTING PRICE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
In other words, the APRFE is a weighted average of one plus ad valorem
foreign trade taxes rates (or its equivalent for other types of restrictions or
incentives) in which the weights represent the share of the change in the
value of the imports or exports of each good, in the supply change generated.
If imports and exports were also subject to domestic taxes ft and tj, respec-
tively, the equivalent of [3.30] would be
If the change in exports includes intermediate or capital goods, expressions
[3.30] and [3.31] will continue to be valid if:
(a) we can assume that domestic demand for such goods is a good approxi-
mation of the value of their marginal product (in consumption units) as
shown in expression [3.14] for the case of imports; or
(b) the domestic prices of the inputs used in the production of consumer
goods are regarded as good approximations of their efficiency prices (in
the consumption numeraire), which would result in the same as shown in
expression [3.15] for imported intermediate goods.
The calculation of the weights <p requires that the price elasticity of the
supply of exported goods and of the domestic demand for imported goods be
known, information which in practice is not available. As a result, the
APRFE is frequently calculated on the assumption that the weights <p are
equal to the average share of each product in total imports and exports. Thus,
for example, in the case of imports, the weights are calculated as
Substituting [3.32] and its equivalent for exports in [3.27], and dividing by
the EER we obtain
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DOMESTIC PRODUCTION OF IMPORTS
in which
The same expression has been presented in various texts as the formula for
calculating the "standard conversion factor", which is used to convert values
expressed in the consumption numeraire to the foreign exchange numeraire.10
3.6 The Accounting Price of Foreign Exchange When There Is Domestic
Production of Marginally Imported Goods
Up until now, it was taken for granted that there was no domestic production
of imported goods, avoiding the resulting complications of considering the
effects on domestic production of marginally imported goods. This section
analyzes those effects.
Suppose the imported good a is also produced domestically, as shown in
Figure 3.5. If adjustment to an additional supply of foreign exchange takes
place through a reduction in the EER, this will reduce the internal price of a
by p®-pa, reducing domestic production by asQ - a\ and increasing imports by
(asQ - a\) + (al - a0). Following a similar reasoning as in the case of exports,
for small EER variations and taking the domestic price of a to be equal to its
long-run marginal cost at efficiency prices,11 the value at efficiency prices for
10. Squire and van der Tak (1975, Chapter IX), Bruce (1976), Gittinger (1982, Chapter 7),
and Squire, et al. (1979, Appendix C). See Chapter 5 of this study.
11. As in the export case, if this assumption were unacceptable, the APRFE could be calcu-
lated using input-output techniques. See Londero (1994).
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ACCOUNTING PRICE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
Figure 3.5. The Effect of an Exchange Rate Reduction on Markets for
Domestically Produced, Marginally Imported Goods
that part of the additional supply of foreign exchange which is devoted to
import good a will also be
In other words, it is the willingness to pay for the additional consumption
a\ — a0, plus the "value of the resources released" by the reduction in
domestic production as0 — a\. Given the assumption of equality between
domestic price and long-run marginal cost at efficiency prices, there would be
no (significant) distributional effects stemming from the reallocation of inputs
to be registered, and the taxes on additional imported goods would explain the
entire difference between the APFE and the EER coming from the domestic
production of imported goods.
3.7 The Existence of Transport and Trade Margins
When defining the relation between the domestic and international prices of
traded goods as
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TRANSPORT AND TRADE MARGINS
it was assumed that the domestic transport and trade margins were nil, which
simplified presentation considerably. The appropriate corrections can now be
made. If fra, and com, are the transport and trade margins per unit of imports i,
the domestic price will be as follows:
If as a result of an increase in the supply of foreign exchange, which
reduces the HER, imports of good i increase, the value of additional consump-
tion will be Ag,/?, less the cost of providing transport and trade services valued
at their efficiency prices, that is,
in which/?, corresponds to the expression [3.34] and the superscripts ' indicate
that the transport and trade margins are valued at efficiency prices. If we now
replace/?, by its expression [3.34], we obtain
In the case of exports, the reduction in the EER will result in an increase in
domestic consumption Ag/ and a reduction in production Agj. The former
will require more transport and trade services while the latter will release
resources under the same heading. Consequently, the value of additional
consumption will be
in which, for the sake of simplification, it is assumed that the transport and
trade margins for the domestic consumption of j are equal to those for export-
ing it.
If the value at market prices of these margins is, for practical purposes,
equal to their value at efficiency prices, the effects (tra — tra'} and
(com — com'} will be nil and the APRFE can be calculated according to
equations [3.30] or [3.31], or to its operational version [3.33].
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ACCOUNTING PRICE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
3.8 Summary
Calculation of the APRFE in accordance with expressions [3.30] or [3.31], or
its operational version [3.33], presupposes that the following main conditions
are met:
(a) the exchange rate is the instrument used to adjust the supply and demand
of foreign exchange in the long run;
(b) the exchange rate corrected by the APRFE (or the one used to calculate
the APFE) is the one that keeps the supply and demand of foreign ex-
change in long-run equilibrium;
(c) if other incentives or disincentives for imports or exports exist, they can
be expressed through an equivalent tax or subsidy;
(d) the domestic demand functions for intermediate goods adequately reflect
the value of the marginal product at efficiency prices or (more appropri-
ately) the prices of the remaining intermediate goods adequately reflect
their efficiency prices;
(e) the value at market prices of the transport and trade margins is equal to
their value at efficiency prices.
Under these circumstances, an additional unit of foreign exchange ex-
pressed in the national currency at the (long-term equilibrium) exchange rate
can be expressed in units of consumption by multiplying it by the APRFE
calculated in accordance with what has been presented in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
THE VALUATION
OF TRADED GOODS
4.1 Traded Goods
The system of foreign trade incentives and disincentives in most countries is
characterized by the diversity of the instruments used and by the variation in
the extent to which these instruments alter domestic prices in relation to
international prices. Some goods and services are traded internationally (are
imported or exported) at prices that are not subject to any other effect than the
level of the exchange rate. At the other extreme, others are not traded due to
the level of such incentives and disincentives. Moreover, in many countries
the existence of systems for promoting certain activities or firms results in
different domestic prices for different users of the same imported input.
However, in the example of imported inputs, the "efficiency" criterion dic-
tates that the cost of importing additional units is determined by the reduction
in the incomes of the persons affected (the sum of their CVs) by the use of the
resources required. This effect on incomes and its distribution among those
affected depends, as this chapter will show, both on the effective cost to the
importer and on the accounting price of foreign exchange.
This chapter presents the most frequent cases in the valuation of traded
goods, with an emphasis on identifying the related distributional effects. For
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VALUATION OF TRADED GOODS
this purpose, an APRFE will be used that corresponds to the expression [3.31]
and which, as a consequence, depends on the validity of the assumptions
already discussed in chapter III.
A good or service is said to be internationally traded at the margin (imported
or exported), or simply traded, when the adjustment to an additional domestic
demand or supply of that commodity is made entirely through a change in its
exports or imports. It should be noted that describing a good as traded depends
on what actually happens with the corresponding exports or imports, a feature
that differentiates this classification from that in which groupings are made in
accordance with what would potentially happen (/export and import incentives
and disincentives were altered or eliminated. In the latter case we speak of
tradable (importable or exportable) goods and services.1
4.2 The Project Increases the Demand for Imported Goods
The immediate effect of a project that increases the demand for an imported
good will be to displace towards the right the demand for the good concerned
in the quantity required by the respective technical specifications. If this
additional demand is insignificant with respect to world supply, the GIF price
of the product can be considered constant and world supply infinitely elastic
at that price. The price to the domestic purchaser will be
in which
tm = ad valorem tax rate
cpm = costs of port handling, at market prices
tram = transport costs from the port to the user, at market prices
comm = trading costs, at market prices
Figure 4.1 shows the situation described when cp, tra and com can be
assumed to be constant per unit of product for small changes in demand. In
such a situation, the cost at efficiency prices (in the consumption numeraire)
of providing the quantity Am = m\ — m0 will include the cost of the foreign
exchange required to import that quantity valued at the APFE
1. The implications of the classification criterion adopted are discussed in V. Joshi (1972,
Section IV), Dasgupta (1972, Sections 5.3 and 5.4), H. Joshi (1972) and Mishan (1982, Chapters
13&14).
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ADDITIONAL DEMAND FOR IMPORTS
Figure 4.1 The Project Increases the Demand for Imported Goods
plus the cost at efficiency prices of the respective port handling (cpm) transport
(tram) and trading (comm) services.
If the value at market prices of these services can be accepted as a reason-
able approximation of their efficiency prices, an assumption already made in
the previous chapter, obtaining the efficiency price of the imported input only
requires the foreign exchange to be corrected. Let
be the cost to the purchaser, in this case to the project, of the additional
imports, which we wish to value at efficiency prices, and let APRFE = 1.2 be
the accounting price ratio of foreign exchange.
Table 4.1 shows the valuation of these imports at efficiency prices. The first
column indicates the cost to the purchaser, or what the project pays to obtain
these imports. The second records two effects on the Government's finances.
The first one is the taxes on foreign trade no longer received due to the net
balance resulting from the reduction in imports and increase in exports re-
quired to provide the foreign exchange needed for the project. As explained in
Chapter 3, the latter is equal to the difference between the amount of the
reduction in incomes needed to provide foreign exchange ( — 100 x 1.2) and
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VALUATION OF TRADED GOODS
Table 4.1 Valuation at Efficiency Prices of the Cost to the
Purchaser of Imports (Consumption Numeraire)
Breakdown
Foreign Exchange
Taxes on Foreign Trade
Other Domestic Costs
Total
Project
-100
-10
-23
-133
Government
-20
+ 10
-10
Total at
Efficiency
Prices
-120
-23
-143
its valuation at the EER (-100). The second effect is the import taxes it
receives directly from the project. The last column shows the valuation at
efficiency prices of the resources required to provide the imports concerned. It
shows that the valuation at market prices (-133) underestimates the value at
efficiency prices by the difference between willingness to pay for the reduc-
tion in consumption needed to release the foreign exchange (—100 x APRFE
= —120) and what is actually paid for the imports that they make possible
(-100 - 10). At the same time, this last column shows that the loss in
income of those involved (the project and the Government) is 143. In other
words, the resources used to provide the imports concerned require a reduc-
tion in incomes of 143, consisting of 133 from the (owners of the) project and
10 from the (users of the services of the) Government.
4.3 The Project Increases the Demand for Exported Goods
Let us consider the case of a good e which is exported and whose international
price is not affected by small variations in the country's supply to the interna-
tional market. The producer receives a price equal to the export price less the
corresponding taxes and less port, transport and trading costs,
[4.1]
in which the superscript ;c indicates that these are transport and trade margins
for export. Since the domestic producer does not distinguish between pur-
chasers, he sells the product to anybody who pays price ppe for it. Thus, the
price to the domestic purchaser will be equal to the producer's price plus
domestic transport and trade costs
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ADDITIONAL DEMAND FOR EXPORTS
Replacing the producer's price by its expression [4.1] we obtain
If the incremental transport and trading expenses are nil, the purchaser's
price will simply be
Figure 4.2 shows the case in question. In the situation without the project
(D0), quantity eQ of domestic production et is for domestic consumption and
the remainder (et — e0) for export. As the producer's price is determined by
the international price, the increase D0 - D{ in domestic demand generated
by the project will not affect the domestic price. As a consequence, there will
not be increases in production or reductions in domestic demand and the
additional quantity demanded will be provided through a reduction in exports
equal to
whose value at the prices paid by the project will be
Figure 4.2 The Project Increases the Demand for Exported Goods
p
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VALUATION OF TRADED GOODS
Table 4.2 Valuation at Efficiency Prices of the User's Cost
of the Reduction in Exports (Consumption Numeraire)
Total at
Efficiency
Project Government Prices
Foreign Exchange
Taxes on Foreign Trade
Other Costs
Total
-100
10
2
-88
-20
-10
-
-30
-120
-
2
-118
Let, for example,
be the value of the exported goods used by the project, whose valuation at
efficiency prices is shown in Table 4.2. The APRFE is equal to 1.2 and the
value at market prices of port services is assumed to be equal to their value at
efficiency prices. The first column is merely the breakdown of what the input
costs the project, as explained when the expression for the price to the domes-
tic purchaser was deduced. The second shows the effects on the Government,
which sees its tax revenue reduced for two reasons: (a) the net balance
resulting from the lower imports and greater exports needed to adjust the
foreign exchange market after exports have been reduced by 100; and (b) the
export taxes it no longer receives when exports have been reduced by 100. In
short, the cost at efficiency prices of the exported input is equal to the cost to
the purchaser plus the reduction in Government revenue.
4.4 The Projects Substitutes for Imports
Let us begin by considering the case of a project that substitutes for imports in
the context of existing incentives and disincentives to foreign trade; for exam-
ple, the existing import tariff will not be altered as a consequence of the
project. In addition, the reduction in international demand for the imported
product (at the margin) does not affect the corresponding CIF price. This
situation is reflected in Figure 4.3 in which md is domestic production and
m0 - md imports, both in the "without project situation". The purchaser's
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IMPORT SUBSTITUTION
Figure 4.3 The Project Substitutes for Imports at the Prevailing Tariff
price of the product is determined by the international price plus domestic port
handling, transport and trade expenses
[4.2]
and will remain unaltered in response to the additional supply of the project
(ms — md). As price p" is given, the project will sell at a price equal to pu less
the domestic transport and trade costs between the project and the purchaser.
Thus the price to the producer (project) will be
in which tra and com are the transport and trade margins of domestic produc-
tion. Replacing/?" by its expression [4.2] we obtain
Assuming, to simplify presentation, that the net transport and trade balances
are nil, the producer's price of the substituted import will simply be
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VALUATION OF TRADED GOODS
Consequently, sales from the project will equal the quantity (ms - md) at price
pp. For example, let
be the breakdown of the value of sales in savings on port costs, savings in
foreign exchange and the reduction in import tax revenue. The valuation of
these sales at efficiency prices is given in Table 4.3 on the assumption that the
market value of port costs adequately reflects the corresponding value at
efficiency prices. The value at efficiency prices of the imports substituted is
equal to that of the foreign exchange saved plus that of the resources corres-
ponding to the port costs saved. The difference between this total and the
price to the producer is explained by the net effect on the collection of taxes
by the Government, consisting of: (a) the reduction of 30 through the imports
substituted; and (b) the increase of 20 due to the effect of the reduction in the
demand for foreign exchange on receipts from taxes on foreign trade.
Consider now the case in which the Government wished to make privately
profitable the substitution of an imported consumer good that is not produced
domestically. With this objective in mind, the Government increases the
prevailing tariff t$ in At, an increase which would not be effected if the
project(s) were not carried out. This situation is illustrated in Figure 4.4, in
which p0 is the price to the user of the imported product when the import tariff
is t0 and p* is that price when the tariff is r, = t0 + At. Given that, at the new
tariff, the price to the purchaser of imports (p*) is greater than that of domestic
production supply (p,), imports m0 will be reduced to zero by the substitution
of quantity m^ and the reduction in domestic consumption by m0 — m} due to
the price increase/?, — p0.
Table 4.3 Valuation at Efficiency Prices of the Imports
Substituted (Consumption Numeraire)
Foreign Exchange
Taxes on Foreign Trade
Other Costs
Total
Project
100
30
3
133
Government
20
-30
-10
Total at
Efficiency
Prices
120
3
123
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IMPORT SUBSTITUTION
Figure 4.4 The Project Substitutes for Imports by Increasing the Tariff
Assuming that m is a consumer good, the price increase results in a welfare
loss for the consumers, measured by the respective compensating variations
whose sum is shown in Figure 4.4 by the areapoBCp^.
The numerical example of Table 4.4, constructed on the basis of the data
will allow for a clearer presentation of the income changes caused by the
project. The effect on the consumers, measured by the sum of their CVs of the
price increase, can be shown as the increase in the cost of consuming m, plus
their willingness to pay for m0 — m, less what they actually do pay for such
consumption:
The project receives income through the sale of mp which is equal to the
domestic value of the imports substituted (m, pQ) plus the increase in this
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IMPORT SUBSTITUTION
value m, (p{ — p0). Since these values are expressed at the prices paid by the
purchaser of the imports substituted, the corresponding transport and trading
costs have to be charged to the project. The importers no longer receive
income from the sale of m0 and, at the same time, stop paying for the
corresponding costs, including "normal" profits. The Government no longer
receives import taxes corresponding to m0 while it receives the net taxes on
foreign trade resulting from the reduction in the demand for foreign exchange.
Assuming that the port costs valued at the prices paid for the service are equal
to its value at efficiency prices and that the (saved) transport and trading costs
of imports are equal to those (incurred) of domestic production, presentation
of the effects of import substitution has been completed. The Total row in
Table 4.4 shows that the project receives $8,000 worth of income, the con-
sumers lose the compensating variation of the price increase of $975, the
importers are unaffected and the Government loses $150 of revenue. Total
gains and losses of those involved, equal to the value at efficiency prices of
the reduction in imports ($7,200 + $150) less willingness to pay for the
reduction in consumption ($475), gives the valuation at efficiency prices of
the production of the project.
It should be noted that in the example in Table 4.4, the CVs of the con-
sumers are added together, which implies the interpersonal value judgment of
efficiency analysis. If we wish to break the total down into consumers
grouped together according to their monetary income level, we must remem-
ber that the total of the CVs of consumers i can be expressed as
Since the first term depends on quantities consumed in the without project
situation, it can be broken down by income brackets using the data from a
household expenditure survey. The second term, on the other hand, depends
on the change in consumption per unit of change in price and, in general, this
information is not available and very difficult to estimate. However, since the
second term will be very small in relation to the first, the distribution of the
total CVs will be dominated by that of the change in expenditure in quantity
m0 and, from a practical point of view, the distribution of expenditure by
income brackets in the without project situation can be used as an approxima-
tion.
If on the other hand we were dealing with an intermediate good, the price
change would be translated into a change in purchasers' costs which they
would try to pass on in successive steps of intersectoral transactions to the
consumers, who would receive the total or partial effect. Discussion of this
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VALUATION OF TRADED GOODS
case, the characteristics of which are common to price variations in general, is
postponed until Chapter 7.
4.5 The Project Increases Exports
Consider the case of a project that increases exports under existing export
incentives and disincentives when this increase in exports does not affect the
international price of the product.
Since the price to the domestic producer is determined by the export price,
the project will not affect domestic consumers (Figure 4.5) and will result in
an increase in the value of exports by FOBe EER (e, - e0). However, this is
not the value received by the domestic producer because of the existence of
port, transport and trading costs. In addition, exports are subject to a tax te per
unit of sales on the foreign market. In this way, the price to the producer will
be
Consequently, the producer's sales revenue can be presented, for example, as
Figure 4.5 The Project Increases Exports
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ADDITIONAL EXPORTS
Table 4.5 Valuation at Efficiency Prices of Additional Exports
(Consumption Numeraire)
Foreign Exchange
Taxes on Exports
Port Costs
Transport
Trading
Total Sales
Project
100
-5
-2
-1
-12
80
Government
20
5
_
25
Total at
Efficiency
Prices
120
-2
-1
-12
105
whose valuation at efficiency prices is given in Table 4.5. The case presented
assumes that payments for port, transport and trading services are equal to
their respective values at efficiency prices. The table shows additional Gov-
ernment revenue from tax te plus the additional revenue it receives from the
(net) taxes on foreign trade due to the increase in the supply of foreign
exchange.
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CHAPTER 5
FOREIGN EXCHANGE AS A
NUMERAIRE
5.1 From the Consumption to the Foreign Exchange Numeraire
The publication of an OECD manual for appraising industrial projects, as well
as two widely-read subsequent books on the topic,1 led many economists to
believe that it was preferable to use foreign exchange expressed in the national
currency at the equilibrium exchange rate as a numeraire. Presented in this
way, this is merely a change in the unit of account in which the costs and
benefits of a project are expressed, and to that extent, the change in the
numeraire does not present any difficulties. In order to express a certain
quantity of foreign exchange at efficiency prices in the consumption nume-
raire, it has to be multiplied by the APRFE. Conversely, any other cost or
benefit already valued at efficiency prices in the consumption numeraire can
be expressed in the "foreign exchange numeraire" by dividing it by the
APRFE, while the costs and benefits in foreign exchange will already be
expressed in the numeraire. Presented in this way, the choice of numeraire
would seem to be merely a question of practical convenience.
1. See Little and Mirrlees (1969 and 1974) and Squire and van der Tak (1975).
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CONSUMPTION AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE NUMERAIRES
Let us suppose that a Government project substitutes imports for
using imported inputs for
Suppose also that
In such a case, and following the presentation in Chapters 3 and 4, the
corresponding valuation when APRFE =1.2 will be
which is shown in Table 5.1. The imports substituted generate a saving in
foreign exchange (100) and a reduction in receipts from taxes (100), while the
price paid for the imported inputs is broken down into 20 of foreign exchange
and 10 of additional taxes for the Government. Consequently, the project
increases the supply of foreign exchange by 100 - 20 = 80, the use of which
produces additional revenue for the Government of (100 - 20) X 0.20, in
which 0.20 is the foreign exchange premium (APRFE - 1).
If we wish to express this valuation in the foreign exchange numeraire
regardless of its distribution, it amounts to asking what increase (reduction) in
Table 5.1 Valuation of the Net Use of Foreign Exchange
(Consumption Numeraire)
Value of Production
Foreign Exchange
Taxes
Value of Imported Inputs
Foreign Exchange
Taxes
Total
Project
100
100
-20
-10
1/0
Government
20
-100
-4
10
~4
Total at
Efficiency
Prices
120
-24
~96
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FOREIGN EXCHANGE AS A NUMERAIRE
Table 5.2 Valuation of the Net Use of Foreign Exchange
(Foreign Exchange Numeraire)
Net Use of Foreign Exchange
Project
141.7
Government
-61.7
Total at
Efficiency
Prices
80
the supply (demand) of foreign exchange AS would have resulted in an in-
crease in total consumption of 96, that is
of which
The changes in the revenue of the Government and the project can be
expressed in the new numeraire using the same algebraic operation (see Table
5.2).
Note that the above does not purport to answer the question of how much
foreign exchange will have to be transferred to (the owners of) the project nor
how much will have to be taken away from the Government to produce an
equivalent result, since the project does not give rise to such changes for itself
or the Government; it only gives rise to changes in their real income. Nor does
the change in the numeraire try to measure the changes in the use of foreign
exchange that would result from spending such income changes. Cost-benefit
analysis does not, in general, take into account such indirect effects.2 It tries
only to estimate the income changes of those affected before adding them up
in accordance with a distributional value judgment. The change in numeraire,
as its name indicates, involves only a change in the unit of measurement, in
the same way as a distance can be measured in centimeters or in inches. Thus,
the use of any particular numeraire cannot bring about any difference in the
final result. In fact, if Bt is the net benefit from a project in period t, d the rate
of discount and r the project's internal rate of return, it is clear that:
2. To do so would require taking into account the benefits deriving from such expenditure as
well.
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UNCOMMITTED PUBLIC INCOME
5.2 Valuation in the "Uncommitted Public Income" Numeraire
Let us suppose now that for some reason, income in the hands of the Govern-
ment is considered more valuable than in the hands of the private sector, and
that "uncommitted public income" is chosen as the numeraire. In such a case,
a review of Table 5.1 will reveal that if the additional revenue generated can
be freely used by the Government, the valuation is already in the numeraire
since private income has not been directly affected. If now we want this
public revenue to be expressed in foreign exchange at the equilibrium ex-
change rate, the Little and Mirrlees (1974) numeraire, no possibility exists
other than the valuation shown in Table 5.2.
The numerical example used in the tables mentioned corresponds to the
first two rows in Table I presented by Little and Mirrlees (1974, page 149),
but with different results. A detailed comparison of both will reveal that the
example of these authors omits the changes in Government revenue resulting
from the adjustment of the foreign exchange market to the additional supply
created by the project. This omission explains that what is paid for net import
substitution (200 - 30), less the import taxes included in the respective prices
(-100 + 10), is equal to the net foreign exchange revenue valued at the EER,
which constitutes an accounting identity and not a measure of the net effect
on Government income (the numeraire).
It should be pointed out that the omission mentioned above does not affect
the result of the analysis when it seeks only to determine whether the project
satisfies the potential compensation criterion. However, it does affect the
results if the objective is to obtain the information required to make compen-
sation effective, to make distributional value judgments different from the one
assigning equal weights to all marginal income changes, or to discard the
assumption of equality between the rate of discount and the marginal rate of
return on investment.
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CHAPTER 6
ACCOUNTING PRICES FOR LABOR
6.1 The Supply of Labor
In neoclassical microeconomics, the supply of labor and the demand for
consumer goods are treated in a similar way. It is assumed that the time
dedicated to work in exchange for a certain sum of money has other uses for
the individual and that the welfare derived from the additional purchasing
power acquired competes with the welfare derived from these alternative
uses. Furthermore, it is assumed that the additional income required to per-
suade an individual to perform an additional hour's paid work of a certain type
rises in relation to the number of hours worked. Thus, his supply function of
working hours for a particular job i takes the shape shown by function S' in
Figure 6.1. At wage w0 the individual works L^ hours per day, and a higher
wage w, is needed to persuade him to do an additional hour's paid work i. At
the same time, it can be shown that the area w0ABwl is approximately equal to
the compensating variation corresponding to the wage increase w, — w0, that
is the sum of money that his income would need to be reduced by so that, after
the increase wl — w0, he would be at the same level of welfare as before the
increase,1
1. See Mishan (1981), where some of the problems associated with the interpretation of the
area enclosed by the supply curve and the wage increase are discussed.
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THE SUPPLY OF LABOR
Figure 6.1 The Labor Supply
Bear in mind that 51' in Figure 6.1 refers to the supply of hours of paid work
of a certain type, since if we were dealing with occupation,/, an individual
might be willing to work a smaller number of hours for the same hourly wage.
In addition, this representation is suitable for jobs in which the worker may
work the number of daily hours that he wishes at the prevailing wage. How-
ever, if the existing jobsy consist of a day with a fixed number of daily hours,
for example 8, the minimum daily wage that a worker will be willing to accept
for one of these jobs will be that for which the excess CV of those hours
whose valuation is less or equal than the wage equals the compensation
needed to persuade him to work the remaining hours. Thus, in Figure 6.1, w0
is this minimum wage in job j and the excess CV of L{ hours is equal to the
income needed to compensate him for working 8 - Ll hours. Consequently,
each time that the worker obtains a job of type j at a wage w, he will increase
his welfare by the equivalent of 8(w, — w0), equal to the difference between
the daily wage received 8n>, and the minimum daily wage he is willing to
accept.
The market supply function will be the horizontal aggregate of the individ-
ual supply functions and an increase in the demand for labor L\ — Ls (Figure
6.2) will result in an increase in the equilibrium wage. If the jobs are ones in
which the number of hours can be adjusted freely, w, - w0 can be interpreted
as the wage increase required to bring about additional hours L, — L0; in the
second case, Aw will be the increase in the daily wage required to obtain the
additional days needed. The area w0ABw} will be an approximation of the
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ACCOUNTING PRICES FOR LABOR
Figure 6.2 An Increase in the Demand for Labor
Alternatively, the CV of the wage increase for employment level L, can be
expressed as the sum of two components. The first is the increase in the
income of workers L0 already employed at wage w0, the CV of which is by
definition this additional income. The second component is the difference
between what is received by the workers Ll — L0 less the minimum compen-
sation that they are willing to receive, that is, the difference between their
additional income and the CV of the job. The latter will be equal to the area
L0ABLt which, by analogy with the concept of willingness to pay, will be
called willingness to receive. Thus, the CV of the wage increase w, - WQ for
job L[ can be broken down in the following way:
74
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EFFICIENCY PRICE OF LABOR
Figure 6.3 Effects of a Wage Increase
6.2 The Efficiency Price of Labor
From the "efficiency" analysis perspective, it is of interest to know the sum of
the CVs of the effects attributable to the increase in the demand for labor gener-
ated by a project. The efficiency price of labor for this additional demand will be
the quotient between this sum of CVs and the additional demand in question. In
most cases, however, the efficiency price of labor can be calculated as the sum
of the CVs attributable to a unitary excess demand. As the previous analysis
showed, if a project increases the demand for labor by L, - Ls (Figure 6.2)
when there is no "involuntary unemployment", the workers will come from a
reduction in employment in other jobs (L0 - Ls) and from an increase in
workers who join the market due to the wage increase (L, - £0). As indicated
in the previous section, the cost at efficiency prices of the latter will be given
by their willingness to receive. However, jobs L0 — Ls in the project will be
filled at the cost of employment in other sectors, which will see their costs rise
because of the wage increase. The effects of such a situation are shown in
Figure 6.3 in which, for the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that in the
without project situation, labor L0 is used only to produce the quantity q0 of
consumer good q. If in addition it is assumed that Aw is sufficiently small not
to bring about substitution between labor and the other inputs (the average
long-run technical coefficients are equal to the marginal coefficients)2, and
2. This assumption does not seem very restrictive if we consider that the long-run effect of the
price increase produced by Aw will most probably be limited to postponing the entry sequence of
a given set of plants.
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ACCOUNTING PRICES FOR LABOR
that the prices of the remaining inputs are equal to their efficiency prices and
are not affected, the difference between long-run average costs C(wj) and
C(w0) will be
[6.2]
The increase in the market value of quantity q} of the consumer good will be
[6.3]
Substituting [6.2] in [6.3] we see that
[6.4]
The complement of the C V of the consumers of q will be
[6.5]
Substituting [6.2] in [6.5] we see that
[6.6]
The sum of the consumers' CVs can then be obtained as the sum of [6.4]
and [6.6], that is
[6.7]
If we now compare [6.1] with [6.7] we can see that the difference between
the sum of the CVs of workers Lj and that of the consumers will be
equal to the area ACB in Figure 6.2. In other words, an important part of the
gain to workers L{ is offset by the loss to the consumers.
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EFFICIENCY PRICE OF LABOR
It is now possible to summarize the effects of the additional demand for
labor and to identify the sectors affected (see Table 6.1). The workers em-
ployed in the without project situation Ls + (L0 — Ls) gain the equivalent of
wage increase w, — vv0 for this volume of employment. The additional work-
ers L, — L0 gain the difference between their wage income and their willing-
ness to receive or the minimum income they are willing to accept. The total
effect on the workers is equal to the sum of their CVs. As shown in [6.4], the
additional income of employment Ls corresponds, under the simplifying as-
sumptions adopted, to the loss to the consumers through greater expenditure
on quantity q[1 of the consumer good. The consumers also lose the difference
between their valuation of q0 — g, and what they actually pay. The project
pays the hired workers wage w, and the firms producing the consumer good
no longer receive revenue from sales q0 — q{ and at the same time stop paying
for the resources required to produce that quantity. If the market prices of
these resources are acceptable approximations of their efficiency prices, the
value of these resources at market prices is taken as a gain.
The reader can imagine that data in Table 6.1 could have been disaggrega-
ted at the level of each worker, consumer and owner of the project and of the
other firms, in which case the columns could have been added up vertically
without resorting to interpersonal comparisons. However, it should be noted
that any horizontal sum requires a value judgment regarding the contribution
to "total welfare" of the changes in individuals' income. From the point of
view of the potential compensation criterion, the comparison of the vertical
totals indicates that the gain of workers CVL is insufficient to compensate the
consumers (CVcons) and the employers (the project). Consequently, the
"total" loss that can be attributed to hiring Lt — Ls workers is recorded in
the Total column and shows the minimum income that their employment
ought to generate to make compensation possible.
Application of the value judgment that assigns equal weights to all marginal
income changes allows for columns in Table 6.1 to be added up, and the total
in the last column to be interpreted according to efficiency analysis. This total
consists of the cost of the additional employment for the workers, their will-
ingness to receive (WR), equal to
plus the consumers' willingness to pay (WP) for the quantities q0 — q^ of
consumer goods that they will stop consuming
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EFFICIENCY PRICE OF LABOR
less the value of the resources released (VRR) by this reduction in consump-
tion and which remain available for use in the rest of the system, which
consequently excludes quantity L0 — Ls used by the project,
Thus, looked at from the "value of resources" angle, the cost at efficiency
prices (CEP) of jobs Lj — Ls will be3
It is worth recalling here that the previous example, although illustrative of
the logic of the valuation of labor, is based on the assumption that the wage
increase does not lead to any substitution of inputs in the production of
consumer goods. If such a substitution existed or if the average long-run
technical coefficients were different from the marginal coefficients, the
change in the unit costs of production of q would not be equal to the wage
change multiplied by the labor requirements per unit of product. Conversely,
income from other "primary factors" would be affected and the identification
and quantification of these effects per group would not be practicable.4 How-
ever, whenever the labor demand of the project Lt — Ls is small in relation to
the respective employment, the change in wages will be insignificant and, as a
consequence, the change in the price of the goods using this labor will be
negligible. In this case, the cost of labor Lj - Ls at efficiency prices (CEP)
will simply be
[6.8]
Table 6.2 presents its breakdown in terms of the effects on various sectors.
Finally, this line of reasoning enables us to arrive at the criterion normally
used in practice. If all the labor employed by the project (Lj — Ls) is taken
from alternative occupations, the cost at efficiency prices of the additional
employment will be
[6.9]
3. The expression —WP(q0 — qt) + VRR substitutes for the value of the marginal product of
labor withdrawn from the production of consumer goods.
4. See Mishan (1982, Chapter 10 and 1981, Part V)
79
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 b
y 
th
e 
In
te
r-
A
m
er
ic
an
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t B
an
k.
 A
ll 
ri
gh
ts
 r
es
er
ve
d.
Fo
r 
m
or
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
vi
si
t o
ur
 w
eb
si
te
: w
w
w
.ia
db
.o
rg
/p
ub
Ta
bl
e 
6.
2.
 
Ec
on
om
ic
 
Va
lu
at
io
n
 
o
f t
he
 
Ad
di
tio
na
l D
em
an
d 
fo
r 
La
bo
r 
W
he
n
 
Ch
an
ge
s 
in
 
W
ag
es
 
Ar
e
N
eg
lig
ib
le
 
(C
on
su
mp
tio
n
 
Nu
m
er
ai
re
)
CV
L Inc
rea
se
 
in 
Inc
om
e 
for
 
L s
Inc
om
e 
of 
L Q
-
L S
 
w
ith
 
the
 
Pr
oje
ct
Inc
om
e 
of 
L 0
-
L S
 
w
ith
ou
t th
e P
roje
ct
Inc
om
e 
of
 ^
 
-
/.„
 
w
ith
 
th
e 
Pr
oje
ct
W
illin
gn
es
s 
to
 
Re
ce
ive
 
of
 ^
 
-
/.„
C
on
su
m
er
s
W
illin
gn
es
s 
to
 
Pa
y f
or
 
q 0
-
q.
Pa
id 
for
 
q 0
-
q^
R
es
ou
rc
es
 
R
el
ea
se
d
To
ta
l
W
or
ke
rs
 
Co
ns
um
er
s
-
 
-
w
(L 0
-
L s
)
-
w
(L 0
-
L s
)
w
(L,
-L 0
)
-
w
(L
,-L
0)
-
p(
q Q
-
q,
)
Pt
io
-Q
i)
-
 
-
-
Pr
oje
ct
-
-
w
(L
0-
L s
)
-
-
w
(L
,-L
0)
- - - -
-
w
(L
,-L
s)
Ot
he
r 
Fi
rm
s 
To
ta
l
-
 
-
-
 
-
-
w
(L
0-
L s
)
-
 
-
-
w
(L
,-L
0)
-
p(
9 0
-
^
)
-
p(q
0-
<
ii)
p(q
0-
qi) 
p(q
a-
qj
-
w
(L
,-L
s)
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 b
y 
th
e 
In
te
r-
A
m
er
ic
an
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t B
an
k.
 A
ll 
ri
gh
ts
 r
es
er
ve
d.
Fo
r 
m
or
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
vi
si
t o
ur
 w
eb
si
te
: w
w
w
.ia
db
.o
rg
/p
ub
80
SKILLED LABOR
the consumers' valuation of the loss in consumption Aq less the value of the
resources released, excluding the labor used by the project. On the other
hand, if all the jobs created by the project were to be done by workers joining
the market because of higher wages, and provided employment in the remain-
ing sectors were not affected, the efficiency value of the additional employ-
ment would be
[6.10]
the willingness to receive for these jobs.5
It should be noted that when the wage is the variable that adjusts the labor
market, and the distributional value judgments of efficiency analysis are
made, the economic cost of labor is always w AL. However, when labor is
withdrawn from alternative jobs (expression [6.9]), use of the valuation w AL
requires the following additional assumptions: (a) the market price of the
good in the production of which it would be used in the without project
situation is accepted as its accounting price; and (b) the market prices of the
remaining resources released (VRR) are also accepted as their accounting
prices. Assumption (a) does not present any problems if the good in question,
q in the example given, is a non-traded consumer good. However, if q were a
traded good it would be necessary to correct its market price in the manner
indicated in Chapter 4. This case will be dealt with in Section 6.4. If on the
other hand, q were a non-traded intermediate good, use of the valuation wAL
would require assumptions (a) and (b) to be valid along the entire inter-
industrial chain up to the non-traded consumer goods or the traded goods.
6.3 The Accounting Price of Skilled Labor
The traditional approach holds that skilled labor is fully employed and that its
supply is completely inelastic in relation to small changes in wages. As a
consequence, additional hiring is done at the cost of reducing employment in
alternative occupations. In such a situation, the corresponding cost at effi-
ciency prices is the loss in consumption due to the withdrawal of labor from
5. Lai (1973) has questioned the inclusion of WR in the calculation of the accounting price of
unskilled labor. See also Hamilton's (1976 and 1977) critique of Lai's position.
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ACCOUNTING PRICES FOR LABOR
such jobs and, consequently, its efficiency price (APLJ can be calculated on
the basis of [6.9] as follows:
If the market prices of all the resources released are considered acceptable
approximations of their efficiency prices, it follows from expression [6.8] that
the wage paid will be the appropriate efficiency price and there will be no
distributional effects significant enough to be recorded.
If the skilled labor were to be hired abroad, it would be appropriate to treat
it as an imported good. In fact, since the Government is only interested in the
welfare of "nationals" when it performs cost-benefit analyses, the effects of
hiring on the income of skilled labor abroad or on the production of goods for
which it would be employed in the without project situation does not count in
the analysis. Conversely, what does matter are the costs that this hiring
imposes on "nationals." Since the wages for imported labor are normally paid
in foreign exchange, of which only a part is remitted, the cost of employment
is given by the value of the foreign exchange remitted (PER) plus the value at
efficiency prices of domestic expenditure on goods and services (DE). If the
market prices of the latter are considered as acceptable approximations of
their efficiency prices, the corresponding efficiency wage will be
Let, for example, Wcal = $100 be the equivalent in the national currency of
the monthly salary of a foreign professional recruited for the project. This
salary is paid in foreign exchange, and it is estimated that $50 is spent in the
country, $40 is remitted to the country of origin and $10 is income taxes paid
to the Government. This situation is shown in Table 6.3, in which the part of
wages remitted in foreign exchange has been corrected by the APRFE, and
the loss in Government revenue due to lower expenditure of foreign exchange
Table 6.3. Valuation of the Employment of "Imported" Labor
Value at
Efficiency
Project Government Prices
Salary
• Foreign Currency Remitted
• Domestic Expenditure
• Tax
Total
-40
-50
-10
-100
-8
—
+ 10
+2
-48
-50
-
-98
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SKILLED LABOR
Table 6.4. Valuation of Employing a Worker Who Would Have
Emigrated Without the Project
With the Project
Wage
Willingness to Receive
Without the Project
Wage
Willingness to Receive
Total
Project
~™dom
-
-
-
~™<km
Worker
™dom
-WRdom
-V-k)Wexl-kWext
WRex!
wdom-mm
Government
-
-
-kWext(APRFE--\)
-
-MJMflF£-1)
Total
-
-WU
-(l-k)Wea-kWex,APRFE
w-
-WRm-kWext(APRFE-l)
on uses subject to the payment of import tax has been recorded. Since without
the project, this professional would not have been employed in the country
that hires him, the income tax is attributable to the project and as such is
shown as a transfer from the project to the Government.
Finally, consider the case in which the demand for skilled workers gener-
ated by the project is covered by people who, in the absence of the project,
would have emigrated due to the lack of jobs. In such a case, there would be
no reduction at all in domestic production, although the situation with the
project could imply a reduction in output in the country of destination of the
potential migrant. However, current value judgments in cost-benefit analysis
only take account of the effects on the economic welfare of the "nationals".
These effects are summarized in Table 6.4.
In the situation with the project, the worker would receive a wage Wdom
which will have to be greater than or equal to his willingness to receive WRdom
when the alternative of emigration does not exist. The latter requires WRdom to
be completed with the possible gain Wext - WRext resulting from the difference
between his wage abroad and the respective willingness to receive. Since the
worker remits a proportion k of his wage to his family when he emigrates, the
Government loses the corresponding foreign exchange premium. The com-
pensating variation of accepting the job in the project, and consequently of not
migrating, will then be
which will be the minimum sum he is prepared to accept. His net gain will be
Wdom — WRm. The sum of the totals of each column indicate the minimum
income to be created by his employment in the project which is required to
make the compensation possible. This minimum income will be equal to
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ACCOUNTING PRICES FOR LABOR
the compensating variation WRm plus the loss in Government revenue due to
the foreign exchange that would not come in. Assigning the same weights to
all marginal income changes allows for the columns to be added up horizon-
tally and the welfare loss (measured by total CVs) corresponding to the job in
the project to be obtained in accordance with this value judgment. This will be
equal to his willingness to receive for not migrating, plus the premium on the
foreign exchange, which he would have remitted if he had emigrated.
6.4 The Accounting Price of Unskilled Labor
The simplified analysis in Section 6.2 made it possible to show that the
accounting price of labor depends on the way in which the market adjusts in
response to project demand. Some alternative examples of adjustment are
presented in this section to show their consequences on the efficiency price of
unskilled labor. These examples may be used as the basis for applying the
basic reasoning to other particular cases.
Suppose first that the project being analyzed is located in the metropolitan
area of the capital city, where a high level of underemployment exists. Full-
time unskilled jobs are concentrated in the formal sector, in which wages are
relatively high, determined principally through negotiations between workers
and employers, and which are considerably above the respective supply price
(willingness to receive). Thus, the supply of unskilled labor faced by employ-
ers in the sector is infinitely elastic at the prevailing wage. The other sector,
the informal one, includes " . . . most of the self-employed, domestic staff and
those employed in excessively small undertakings, which are not formally
organized and engage in marginal activities". In this sector, wages " . . . tend
to be situated at a relatively adequate level in relation to the other options
offered by the labor market, becoming the adjustment variable that determines
the number of suppliers in a given informal activity" .6
Suppose now that the jobs created by the project will be filled by workers
from the informal sector, in which the abundance of self-employed workers
whose working hours can easily be adjusted results in an almost infinitely
elastic supply at the prevailing wage so that minimum variations in wages are
enough to make the adjustment. This situation is illustrated in Figure 6.4. The
increase in the demand for labor in the formal sector (L| — L?) results in a
reduction in the supply in the informal sector which, though it practically does
not alter wages in that market, reduces the under-employment of the remain-
ing workers. In such a case, the workers now employed in the formal sector
increase their income by (vi^ - w') (£, — L0) while those in the informal
84
6. PREALC (1977, cHAPTER v, PP 258-59).
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Figure 6.4 Adjustment of the Unskilled Urban Labor Market
sector increase their weekly hours of work at a wage w' equal to their willing-
ness to receive. Consequently, part of the labor cost to the project is a transfer
to the new workers now employed in the formal sector.
Table 6.5 contains a schematic presentation of the preceding explanation.
The first column records the cost to the project. The second shows the in-
crease in the incomes of the new workers employed in the formal sector. The
third column shows that the remaining workers in the informal sector increase
their employment level at a wage equal to their willingness to receive, and so
are not affected by the new situation. Finally, the distributional value judg-
ment that assigns equal weights to all marginal income changes enables us to
arrive at the fourth column, which contains the net income changes according
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ACCOUNTING PRICES FOR LABOR
Table 6.5. Valuation at Efficiency Prices of Additional Jobs
Created in the Formal Sector When Labor Comes from the
Informal Sector (Consumption Numeraire)
to source. The totals in each column can be interpreted as the basis for
checking that the potential compensation criterion is complied with. In this
case, the increase in workers' income AZ/is not sufficient to compensate the
cost (loss) to the project, and the necessary complement will have to come
from the production resulting from their employment in the project. From the
point of view of efficiency analysis, the net loss vv'AI/ will have to be lower
than the value of production (at efficiency prices) resulting from such employ-
ment.
Let us now take a case in which an additional job created in the formal
urban sector is filled by an informal sector worker, which in turn gives rise to
the migration of one rural worker who replaces the former in the informal
sector. In such a case, the workers who remain in the informal sector would
not be affected and the entire impact would be transferred to the rural sector.
Suppose also that the source of rural labor is family small-holdings in which
the effect on family production of the withdrawal of one member can be
compensated through the increase in working hours of those remaining.7
Table 6.6 outlines this situation. The wage paid for the project is w/ and the
worker previously occupied in the informal sector gains, as in the previous
case, wage difference w? — w'. The migrant rural worker enters the informal
sector earning w', at the same time as he stops receiving his share of rural
family income yr. The rural family gains yr, stops receiving the income from
wages w* which the migrant earned away from the farm during the harvest of
export crops, loses the value of the marginal product of the migrant worker on
the farm vrm but compensates for it (totally or partially) with the additional
Remainder of Value at
Workers the Informal Efficiency
Project L\ - L'0 Sector Prices
Formal Sector
• Wages -w'(L( - L',) w'(L{ - L',)
• Willingness to Receive - w '(L{- /.J) - -w!(L\-L'^)
Informal Sector
• Wages - - w'ft - L'0) v/'(L\ - L[]
• Willingness to Receive -w'(L\ - L'0) -wl(L( - i [ )
Total -w'W-ii) A»(i;-ii) - -w'W-iJ)
7. The method of presentation used in the following paragraphs is based on Sen (1966 and
1972).
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ACCOUNTING PRICES FOR LABOR
production vrr resulting from the increase in working hours of the remaining
members. The farming company stops paying wage wx at the same time as it
stops receiving the market value of the marginal product v", since during the
harvesting period the labor supply is completely inelastic.8 However, v* is the
value of the marginal product valued at the farm gate, that is
[6.11]
in which qx is the marginal product and p* the farm gate price. The latter will
be equal to
the f.o.b. price less the taxes on exports equivalent to an ad valorem rate tx
less domestic transport, processing and trading costs expressed as a propor-
tion (dc) of the f.o.b. price. Consequently, the marginal product that is lost by
hiring the worker, valued at farm gate market prices, can be broken down in
the following way:9
[6.13]
Note that the valuation at market prices includes foreign exchange valued at
the exchange rate, less taxes and less the domestic costs required to export the
agricultural product. However, the taxes that are no longer paid are revenue
that the Government no longer receives, to which must be added the revenue
it would have received from the use of the foreign exchange that it loses. The
total effect on the Government will consequently be
which is that shown in the Government column in Table 6.6.
If, for the sake of simplicity, the market value of domestic costs (qx pf°b dc)
is assumed equal to their value at efficiency prices, the income that trans-
porters, processors and traders stop receiving will be equal to what they stop
8. See, for example, Londero (1981).
9. Gittinger (1982, Chapter 3) shows the breakdown of the farm gate price of a traded good in
more detail.
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UNSKILLED LABOR
paying for the resources used. Consequently, there will be no changes in their
income to be recorded under this heading.
The second row in Table 6.6 shows the CVs of the additional work of those
affected. The rural family will have to compensate for the work done by the
migrant worker by intensifying or extending the working day, dr being the
respective CV. The migrant worker will stop working on the family holding
and, assuming that his CV for such work is equal to that of the family, will
gain dr, the respective CV. He will also gain the CV of not working in export
agriculture dx. At the same time he will occupy the vacancy created in the
informal sector whose CV is assumed to be equal to that of the worker in the
informal sector d'. The latter gains d' at the same time that he loses the CV of
his working time in the formal sector df. The efficiency price of unskilled
labor (APLU) can now be obtained in the same way:
[6.15]
This indicates the minimum income that will have to be generated by the
project job to make compensation possible or, looking at the Total column,
the loss in "total welfare", corresponding to the efficiency analysis value
judgments, resulting from reduced production and increased work. The pre-
vious expression for APLU can be simplified if the rural family compensates
fully for the marginal product of the migrant (Avr = 0). In such a case, [6.15]
is reduced to
[6.16]
A different set of assumptions on compensating variations d allows us to
obtain the most frequently used expression for APLU. If the CVs of each hour
of work are equal in the rural, export, informal and formal sectors, df - dx can
be estimated as the number of hours of work in the formal sector, less the
hours worked in export agriculture, all times the minimum hourly wage that a
farm worker is willing to accept (his "reservation wage"). Thus, [6.16] will
indicate that the APLU will be equal to the value of the marginal product
during the period of full employment in the farming sector (v* in the example)
valued at efficiency prices plus the "reservation farm wage" during the period
in which there is underemployment or unemployment in the rural sector.
Expression [6.16] can also be presented only in terms of vx obtaining from
[6.13]
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ACCOUNTING PRICES FOR LABOR
and substituting it in [6.16]. Thus we arrive at
[6.17]
The calculation of expression [6.17] does however require that the farm gate
market value of the marginal product in export agriculture v* be estimated.
This could be avoided if during the period of peak demand, wages equalled
the market value of the marginal product (v* = w*). Thus, expressions [6.17]
can be calculated on the basis of
[6.18]
It can easily be shown that expression [6.18] is the traditional valuation of
labor at efficiency prices. This will be equal to the value at efficiency prices of
the marginal product (in this example, the value of foreign exchange less the
domestic costs saved) during the period of full employment in the farm sector
plus the compensating variation df — d* measured through the "reservation
wage" during the period in which there is unemployment or underemploy-
ment in the rural sector:
Using [6.12], pf°b dc can be replaced by
to obtain
after working out the products and regrouping, we arrive at expression [6.16]
which is the one used as the basis for deducing [6.18].
Some authors have pointed out that an increase in employment in the formal
urban sector may lead to the migration of more than one rural worker.I0 Such
10. See Harris and Todaro (1970), Harberger (1971a)and Mazumdar (1976).
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migrants would become part of the urban labor supply, which is infinitely
elastic at the prevailing wage in both sectors (formal and informal). As a
consequence, the number of unemployed or underemployed will increase if
the fixed number of informal jobs is distributed among a larger number of
workers. In this situation, expression [6.18] for the APLU will have to be
modified since it was deduced on the assumption that only one rural worker
would migrate for each additional job created in the formal urban sector. For
this purpose, it would be useful to revise, and make the corresponding adjust-
ment to, each column in Table 6.6 for the situation in which more than one
worker migrates. The first two columns will remain unaltered since the project
would continue to employ a worker from the informal sector. To simplify
presentation, assume now that h rural migrants would share the working
hours released in the informal sector. Thus, the total of the effects on the
migrant workers would be
whereas those on the rural family (families) would be
As for the farm companies, they would be affected by the departure of h
workers
and the Government would see its revenue reduced by
Finally, using the same assumptions as for [6.18] the accounting price of
unskilled labor would be
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that is, the value of the marginal product of h migrant workers, plus the CV
of the single additional job created, less the sum of the CVs of not working in
export agriculture.
6.5 The Treatment of Contributions to a Compulsory
Social Security System
The existence of a compulsory social security system introduces a difference
between the cost to the employer of hiring a unit of labor and the monetary
income received by the worker. The cost to the employer will be equal to the
wage received by the worker plus the contributions of the latter and the
employer to the social security system. In this section the main aspects to be
taken into account for the allocation of these contributions in distributional
analysis will be presented.
The wage appearing in the Project column of the tables that present the
effects of the additional job created corresponds to the cost to the employer of
hiring labor, since this is the sum of money that the project has to pay for
hiring. If this sum is represented by w, the sum of money received by the
worker will be w (1 - tss) in which tss is the proportion of the cost to the
employer that is transferred to the social security system as the sum of contri-
butions from the employer and the worker. The latter receives a benefit from
his participation in the system, which he values at fiss, the CV of participating
in the system. Consequently, we have the following set of effects
in which Css is the cost of providing the service. Although Css can be esti-
mated, at least as the average cost per member, Bss will not normally be
known and some drastic simplification will be required. Assume, for exam-
ple, that wtss is the payment for a worker who joins a medical insurance
scheme to participate in the system and that this is the only service of such a
type to which the worker has access. If it can be assumed that w tss = Bss, then
the total wage w will be income for the worker. Assume, on the other hand,
that the worker is employed in an area that is very far from social security
medical care centers, and he consequently will not make use of these services,
even though both employer and worker will have to pay the corresponding
contributions. However, the project will provide the medical services which
the worker values at Bsp. In such a case, the effects to be recorded will be
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in which the cost of the service provided by the project (Csp) will be included
with the other costs. Again, if Bsp = w tss is a reasonable assumption, all of
wage w will be income for the worker. As for the social security system, it
will receive revenue without incurring any costs.
Let us now consider a case where the workers hired already participate in a
pension scheme and would continue to do so in the situation without the
project, as might be the case with skilled labor. Hiring these workers for the
project would not affect their situation (if their wages did not change) since
they would continue to pay (w tss) and receive (Bss) from the system as they
would in the without project situation. Their original employer would not be
affected either if the cost to this employer is assumed to be equal to the value
of the marginal product, and the social security system continued to receive
the same revenue and incur the same costs. In the case of workers who belong
to the system and are expected to continue to belong to it until their retire-
ment, as might be the case with unskilled jobs created in the formal sector, the
only approximation possible may be to assume that Bss = w tss. However, in
the case of temporary hiring of rural labor which is not expected to succeed in
obtaining benefits from the system, the effects will be as follows:
The worker's income will be less than his wage and the social security system
will receive a transfer w tss.
Given the difficulty (not to say the impossibility) of estimating the benefits
Bss, the solution that is always adopted will include an element of arbitrariness
on the part of the analyst. However, common sense should enable him to
come up with an acceptable approximation.
6.6 An Example
Consider the case of an industrial project in the formal sector of the economy,
which will be located in the metropolitan area of the capital city and will hire
unskilled labor for a present value of 31,887. This sum corresponds to the cost
for the project of hiring labor, and therefore includes not only the worker's
monetary income, but also contributions to the social security system (wf ts)
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estimated at 2,232. We know that the labor force comes (at the margin) from
the farming sector, in which workers are fully employed for a period of three
months for the harvest of an export crop. During this period, the supply of
labor is totally inelastic to small changes in wages and the latter effectively
determine the allocation of available labor among big farms. During the
remainder of the year, the farm workers are under-employed. The demand for
labor from small-holdings (the providers of labor during the period of peak
demand) plus the requirements of the big farms are considerably less than
what is available. This is clearly shown by the fact that during the latter period
"landless farm workers" have great difficulty finding jobs, even temporary
ones, and thus finance their consumption to a certain extent from income
earned during the period of peak demand. For these reasons, for the purposes
of estimating the APLU, the year has been divided into these two periods.
The income from wages earned during the period of peak demand (wx),
which rises to 20% of the annual cost to the employer or the project
(w* = 0.2 wf), is considered a reasonable approximation of the farm gate
value of the marginal product (wx = v"). Consequently, in accordance with
[6.13]
It is also known that an export tax of 4% (tx = 0.04) is levied on agricultural
produce and that the domestic processing, transport and trading costs are 15%
(dc = 0.15) of the f.o.b. price. Consequently, the farm gate value of the
marginal product can be broken down into
Contributions to the social security system are not included in this breakdown
since in practice they are not paid.
During the rest of the year, the labor force is underemployed and the output
of the rural economy and the farms is assumed to be unaffected (-yj, + v' = 0).
Consequently, the valuation during this period corresponds to the CV of the
job, less the CV of not working in export agriculture, all valued at the reser-
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AN EXAMPLE
Table 6.7. Effects of Hiring Unskilled Labor
Foreign Exchange (-q'p1*)
Taxes (txq'pm]
Cost Savings (dcq'p"*)
Reservation Wage (d1 - d')
Social Security (w'ts)
ISS Benefits (Bs)
Other Transfers (AW)
Total (w1)
Project
-7873
315
1181
-9566
-2232
-
-13712
-31887
Unskilled
Workers
—
-
-
-
-
2800
13712
16512
ISS
—
-
-
-
2232
-2232
-
-
Govern-
ment
-787
-315
-
-
-
-568
-
-1670
Total
-8660
-
1181
-9566
-
-
-
-17045
vation wage in the farm sector. The result is equivalent to 30% of the wage
paid by the project (df - dx - 03wf), that is
Thus, the cost to the employer (the project) of the labor to be hired for the
project will be
in which Aw is the increase in the monetary income of the workers hired for
the project less the CV total of the jobs.
With this information and the breakdown already presented for w*, almost
all of the first column of Table 6.7 has been constructed. The remaining entry,
755 Benefits, corresponds to the benefits that the workers will receive from
the Institute of Social Security (ISS) estimated as equal to the average costs
per member of the Institution (Bss = Css). Since the cost of providing
these services is greater than the contributions received to finance them
(wftss < CM), the Government is shown as financing the difference (-568).
The column Unskilled Workers summarizes the effects which in Table 6.6 are
divided into the categories Informal Sector Workers, Migrant Workers and
Rural Family. The members of this group receive benefits from the ISS (2800)
and the transfer (13712) consisting of the difference between the increase in
their net monetary income and the CVs of their work. The ISS receives
contributions wftss, which it returns as 2800 of services (Bss = Css), of which
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ACCOUNTING PRICES FOR LABOR
it finances only 2232 (the contributions), while the remaining 568 is financed
by the Government.11 The latter also loses the foreign exchange premium
(APRFE - 1 = 0.1) and the export taxes (-315) because of the reduction
(f $°b in exports. Finally, the column totals are the total gains and losses of
those affected and the horizontal sum of these totals indicates the minimum
additional income that hiring the workers must generate to make compensa-
tion possible.
11. Note the implied assumption that the cost of the services at market prices is equal to their
value at efficiency prices.
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CHAPTER 7
FIRST APPROXIMATION OF
THE VALUATION OF
NON-TRADED GOODS AND SERVICES
7.1 Non-Traded Goods at the Margin
A good or service is said to be non-traded at the margin, or simply non-
traded, when adjustment to an increase in domestic demand for a commodity
takes place through an increase in domestic production, its withdrawal from
alternative domestic uses or a combination of both effects. Similarly, adjust-
ment in response to additional domestic supply takes place through an in-
crease in the quantity consumed domestically, a reduction in the output of
other producers or a combination of both effects. Describing a good as non-
traded depends, consequently, on what actually happens in response to
changes in demand or supply. As in the case of traded goods, this classifica-
tion must be distinguished from that based on what would potentially happen
if the existing incentives or disincentives to foreign trade were altered or
eliminated, in which case we speak of non-tradeable goods.
The objectives of this chapter are: (a) to present, at least in introductory
form, the problems involved in the valuation of non-traded goods; (b) to
explain the assumptions implied in accepting the market price as being equal
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VALUATION OF NON-TRADED GOODS
Figure 7.1 The Project Generates Excess Demand for a
Non-Traded Good or Service
to the efficiency price; and (c) to pave the way for presenting the use of input-
output techniques in Part II. Since our interest lies in the distributional as-
pects, special attention will be given to price changes brought about by the
project and to the possibility of estimating the distribution of the correspond-
ing CVs.
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7.2 The Project Demands Non-Traded Inputs
Starting from an equilibrium situation, the additional demand generated by a
project at the prevailing market price can be represented graphically (see
Figure 7.1). Additional demand generated by the project is ql — qs, and the
respective adjustment is to produce ql — q0 additional units and to reduce their
alternative uses by q0 — qs, both brought about by the increase p1 - p0 in the
price. Using Figure 7.1, it is now possible to work out an initial approxima-
tion of the changes in income caused by the additional demand for q created
by the project, shown in Table 7.1.
The project pays p^(q^ - qs) for its purchases and the remaining purchasers
incur additional costs (pl — pQ)qs. The producers of q receive these sums as
additional income and incur additional costs C[q^] - C[q0], in which C[qt] is
the long-run total cost of producing quantity qt and the square bracket indi-
cates "function of". Finally the purchasers who no longer buy quantity
q0 - qs stop spending p0(qa — qs) but lose 2 CV(q0 - qs). This first approxi-
mation enables us to discuss each change in income and the possibility of
distributing it according to beneficiaries: in particular, the purchasers of
q0 — qs in the situation without the project, the producers of q and the users
ofqs. C
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VALUATION OF NON-TRADED GOODS
Figure 7.2 The Competitive Model
Let us begin discussion with the area (p\ — p0)qs, since this is the one that
can entail important distributional effects, although they are very difficult, if
not impossible, to identify. For that purpose, two situations will be considered
which differ in the type of competition and, consequently, in the type of
adjustment involved.' In the first place, consider the case in which the real
situation can be approximated by a totally competitive model without restric-
tions on access to technology, without economies of scale and in which no
abnormal private profits exist, the latter being defined as those resulting from
the difference between the rate of return on investment at market prices and
the minimum profitability required for businessmen to invest. This situation is
reflected in Figure 7.2 in which the individual long-run average cost functions
(including "normal" profits) are equal for all producers and depend on the
volume of production. In other words, for each volume of total production q(
there exists an average cost c[#,] equal for all. But since pt = c[qt] for all, the
additional income (pt — p0)<7, is simply what is needed to pay the total
additional costs C[<?J — C[q0] incurred by each producer (if the industry
could expand at constant costs, pf - p0 would be nil). This additional income
(costs) for the producer of q can represent income changes ranging from
additional abnormal profits per product unit in the inter industrial chain sup-
plying the inputs, to changes in relative factor prices that increase the price of
product q relative to that of others. This type of distributional effect is difficult
to even approximate and in practice is ignored.
Let us now consider the case shown in Figure 7.3, in which there are
economies of scale, restrictions on all the producers having access to the same
technology and entry barriers. The "big" producers, with average long-run
1. Consulting Mishan (1968, 1981a, Part V and 1982, Chapter 10) will help to shed light on a
problem not often dealt with in the literature on applied welfare economics.
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NON-TRADED INPUTS
Figure 7.3 An Oligopolistic Model
costs including "normal" profits cb[q], and the "medium-sized" ones (cm[q])
allow the existence of "small" firms, and it is to their costs (c5[^]) that the
market price corresponds.2 The effects of the demand increase created by the
project are also difficult, if indeed possible, to estimate. If additional output
came from the "small" firms, there would not be abnormal profits for them,
although the problem of relative price changes could arise for the competitive
case already discussed. Conversely, if the additional output came from the
expansion of medium-sized or large firms it is very likely that they would
enjoy abnormal profits since the price determination "model" implies that the
small firms are not eliminated completely.3
The difficulties in approximating the distributional effects of the changes
Pi ~ Po (if they existed) are obvious and, in practice are usually ignored. This
raises the question of how important the effects omitted are. In the case of
producers with different costs (Figure 7.3), the greater the difference between
the price and the average cost of the firms that expand output in response to
excess demand, the greater the magnitude of the effect. Conversely, in more
competitive markets (Figure 7.2) the effects are likely to be less important. In
this regard, it can be shown that for small changes q{ - qs,
2. See SylosLabini( 1966).
3. See Sylos-Labini (1966) and the works by Mishan mentioned at the beginning of this
section.
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VALUATION OF NON-TRADED GOODS
Table 7.2. Practical Approximation of Income Changes Due to
Excess Demand Generated by the Project.
The Competitive Model
Purchases of (9, - qs)
Costs of Producing (g, -qs)
Total
Project
-ptoi - 9S )
-P(<7, - <7S)
Producers
of q
P(<?1 - <7S)
-c(<7, - Qs)
(p - c)% - qs)
Total at
Efficiency
Prices
-c(Qi - <7S)
-c(9, - 9S)
Source: Figure 7.1.
in which a is demand increase <?, - gs as a proportion of q0, e is price
elasticity of supply and 17 price elasticity of demand.4 Consequently,
will be smaller, the greater the supply and demand elasticities are in absolute
terms. Given that, in general, supply elasticity will be sufficiently high,
ignoring the distributional effects implicit in this area is not expected to have
major repercussions on the final result. If we ignore the area (p, — p0) q0, we
can redefine the effect on the producers of q, limiting it to the difference
between their marginal income and their marginal costs (at prices prevailing
in the situation without the project)
in which c is now the constant long-run marginal cost. The analysis is thus
conducted as if all the demand increase were met by additional output and
thus disregarding the (minor) effects on the purchasers of q0 - qs. Conse-
quently, the effects which in practice could be considered are project expen-
diture, its counterpart as additional income for producers, and the marginal
costs (at the prices prevailing in the without project situation), shown in
Table 7.2. Recall that equality between price, marginal cost at market prices
and marginal cost at efficiency prices was already assumed in Section 3.4.
This assumption, maintained throughout Part I, results in the valuation of non-
traded inputs at their market price. Part II includes a brief discussion on the use
of input-output techniques to approximate the valuation of marginal costs at
efficiency prices, and to identify the main transfers involved in the difference
between the price and marginal costs at market and efficiency prices.
4. See Fontaine (1981).
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CONSUMER GOODS
7.3 The Project Produces Consumer Goods
The examples of market functioning briefly presented in the previous section
will be useful for discussion here on additional supply of consumer goods. We
will consider the cases in which price reductions can be either expected or not
and in which, consequently, it will or will not be necessary to estimate
changes in consumers' surpluses. Let us consider first the competitive case in
which all enterprises use the same technique and none obtains abnormal
private profits. In such a case, it is unlikely that a project using the same
technique would come up for analysis, unless for short-run reasons the firms
are making such profits temporarily and the investment being considered is
what causes the adjustment. Under these circumstances, the elimination of
abnormal private profits through a price reduction is not a transfer that can be
attributed to the project for a longer period than is necessary for another
enterprise to expand capacity in the without project situation. These short-run
effects are not often estimated and, more important from a practical point of
view, it is even less probable for the public sector to assess projects with these
characteristics.
A second case in a competitive market would be a situation where the
introduction of a new technique would reduce costs (at the prevailing relative
prices), in which case the price would continue to be dominated for a (possi-
bly lengthy) time by marginal producers, and the effect of the project would
be to replace some of them. This will continue as long as there are no
restrictions on access to the particular technique and the price will not fall
until (at least in theory) the last producer using the old technique has been
eliminated. In this instance again, it is unclear whether the resource savings
stemming from the introduction of the new technique must be attributed to a
particular project when the market behavior model itself implies that introduc-
tion of the new technique will take place inevitably for one firm or the other.
An interesting exception to the foregoing would be projects such as credit
projects for small farmers to introduce "improved" methods of cultivation. In
these cases, the objective is to achieve or speed up a reduction in unit costs or
an increase in production, which would not take place without the project
(credit). But even in this case, there would only be an effect on the price of
outputs insofar as what can be attributed to credit is the eradication of the
"old" technique or the speeding up of the process. Otherwise the price would
continue to be determined by the costs of the producers with the old technique
and the effect of the project would simply be the saving in resources resulting
from producing the same quantity at lower costs.
Price reductions following the complete replacement of a technique by
another should not be attributed separately to credit but to a technical develop-
ment and dissemination program of which credit is only a part. Figure 7.4
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Figure 7.4 Producers Use the "Traditional", "Modern" and
"Most Efficient" Techniques
Figure 7.5 A "Modern" Producer Turns to the "Most Efficient" Technique
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CONSUMER GOODS
provides an example that shows the long-run average cost curves of individual
producers who use the "traditional" technique (qQ — qm), those who use the
"modern" technique (qm — qe) and the most "efficient" one (qe), on the
assumption that all the plots are the same size and that there are no differential
rents within each group. Only if the program goes as far as including the
producers of q0 - qm needed to reach ql with the new technique, will there be
a reduction in prices (the CVs of which will not only be attributable to credit)
as well as a release of resources because higher production per surface unit
could displace some of the producers who use the "traditional" technique. If
the project does not affect marginal producers, it will not affect prices, nor,
consequently, will it affect the differential rents of the remaining producers.
On the other hand, it will create differential rents for the beneficiaries of the
project. If the project affects all marginal producers, and consequently the
price, it will reduce the differential rents of other producers by an extent that
will depend on the technique introduced. Furthermore, it can give rise to
differential rents for the direct beneficiaries of the project (producers who
change their technique) only if costs in the situation with the project convert
other producers into marginal producers. In the example this would occur if
the project benefited the producers of q0 — qm by bringing them to the "most
efficient" technique without eliminating all those who use the "modern"
technique.
A second example consists of irrigation projects, which are a particular
instance of technical change. There again, there will only be reductions in
prices and a release of resources if irrigation is introduced in marginal hold-
ings. Otherwise, there will only be a release of resources and differential
rents. This case will be considered in more detail in Chapter 12.
We can then conclude that in general, in situations that can be represented
by the competitive model, there will be no price reductions that can be
attributed to the project, unless it reduces the unit costs of marginal producers,
and this reduction in costs would not have taken place without the project
being analyzed.
Now we can look at two examples of the introduction of a new technique on
the basis of Figure 7.4, which shows the situation without the project. To
simplify presentation, assume that production per surface unit of a "modern"
producer is half that of an "efficient" one. Let us first consider, for example,
the case of an irrigation project, which affects only one of the producers of
qm — qe, that is one who uses the "modern" technique, and that as a result of
the project this producer will move to the category of the most "efficient".
This situation with the project is represented in Figure 7.5, which shows that
the effect of the project is to displace some of the marginal producers without
eliminating them altogether. Consequently, the price will continue to be p0,
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VALUATION OF NON-TRADED GOODS
Table 7.3. The Project Introduces the "Most Efficient"
Technique to a "Modern" Producer
Changes in Sales
Changes in Costs
Total
"Modern"
Producer
Po(ls - 1m)
-c'(qm - qe) + cm(qs - qm)
(P0 + cm)«7s - qm) - c'(qm - qe)
"Traditional"
Producers
-Potos - 1m)
c'to«-u
(c< - p0)(<js - O
-cefe - <g
-c"(<7m - <7e)
Total
+ (cm + c') (qs
+ (cra + c')(<7s
-o
-y
Source: Figure 7.5.
and there will be no direct effects either on the consumers of q, the remaining
"modern" producers or the most "efficient" ones.
One of the main effects of the project, as indicated in Table 7.3, consists in
increasing the differential rents of the "modern" producer benefiting from the
project. The second effect will be to displace the marginal producers to other
activities without however, it is assumed, affecting their earnings since they
did not in any event receive any differential rents. If the unit costs at market
prices c', cm and c" were equal to costs at efficiency prices, there would be no
more effects to be recorded. Conversely, if the market prices of the inputs
were different from their efficiency prices, it would also be necessary to take
into account the transfers that constitute the difference between market and
efficiency prices. A clear example of this is the price of water, since the tariff
charge is often less than the costs of providing it. In this case, we have to
compute the investment, operating and maintenance costs of the irrigation
system, annualized and at efficiency prices, to compare them with the tariff.
This correction is always estimated in these projects, since to start with, the
costs of providing the water are computed, and the tariff is considered a mere
transfer between farmers and the irrigation authority (see Chapter 12).
Note that the sum in the Total column, or net benefits at efficiency prices, is
the difference between the costs saved by displacing the traditional producers
and by discarding the "modern" technique, less the costs incurred in using the
efficient technique. This result is logical since, as the price is not affected,
there will be no additional sales and all benefits at efficiency prices will be
cost savings. The reader will also notice that in practice the market prices of
costs cm and ce are corrected, but the correction of the effects that might be
caused by the displacement of marginal producers is omitted, i.e. it is as-
sumed implicitly that the market price in the without project situation is equal
to the average cost at market prices of the displaced producers (p0 = c'), that
this is equal to the corresponding cost at efficiency prices, and that there are
no income changes for the displaced producers. If p0 = c!, the sum of the total
column can be expressed as
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CONSUMER GOODS
Figure 7.6 The "Traditional" Producers Turn to the "Modern" Technique
that is, the additional sales of the producers affected by the project less their
additional costs, which is the traditional way of presenting the results of
projects of this type.
Let us now consider a case in which the project will introduce irrigation for
producers who use the "traditional" technique with unit costs c', bring them
to the modern technique with unit costs c™and, consequently, reduce the price
from p0 to PJ. The without project situation is shown in Figure 7.4 and that
with the project in Figure 7.6. Since a price change is brought about, con-
sumers and all producers are affected by the project. This gives rise to various
effects, which are worth considering step by step according to the group
affected. To simplify the presentation of the effects on the different people,
given in Table 7.4, consumers are treated as a single whole and the Con-
sumers column shows the sum of their CVs. The reader will bear in mind that
if the objective is to present the distribution of income changes, it will be
necessary to distinguish between groups of consumers, as will be done later in
Chapter 10.
Beginning with the consumers of q, each one benefits by the CV of the price
reduction. The total of consumers' CVs has been broken down into savings
from the purchase of q0, willingness to pay for additional purchases ql — q0,
and what is actually paid for them. What the consumers stop spending on q0 is
income that the producers no longer receive in proportion to their participation
107
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 b
y 
th
e 
In
te
r-
A
m
er
ic
an
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t B
an
k.
 A
ll 
ri
gh
ts
 r
es
er
ve
d.
Fo
r 
m
or
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
vi
si
t o
ur
 w
eb
si
te
: w
w
w
.ia
db
.o
rg
/p
ub
VALUATION OF NON-TRADED GOODS
in sales q0. What they pay for additional purchases </, - q0 is additional
income for producers who increase their output, i.e. the "traditional" pro-
ducers who adopt the "modern" technique, and is shown in that column as
part of the Project sales. The "efficient" producers will reduce their sales to
qe — q'e as a result of the price fall and lower production will reduce their total
costs by
in which cf is the average cost of the corresponding sales at price pr The
effects on the producers who already used the "modern" technique in the
without project situation are similar, since they reduce production by qm - q'm
and stop incurring the corresponding costs. The "traditional" producers, that
is those who adopt the "modern" technique as a consequence of the project,
are considered in two stages: first as if they were eliminated by the project, in
which case they also no longer receive p\(q$ — qm) and no longer incur costs
c'(q0 — qm); and then as if they reappeared using the "modern" technique, so
that they receive income from their sales. These include what the "tradi-
tional" producers produced previously (q0 — qm), plus reductions (qe - q'e)
and (qm - q'm) in the output of other producers caused by the price reduction
and plus additional purchases by consumers (qt — qa). At the same time, they
incur corresponding costs c™per unit produced.
It should now be noted that Table 7.4, although it carefully records all the
effects on consumers and producers, is very complex to use in practice. The
reader can imagine what it would be like if we discarded the assumption of a
single product q, only three techniques and a single farm size. In practice,
however, it is assumed that the effects of the price reduction on the quantities
produced by the "efficient" and "modern" producers in the without project
situation are insignificant, that is,
As a result, the entire increase in output by producers who adopt the "mod-
ern" technique is additional sales for the market as a whole, so that Table 7.4
can be considerably simplified.
The new results are shown in Table 7.5. The vertical sum of the columns
indicates the income changes of the various persons affected by the project. In
the case of consumers, they gain the total of the CVs of the price change
measured by the change in consumers' surplus. The "efficient" and "mod-
ern" producers in the without project situation see their income differentials
reduced to zero because the project has converted the users of this technique
into marginal producers. Finally, the effects on the "traditional" producers
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VALUATION OF NON-TRADED GOODS
can best be presented in two stages. The first consists in their discarding the
"traditional" technique
and the second in their adopting the "modern" technique
The example given is also simplified in the sense that it assumes that all the
"traditional" producers adopt the new technique and that the market absorbs
all that is produced as a result at a price no lower than their average costs. If
this were not the case, and some of the "traditional" producers were trans-
ferred from q to another crop z, the respective column would also have to
include the relevant additional income and costs:
Adding up the Total column in this table we obtain
Willingness to pay + Cost savings — Project costs
If input market prices are equal to their efficiency prices, the above expression
will represent the net benefits of the project at efficiency prices. Otherwise it
will be necessary to correct the valuation of these inputs. In this regard, the
valuation of foreign exchange and labor has already been discussed, and as
pointed out in Part I, the assumption of equality between market price and
efficiency price of non-traded goods is maintained. Finally, the reader will
note that the sum in the Total column reproduces the operational rule of
efficiency analysis, viz: willingness to pay for additional consumption, plus
the costs saved by displacement of a technique, less the costs incurred by
adopting that of the project.
7.4 The Project Produces Intermediate Goods
When the effect of the project is only to replace other producers without
affecting the price, the situation is similar to that already presented for con-
sumer goods. Conversely, if it affects prices, it is necessary to reconsider the
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VALUATION OF NON-TRADED GOODS
first column of Tables 7.4 or 7.5. In the case of consumer goods, the final user
of the goods whose price has been affected has been reached and it is possible
to estimate changes in consumers' surpluses. On the other hand, where inter-
mediate goods are involved, the price reduction will be a reduction in costs for
other producers. These in turn will be forced to transfer part or all of these
savings to the following stage in the intersectoral chain through prices, and so
on until the producers of consumer goods are reached and, through them, the
consumers. This raises various problems for estimating the distributional
effects. In the first place, the cost saving will "travel" forward along the inter-
industrial chain and at each stage or transaction, market conditions will deter-
mine the percentage of this saving that "continues the journey" forward
through prices and the percentage retained as additional profits. This makes it
difficult, if not impossible, to estimate which percentage of the initial saving
reaches consumers taken as a whole. In the second place, this initial cost
saving may affect producers of various goods and services, each of whom will
in turn sell to other producers of other goods, and so on. This makes it
difficult to estimate the effects on consumers benefitting from the cost saving,
since what is received will depend not only on the transfer process but also on
the particular composition of the consumer basket.
From a practical point of view, these problems are difficult to solve. With
regard to the distribution of the total saving between the percentage that
reaches consumers and the percentage retained as additional profits, it will be
difficult for the analyst to go beyond determining a range of transfer, taking
into account the type of input involved. As for the effect of the transfer on
different consumer groups, the use of input-output techniques may allow for
an approximation of the incidence of the saving transferred to be made,
although it will be possible to use it only if the following three conditions are
met: if the input-output table is sufficiently disaggregated, if the good in
question can be reasonably identified with some sector of the matrix or can be
incorporated into it, and if the consumption column can be broken down
according to the desired groups of consumers.
Let us assume that the project being analyzed will reduce the price of a good
that is both a final consumer good and an intermediate good. As a result,
people consume it not only directly but also indirectly through the consumer
goods that use it directly or indirectly as an input. As the structure of total
consumption, direct and indirect, of the good in question per type of con-
sumer will not be equal to that of direct consumption, it would be useful to
know the composition of this total consumption by group of consumers. With
the assistance of some simplifying assumptions, and using an input-output
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INTERMEDIATE GOODS
matrix, it is possible to approximate the direct and indirect requirements of the
consumption baskets of each group. Let
[7.1]
be the traditional equation of input-output analysis that relates the vector for
sectoral gross production values X with the final demand matrix D through the
matrix of total direct and indirect requirements T = (I — A)~l, in which /is
the identity matrix and A the matrix for intersectoral transactions in non-
traded goods.5 To simplify presentation, assume that X has only three
columns corresponding to "products" (1), (2) and (3) and that the final
demand matrix D can be broken down into the following vectors: consump-
tion of people with low incomes (Cb), consumption by the rest of the families
(Cr), Government consumption (Cg) and the remainder of final demand (Dr).
Thus, system [7.1] can be written as
[7.2]
The total requirements, direct and indirect, for product (3) corresponding to
the consumption basket of the low-income group will be
X,(Cb) = T3l C\ + F32 C* + T33 C»
which can be interpreted in the following way. In order to provide one peso's
worth of product (1) it is necessary to produce T3l pesos of (3), so that F31 C\
indicates the production value of (3) "contained" in C\ peso's worth of
consumption of product (1). Thus, X3(Cb) will be the value of product (3)
directly and indirectly contained in the consumption basket of the low-income
group, made up of their direct consumption Cf and by indirect consumption
5. See Chenery and Clark (1963) or Bulmer-Thomas (1982).
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VALUATION OF NON-TRADED GOODS
through the quantity of product (3) required to produce basket Cj". We could
calculate in the same way, the total consumption, direct and indirect, of
product (3) by the rest of the families and the Government, thus obtaining the
total consumption of each group:
Then the reduction in value of direct sales to final consumers could be
distributed in proportion to direct consumption, while the reduction in the
value of the intermediate sales which it is assumed reaches the final con-
sumers could be distributed according to the share of indirect consumption of
each group in the indirect consumption of all the consumer groups. Thus, for
example, suppose that the composition of direct consumption of product (3) is
that of indirect consumption is
and the reduction in the value of sales to final consumers is $500, and that to
intermediate users is $2000. If we assume that only 60% of the effect of the
sales price reduction for intermediate consumption reaches the final con-
sumers, each group of consumers will benefit by
and the remaining 0.40 x $2000 = $800 would be retained by producers
along the inter-industrial chain.
The procedure described has not escaped drastic simplification. In addition
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INTERMEDIATE GOODS
to the well known limitations of the input-output model, it ignores effects on
imports and exports, and distributes the savings from sales which are not for
consumption (which includes sales to sectors producing investment goods) in
accordance with the total content of consumption baskets. Although the sim-
ple model presented could be extended to include an approximation of this
type of effect, it would do so at the price of greater complexity and more
demanding requirements for data not often available, while it is unlikely that
it would add much precision to the final result.
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CHAPTER 8
THE DISCOUNT RATE
Preceding chapters have dealt with the identification of direct distributional
effects at a given moment in time. An investment project, however, is also a
proposal to allocate or reallocate income over time. The same resources
required to invest in a project today in order to receive a future flow of
consumption, can also be used to produce more consumer goods today. Thus
a method is required to compare additional present consumption against addi-
tional future consumption. This is the topic of this chapter.
It should be recalled that the discount rate is a parameter of vital impor-
tance, as well as one of the most controversial, in project appraisal. The
details of this controversy are beyond the scope of this chapter, which will
merely indicate the salient aspects of the controversy and provide references
to the main works on the subject.
8.1 Intel-temporal Allocation from the Individual Point of View
As pointed out in Chapter 1, most proposals for applying cost-benefit analysis
are based on the principle that those affected are the ones who define the nature
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THE INDIVIDUAL
of the effects, quantified by means of the respective CV. For the sake of
consistency therefore, weights for intertemporal comparison in principle
ought to be derived on the basis of these criteria. This is in fact the approach
followed by efficiency analysis advocates and for that reason, this section
presents the rationalization prevailing in the neo-classical theory of consumer
behavior regarding decisions on intertemporal consumption allocation. This
will make it possible to discuss the concept of the discount rate from an
individual point of view as well as its relationship with the interest rate of a
perfect capital market, the profitability rate of marginal investments, and
application of the compensation criterion.
A simple illustration of two periods will be used for this purpose. Let us
begin by considering an individual who receives income Y0 in this period and
who knows/or certain that he will receive income F, in the following period.
If a "perfect" capital market exists, without "distortions" such as an income
tax, in which a real interest rate / prevails, Mr. R has before him two extreme
hypothetical options. The first consists in devoting all his income F0 to present
consumption and in addition borrowing an amount F,/(l+0, also for con-
sumption in this period, a debt which at interest rate i he will be able to pay in
the following period (consuming zero in that period) from his income F,.
Thus, maximum present consumption possible will be
The alternative extreme option is not to consume anything in this period and
to invest his income F0 at rate / in order to consume
in the following period. In more general terms, his consumption in the follow-
ing period will be equal to his saving in the previous period plus the interest
between both periods, plus his income from the following period, i.e.
[8.1]
This expression corresponds to a straight line with a slope — (1 + j) and
represents the maximum combinations between present and future consump-
tion available to the individual at rate i (Figure 8.1). The combination to be
chosen will depend on his preferences between present and future consump-
tion. These preferences are represented on the graph by indifference curves U0
and £/,, which show the different combinations of present and future con-
sumption that result in the same level of welfare for the individual. It should
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THE DISCOUNT RATE
Figure 8.1 Possible Combinations of Present and Future Consumption
be noted that in order for him to know the utility level of a certain combination
of expenditure on present and future consumption, he also needs to know the
prices in effect in both periods. An indifference curve shows what quantity of
additional future consumption AC, is required to compensate him for a reduc-
tion - AC0 in present consumption, without altering his level of welfare. Let,
be this relation, which is equal to the slope of the indifference curve at the
point concerned. Thus, starting from a given level of present consumption,
the individual will be willing to reduce this consumption by quantity AC0 if he
can obtain AC0 (1 + d) in the following period, in which d is the so-called
time preference rate. Consequently,
The maximum indifference curve between present and future consumption
that the individual can reach is that which is tangential to his constraint [8.1],
and the point of tangency determines his intertemporal allocation of income.
At this point, the slope of the straight line is found to be equal to the slope of
the indifference curve, i.e.
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INTEREST RATE AS DISCOUNT RATE
This equilibrium position is reached by granting and taking loans. If the
individual's time preference rate is less than the rate of interest, he will save
since the increase in his future consumption (Y0 - C0) (1 + z) will be greater
than the minimum he is willing to accept (y0 - C0) (1 + d) for a reduction in
his present consumption. Conversely, if d > i he will borrow, since his
valuation today of the loss in future consumption (C0 — F0) (1 + i)/(\ 4- d) is
less than the increase in present consumption (C0 — F0). It should be noted
that the adjustment requires the possibility of lending and borrowing at rate i.
8.2 The Interest Rate as the Discount Rate
For given levels of present and future income, the higher the rate of interest,
the more the individual will save (F0 — C0), i.e. his supply of savings rises
with the interest rate. The horizontal aggregation of these individual saving
functions gives rise to the market savings supply function (Figure 8.2). At the
same time, those drawing funds in this period can invest these savings in
projects available to them, which can be classified in descending order ac-
cording to their certain profitability q, without considering interest paid as
costs. Since it is assumed that no investments are made that fail to show a
profit after interest payments, all investments made will verify that q > i.
Consequently, for the equilibrium investment level, the marginally under-
taken (or rejected) investment will verify that
Figure 8.2 The Savings Market
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THE DISCOUNT RATE
Table 8.1 Flows of Costs and Benefits of
Two Hypothetical Projects
Project
/*
P2
YearO
Government
-100
-100
Yean
Mr.P
110
Year 2
Mr. ft
130
In this way, a perfect capital market, without "distortions" such as income
taxes, would ensure equality between individual discount rates, the interest
rate and the profitability of marginally undertaken (or displaced) investments.
Now, if all the individuals affected by a project participate in this market,
equality between the interest rate and the individuals' discount rate ensures
that use of the equilibrium interest rate as a discount rate will comply with the
potential Pareto improvement criterion. Let us consider the comparison be-
tween Government projects P1 and P2 in Table 8.1 when the equilibrium
interest rate is 10% per year. Both require initial expenditure of 100 to obtain:
(a) in the case of P1, benefits of 110 to Mr. P the following year; and
(b) in the case of P2, benefits of 130 to Mr. R at the end of two years.
Since the option of transferring the 100 to Mr. P or to Mr. R exists, carrying
out project P1 is "equivalent" to effecting these transfers. It is indifferent to P
whether he receives 100 this year or 110 next year. If this sum were trans-
ferred to R, he could compensate P for the loss involved in not carrying out
P1. However, when considering project P2, Mr. R will prefer 130 at the end of
two years, compared with 100 today, since he is prepared to reduce his
consumption today by 100 if he can obtain at least 100(1+0.1)2 = 121 at the
end of two years. Furthermore, 130 would enable him to compensate Mr. P in
the third year for the 110 he lost in the second by not carrying out P1. This
would require 110(1+0.1) = 121, and leave a remainder of 130 - 121 = 9.
The above appears to indicate that sticking strictly to the principles of who
determines the nature of effects and how they are measured would lead us to
consider the rate of interest in a "perfect" market, without "distortions," as
the appropriate discount rate. However, innumerable criticisms have been
made of this formulation of the problem.
8.3 Criticism of the Use of the Interest Rate as the Discount Rate
The first type of criticism focusses on the existence of the conditions required
for the market to reveal rate d. Not only are future prices and incomes not
even known as random variables, they are also subject to uncertainty. More-
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CRITIQUE OF THE INTEREST RATE
Figure 8.3 Positions of Intel-temporal Equilibrium of Mr. P
over, the market interest rates are expressed in nominal terms so that any
intertemporal consumption plan requires the future inflation rate to be
known.1 In addition, the existence of income tax introduces special complica-
tions. In this case, person j will equal his individual discount rate di with the
rate of interest after taxes z (1 — tj) in which tj is the marginal income tax rate
corresponding to that person. Consequently, unless tJ is the only rate for all
persons, a single interest rate will correspond to various individual discount
rates and there will be a different "average" discount rate for each project,
which will depend on the interpersonal and intertemporal distribution of costs
and benefits.2 Finally, application of the compensation criterion to the inter-
temporal allocation described in Section 8,2 requires both individuals to par-
ticipate in the "savings market." Let us consider for example the case shown
in Figure 8.3, in which the future income of P is less than or equal to the
minimum acceptable consumption in this period, while his present income is
somewhat higher than the respective minimum consumption. In such a situa-
tion, P does not want to borrow since this would mean an unacceptable
reduction in his future consumption. At the same time, the prevailing rate of
interest i is less than his time-preference rate d so that
the increase in future consumption possible at rate i (Cl,—F, in Figure 8.3) is
less than the minimum required to persuade him to save (Cld—YT). In this
1. See Section 9.3 below.
2. Cf. Mishan (1982, Chapter 35). The author wishes to thank Professor Mishan for an
exchange of correspondence on this point.
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THE DISCOUNT RATE
case, the compensation criteria cannot be implemented by using a single rate i
since this rate is different from the time-preference rate of Mr. P. A change in
the distribution of present or future income in favor of P could take him to a
point such as A at which he would participate in the savings market. However,
a generalized redistribution would affect the savings market and would give
rise to a different interest rate than that which would have prevailed without
redistribution. As a consequence, even if a perfect market existed, the result-
ing rate of interest might not be the appropriate one for implementing the
compensation criterion if one or more individuals did not participate in the
market. It should also be noted that the interest rate is not independent of
(present or future) income distribution between individuals.
The second type of criticism is based on the impossibility, in the field of
intertemporal decisions, of complying with the principle that it is those who
are affected who determine the nature of effects, since these extend beyond
the life of the present generation. Mishan (1981a, 1981c, and 1982) has put
this in terms of the impossibility of applying the criterion of the potential
Pareto improvement when gainers and losers do not co-exist in time. Let us
suppose that project Pr, which costs the Government 100, will show bene-
fits the following year of 100(1 + qr) received entirely by Mr. R, and that
qr > d. Alternative project P?, which also costs 100, will provide benefits
100(1 + qf)m received entirely by Mr. F in year 100, in which qf = rf.3
Obviously,
and application of the present value criterion would result in Pr being selected.
However, as Mr. R would not be alive in year 100, it would not be possible to
effect compensation unless a mechanism existed for transfers between genera-
tions that could potentially take compensation 100(1 + d) in year 1, and
reinvest it at rate d for 99 years in order to compensate Mr. F. Given that this
mechanism depends not only on the possibility of transfers between members
of the same generation, but in addition on the possibility of transfers between
generations, Mishan has called it "potential potential Pareto improvements"
and expressed objections to the use of the present value criterion without
explicit consideration of the intergenerational problem.4
Other economists have questioned acceptance of the interest rate of a per-
fect market on the basis of denying the ability or even possibility of individ-
uals of the present generation to make intertemporal comparisons that affect
3. The assumption should be noted that d today is equal to d in 100 years.
4. In this regard, see also Pearce and Nash (1981).
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SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATE
members of future generations. Even in the (unrealistic) case of perfect cer-
tainty about future prices and incomes, there would be no certainty about the
date of death, and this uncertainty of the present generation, which would be
expressed through higher discount rates, is not a defensible argument for
discounting the benefits of future generations.
The criticism would be equally strong if the claim were made to use a
"pure" time-preference rate. In the words of Sen (1961):
A distant object "looks" smaller, and we tend to value, it is claimed, a unit of
consumption in the future less than we value the same now... If the difference is
only due to distance in time, then the position is symmetrical. A future object
looks less important now, and similarly, a present object will look less impor-
tant in the future. While it is true that the decision has to be taken now, there is
no necessary reason why today's discount of tomorrow should be used, and not
tomorrow's discount of today.
These concisely put criticisms are by no means exhaustive. However, they
do illustrate the difficulties in accepting even the interest rate of a reasonably
competitive market as the discount rate.5
8.4 The Social Discount Rate
If a "pure" time preference rate is unacceptable and the uncertainty of the
present generation is not accepted as a criterion for discounting the benefits of
future generations, why should future benefits be discounted at all? What one
gets as an answer is based on rejecting, totally or partially, the intertemporal
preferences revealed by the present generation and sticking to the "principle
of the diminishing marginal utility of consumption." Since the future genera-
tion will be richer than the present one (per capita consumption rises), an
additional unit of future consumption is less valuable than an additional unit
of present consumption.6 This enables us to deduce and interpret a formula for
the discount rate based on the "principle of diminishing marginal utility of
consumption" and on a value judgment made explicit by postulating a "total
economic welfare" function. Various proposals exist, of course, regarding
this function, of which only one will be presented here.7
5. The reader interested in more details of the controversy can consult, in addition to the works
mentioned, Dobb (1960) and Marglin (1963). Layard (1972) and Pearce and Nash (1981) provide
summaries of the discussions. Sen (1982) provides a more advanced treatment of the discount rate
including the subjects of the following sections.
6. The reader will note that the same argument can be applied to members of the present
generation. In this case, a unit of additional income for a poor person today will be more valuable
than the same unit for a rich person. This topic will be considered in Chapter 15.
7. Ray (1984) discusses this in detail. Also see Sen (1982).
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THE DISCOUNT RATE
Let us suppose that the level of "total economic welfare" is a function of
per capita consumption and let
be the flow of costs and benefits from an investment project. As the popula-
tion (Nt) and its growth are independent of the project, B,/N, will be the
change in per capita consumption brought about by the project in year t. If wt
is the contribution to "total welfare" of an additional unit of per capita
consumption in year t, the project's contribution to "total welfare" will be
and the project will be accepted if AW is greater than zero. However, the
analyst does not need to know the weights w, or express costs and benefits in
per capita terms. If AW is positive, then
will be also, from which we can deduce that AW0 is equal to the present value
of flow Bt and a simple expression for the discount rate corresponding to the
"total welfare" function W.
If in order to simplify, we assume that the population grows at a constant
rate «, the weight assigned to benefits obtained in year t + 1 compared with
the one they are assigned the previous year will be
so that we can write
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SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATE
Assuming now, as is customary in cost-benefit analysis, that weights wt also
diminish at a constant rate, we can write the following:
in which d is the discount rate. Consequently, [8.3] can be written as
which is the traditional formula for present value.
We now need to ask ourselves about the relation between the discount rate
obtained this way (d), the "marginal utility of per capita consumption" (w)
and the rate of growth of the population («), which will enable us to obtain a
simple formula for d. On the basis of [8.2] we can write
and bearing in mind that w, = wf+l - Aw, the preceding expression becomes
Multiplying and dividing by the expected per capita consumption growth rate
(Ac/c) we obtain
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THE DISCOUNT RATE
Note now that, given that Aw is a function of the change in per capita
consumption,
is the elasticity of the "marginal utility of per capita consumption." Conse-
quently, expression [8.2] can finally be written as
[8.4]
in which c = Ac/c is the expected per capita consumption growth rate.
If the expected per capita consumption and population growth rates can be
considered as given, the problem is reduced to parameter e, for which some
authors have proposed estimation procedures on the basis of data on prices
and quantities consumed.8 The advantage claimed for this approach is that it is
consistent, at least in part, with the principle of accepting individual prefer-
ences. In other words, of all the reasons that the members of the present
generation may have for discounting future consumption, the one accepted is
that of "diminishing marginal utility of consumption" and it is assumed that
the rate at which it diminishes does not change between the generations
affected.9 Conversely, for other authors, parameter e ought simply to be
considered as a value judgment by the "political authority."10
Whatever the position adopted regarding parameter e, the question of con-
sidering the per capita consumption growth rate as a datum must still be
discussed. If in accordance with the operational rule of efficiency analysis,
investment has to expand until the profitability of marginal investment is
equal to the discount rate, the future per capita consumption growth rate will
be a function of the discount rate through investment. To avoid this problem,
Marglin (1963) has proposed that we begin by determining the (possible)
growth rate desired, in order to derive from that the investment required to
reach it. Given that for whoever makes decisions, this investment rate is
optimal by definition, the rate of return of marginal projects is the discount
rate, since otherwise we would reduce present consumption even more to the
benefit of investment (future consumption). From this we deduce that when,
in efficiency analysis, the rate of return of marginal projects is used as the
discount rate, the investment rate is assumed to be optimal in a normative
8. Helmers (1979, Section 9.2) gives a summary of the procedures used and the results
obtained.
9. The reader interested in more detail can consult Dasgupta and Pearce (1972, Chapter 6).
10. Weisbrod (1968), UNIDO (1972) and Scott, et al. (1976).
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SUMMARY
sense, i.e. it is not different because the political authority considers it
optimal.
8.5 Summary
If the intertemporal preferences revealed by the present generation are ac-
cepted as the criterion for intertemporal aggregation, it is then necessary to
ask ourselves if the financial market complies with all the requirements neces-
sary for the prevailing rate of interest or a derivative thereof to be considered
as the common discount rate for all individuals. If the answer were in the
affirmative, the practical problem of the discount would be solved. Con-
versely, if the conclusion were that the preferences revealed by individuals
indicated the existence of different individual discount rates, the problem of
intertemporal comparisons would become considerably more complicated
since, from a theoretical point of view, the discount rate of each individual
would have to be used. The extent of the practical problem will depend on the
spread of the different individual rates. Only after solving this part of the
problem should we go on to discussing the relationship between the rate of
return of marginal investment and the discount rate(s).
If, on the other hand, the revealed intertemporal preferences are rejected as
a criterion for intertemporal comparisons, it will be necessary to explain the
principles of the alternative criterion to be used (including not discounting)
and ensure that it is consistent with the interpersonal aggregation criterion.11
This should all be done before comparing the resulting discount rate with the
rate of return of marginal investment.
In the remaining chapters of Part I and in Part II of this study, we shall be
working on the assumptions of the operational version of efficiency analysis,
i.e. we assume that the discount rate is equal to the profitability at efficiency
prices of marginal investment. The consequences of relaxing this assumption
will be discussed in Part III.
11. See Chapter 15.
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CHAPTER 9
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF AN
INDUSTRIAL PROJECT
9.1 Introduction
The preceding chapters have presented the principles of cost-benefit analysis,
tracing the path that goes from the compensating variation as a criterion for
measuring changes in individuals' "economic welfare", to the formulas for
estimating accounting prices for foreign exchange and labor. These formulas
correspond to a specific set of assumptions, some of which oversimplify, but
which will be maintained in this chapter. In particular, each time non-traded
goods appeared on the scene in preceding chapters, their market prices were
assumed to be good approximations of their efficiency prices. This assump-
tion, which will be maintained in this chapter, simplifies presentation consid-
erably and allows us to make an initial approach to applied cost-benefit
analysis when the distributional effects are identified. This simplified presen-
tation is useful from an instructional point of view insofar as it provides the
reader, usually more familiar with efficiency analysis than with identification
of distributional effects, an introduction to the problem of estimating these
effects by applying principles presented in the preceding chapters to a simple
example.
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VALUATION OF REAL FLOWS
Let us consider the case of an industrial project submitted to the National
Development Bank (NDB) to obtain a long-term credit. A state bank, the
NDB is an integral part of the industrial promotion system and thus grants
these credits at preferential terms compared with commercial banks with
regard to repayment periods and interest rates. The project analysis presented
in this chapter is carried out exclusively as a cost-benefit analysis, one of the
criteria that the NDB takes into account for granting loans.
9.2 Valuation of Real Flows
Table 9.1 shows the present value of the project's cash flow from the perspec-
tive of the sponsoring firm. In this table, the project inputs have already been
classified into the most appropriate categories for economic analysis. Thus,
for example, a distinction has been made between imported and non-traded
inputs and between skilled and unskilled labor. The project will be analyzed
according to the major categories of this classification, and in the order in
which they appear in the table.
Following the valuation criteria explained in Chapter 4, the factory gate
value of the sales of the project's outputs has been broken down into its main
components. Output A is an intermediate good currently imported directly by
its users, which in the future will purchase directly from the project, i.e., the
commercial sector is not affected. However, the project will be located close
to the user firms, which will permit transport cost savings because of the
difference between such costs for port-purchaser and project-purchaser jour-
neys. Since project-purchaser transport is carried out by the latter, these costs
are not included in Table 9.1, in which output A is valued at factory gate
prices. The corresponding price is set so that it equals the customs gate price
of the imported good, with the saving in transport costs thus being transferred
to purchasers as an incentive to maximize utilization of domestic production
capacity. We assume that the saving will be kept by the purchaser firms in the
form of bigger profits. Ultimately, the factory gate price can be expressed as
the total of the foreign exchange saved, the import taxes no longer paid and
the savings on port costs. Thus, the Government stops receiving taxes corres-
ponding to the imports substituted (20,000). The foreign exchange now needs
to be valued at efficiency prices by using the APRFE, which has been esti-
mated according to expression [3.33] as
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AN INDUSTRIAL PROJECT
Table 9.1 Present Value of the Flow of Funds
from the Industrial Project
(ln$)
Consequently, use of the foreign exchange released will increase tax revenue
by
The production of A yields B as a by-product, which is not used by domestic
industry and is exported subject to a tax of 5 %. It is exported by an intermedi-
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Source
Sales
• Output A
• Outputs
• Sales Tax
Current Costs
• Imported Inputs
• Non-traded inputs
• Skilled Labor
• Unskilled Labor
• Payments for Technology and Trademarks
Fixed Capital Investments
• Construction
• Imported Machinery and Equipment
• Non-traded Equipment
• Non-traded Inputs
• Imported Inputs
• Technical Assistance
• Skilled Labor
• Unskilled Labor
Circulating Capital Investments
« Imported Inputs
• Non-traded Inputs
• Semi-finished Goods
• Finished Goods
Finance
• Long-Term Credits
• Repayments
• Short-Term Credits
• Repayments
Sub Total
Direct Taxes
Total
Amount
630,000
525,000
124,000
-19,000
-450,600
-202,100
-173,900
-37,800
-31,500
-5,300
-145,000
-30,000
-110,000
-2,200
-250
-350
-200
-1,500
-500
-11,600
-5,100
-2,200
-300
-4,000
44,500
86,000
-48,000
72,000
-65,500
67,300
-6,730
60,570
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VALUATION OF REAL FLOWS
ary firm whose trade margin c is 10% of the sales value, so that the factory
gate price pf will be
With these data, the factory gate value of exports can be broken down into
foreign exchange, taxes and trade margins as shown in Table 9.2. Finally the
sales tax paid by the project is additional revenue for the Government, which
is added to the net balance resulting from the changes in revenue caused by
the import substitution and the exports. Thus, the valuation at efficiency
prices will be equal to the changes in the income of those affected: the project,
the purchaser firms and the Government.
Current costs can be considered together with investments in stocks. The
present value of the annual increases in stocks of inputs can be added to the
present value of the respective annual consumption since the goods are the
same. Stocks of semi-finished and finished foods are valued at the production
cost, so that the corresponding value can be broken down into inputs and labor
according to the structure of these costs. In this case, payments for technology
and trademarks, which are paid on sales, must be omitted and logically so
must administrative and marketing costs. The result of this procedure is
Table 9.2 Valuation
(ln$)
Source
Imports Substituted (A)
• Foreign Exchange
• Taxes
• Port Costs
Savings in Transport
Costs
• Port-User Transport
• Project-User Transport
Exports (B)
• Foreign Exchange
• Taxes
• Trade
Sales Taxes
Total
of Sales
Project
525,000
500,000
20,000
5,000
124,000
145,029
-7,251
-13,778
-19,000
630,000
at Efficiency
Purchasers
of A
__
4,200
6,500
-2,300
4,200
Prices
Government
30,000
50,000
-20,000
21,754
14,503
7,251
19,000
70,754
Total at
Efficiency
Prices
555,000
550,000
5,000
4,200
6,500
-2,300
145,754
159,532
-13,778
704,954
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AN INDUSTRIAL PROJECT
shown in Table 9.3 together with the quantification of the effects resulting
from the economic valuation. The vast majority of inputs would be imported
tax-free as part of the industrial incentives granted to the project. These inputs
are valued delivered to the project, so that the relevant transport costs have
been separated. The remaining imported inputs will be purchased locally,
which is why the corresponding taxes and transport and trade margins have
been separated. Foreign exchange has been valued at efficiency prices, using
an APRFE = 1.1, and the values at market prices of transport and trade
services have been accepted as equal to their values at efficiency prices. The
latter criterion was also used for non-traded inputs and skilled labor. Unskilled
labor will be ultimately withdrawn from the agricultural sector and has been
valued according to the presentation in Chapter 6, Section 6.6. Finally, the
payments for technology and trademarks are made to a foreign firm in foreign
exchange. This foreign exchange is expressed in domestic currency, which is
why the corresponding amount has been corrected using the APRFE.
Fixed capital investments include construction, domestic and imported ma-
chinery and equipment (including spare parts), technical assistance for instal-
lable 9.3 Valuation at Efficiency Prices of Current Costs and
Stocks
(InS)
Source
Imported Inputs
• Foreign Exchange
• Taxes
* Transport
• Trade
Non-traded Inputs
Skilled Labor
Unskilled Labor9
Foreign Exchange
Taxes
Other Domestic Costs
Reservation Wages
Social Security
Transfers to Workers
Payments for
Technology and
Trademarks
Total
a. From Table 6.7.
Project
-209,264
-199,448
-2,201
-3,200
-4,415
-177,691
-38,058
-31,887
-7,873
315
1,181
-9,566
-2,232
-13,712
-5,300
-462,200
Government
-17,744
-19,945
2,201
—
-1,670
-787
-315
-568
-530
-19,944
Unskilled
Workers
—
-
—
16,512
2,800
13,712
16,512
Total at
Efficiency
Prices
-227,008
-219,393
-3,200
-4,415
-177,691
-38,058
-17,045
-8,660
1,181
-9,566
-5,830
-465,632
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VALUATION OF REAL FLOWS
Table 9.4 Valuation at Efficiency Prices of Construction Costs
(ln$)
Source
Imported Inputs
• Foreign Exchange
* Taxes
• Transport
Non-Traded Inputs8
Skilled Labor
Unskilled Labor
Total
Project
-6,780
-6,500
-130
-150
-14,060
-6,220
-2,940
-30,000
Unskilled
Workers
—
-
_
1,470
1,470
Government
-520
-650
130
_
-150
-670
Total at
Efficiency
Prices
-7,300
-7,150
-150
-14,060
-6,220
-1,620
-29,200
a. Includes the capital cost that could not be disaggregated.
lation and assembly, and assembly and start-up costs. The latter two items
have been broken down into their main components to better value them at
efficiency prices, which was the same valuation approach used for current
costs. In the case of construction, a different procedure has been followed. It
consists of breaking down such costs according to the main types of inputs
(see Table 9.4) and valuing each of these separately. The imported inputs and
unskilled labor required for construction have been valued by following the
same criteria as those already explained. Since it was not possible to disaggre-
gate capital costs ("depreciation plus profits") these were grouped together
with non-traded inputs, and their market value, like that of skilled labor, was
accepted as equal to their value at efficiency prices. This assumes that the
market prices of the equipment used are equal to their efficiency prices and
that the activity receives "normal" profits (its rate of return is equal to the
discount rate). This procedure, although imperfect, should give a better valua-
tion than simply accepting the market value of construction as being equal to
its value at efficiency prices.'
The results of valuing construction costs in such a way are shown in Table
9.4 and the Total column has been transferred to Table 9.5 to include it with
the other investment costs. Machinery and equipment will be imported tax-
free, which is why these costs, except for 5,000 of port-project transport
costs, are foreign exchange. The remaining items have been valued in accor-
dance with the principles already presented and only "technical assistance"
deserves a special mention. This item includes the salaries of the professional
I. The reader will notice that a similar approximation can be adopted for the main non-traded
inputs shown in Table 9.1. This will be dealt with more completely in Chapter 11 when the use of
input-output techniques for estimating accounting prices is discussed.
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AN INDUSTRIAL PROJECT
Table 9.5 Valuation at Efficiency Prices of Investment Costs
(ln$)
Source
Construction
Imported Machinery & Equipment
Transport
Non-Traded Equipment
Non-Traded Inputs
Imported Inputs
Technical Assistance
Skilled Labor
Unskilled Labor
Total
Project
-30,000
-105,000
-5,000
-2,200
-250
-350
-200
-1,500
-500
-145,000
Unskilled
Workers
1,470
250
1,720
Government
-670
-10,500
-11
-10
-26
-11,217
Total at
Efficiency
Prices
-29,200
-115,500
-5,000
-2,200
-250
-361
-210
-1,500
-276
-154,497
and technical staff of the firm supplying the licence. It is estimated that only
50% of these salaries will be spent within the country and that the remainder
will be transferred abroad.
9.3 Treatment of Financial Flows
The economic analysis of projects is normally effected on the basis of a
flow of funds expressed at constant prices. However, flows of funds expressed
at "constant prices" are often found in which the receipt and repayment of
loans have not been deflated by the expected rate of inflation. As this section
will show, this inconsistency does not affect the "efficiency" analysis, but
does have important consequences for the identification and quantification of
distributional effects.
Let us consider the case of a $100 loan received at the beginning of year
zero, and repaid in five equal annual payments from the beginning of year one
at a nominal interest rate of 10%. This financial transaction will appear in a
flow of funds at current prices as shown in the first four rows of Table 9.6.
However, given the existence of a non-zero inflation rate, the reductions in
future income required to repay the loan each year cannot be compared with
one another, or with the amount of the loan received, until all these values are
expressed in the same unit, i.e. in prices of the same year. Given that in cost-
benefit analysis, year zero is traditionally used as the base period, it will be
necessary to deflate the repayment flow by using the inflation rate in years one
to five, which we assume is known, constant and equal to 10%. Thus, to
construct the last two columns of Table 9.6, each annual repayment amount R,
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FINANCIAL FLOWS
Table 9.6 Flows of Funds from a Loan
Source
Flows at Current
Prices
• Loan
• Amortization
• Interest
Total
Flows at Constant
Prices
• Loan
• Repayment
Present
Value 0
100
— _
- -
100
100 100
78
Year
1
—
-20
-10
-30
_
-27.3
2
—
-20
-8
-28
—
-23.1
3
_
-20
-6
-26
_
-19.5
4
_
-20
-4
-24
_
-16.4
5
_
-20
-2
-22
_
-13.7
must be divided by (1 + 0.1)'; for example, the outflow of funds in year
three, #3, can be expressed at constant prices as
Given that in this example the nominal interest rate is equal to the future
inflation rate, the real interest rate is equal to zero. In fact, by using Table 9,6
the reader may check that
that is, the amount of the loan received is equal to total repayment values
expressed at constant prices. Now, once they have been expressed in real
terms, future income flows will have to be discounted at year zero using
discount rate d, which will also be assumed equal to 10%. Consequently the
present value of the repayment flow at constant prices /?* will be equal to
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AN INDUSTRIAL PROJECT
in which p is the inflation rate. In other words, the recipient of a loan in the
circumstances indicated will repay only 78% of what he has received or, in
other words, will receive a transfer equal to 22 % of the loan.
In more general terms, if the project receives various loans for an annual
total at current prices P, in each year t, the present value of the inflow for a
constant inflation raiep will be
If Rt is the annual debt servicing at current prices of the loans, the present
value of repayments at year zero prices will be
and the present value of transfers T* = P* — /?* will be
Quantifying the present value of the transfers received through long-term
finance (not indexed) means knowing future inflation ratep, which obviously
would not be possible. In some countries, in which the type of economic
policy expected in the future does not differ substantially from that followed
in the past, the analyst will be able to make an approximate projection of a
constant rate p. In others, the margin of error will be considerably bigger and
there will be no way of avoiding them.2
Deciding who grants transfer PV(T*t) will be postponed until Sections 9.4
and 9.5, but for the moment let us only consider the direct effect, meaning
that it is the lending bank that grants the transfer.
We can now go back to Table 9.1, which contains the present value of the
flows generated by the project, and consider the values that appear under the
heading Finance. In accordance with the notation used,
2, There are countries whose rate of inflation is determined by that of some developed coun-
tries, so that the economic policy of the country concerned is not the only determining factor. In
the United States, "when Richard Nixon came to power in January 1969 he was greeted by 5%
inflation, a figure which in the eighties would cause rejoicing in the higher spheres, but which at
that time alarmed a public used to practically stable prices and worried by the trend away from the
stability of the previous three or four years" (Lekachman, 1982, Page 37). In Argentina in 1971
(p71 = 0.35), nobody in his right mind would have forecast the rate of inflation in 1984 (pM =. 6).
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FINANCIAL FLOWS
Table 9.7 Present Value of Credits and Their Repayments
(InS)
Source
Long-Term Credits
Repayments
Short-Term Credits
Repayments
Total
Project
86,000
-48,000
72,000
-65,500
44,500
NDB
-86,000
48,000
-38,000
Commercial
Banks
-72,000
65,500
-6,500
Total
_
-
is the present value of the long-term loans received and
the present value of the corresponding repayment flow. The loan would be
granted by the National Development Bank (NDB), which in Table 9.7, is
shown granting a loan to the project of 86,000 and receiving repayments of
48,000.
According to the financial statements contained in the project document,
during the first few years, the project will have to rely on short-term loans to
finance the formation of working capital. These financial statements show
that, as time goes by, the short-term loans will be replaced by internally
generated funds. However, short-term credit is offered (and supposedly will
continue to be offered during the life of the project) at real interest rates
appreciably below the profit rates firms can achieve from the use of such
funds. As a result, the demand for such loans greatly exceeds availability and
credit is rationed by the banking system. Considering that due to its character-
istics, the project is not expected to experience difficulties in obtaining short-
term credit, the initial loan will not be replaced by internally generated funds.
Instead, the original line of credit will be maintained and renewed periodi-
cally. It will then be useful to explain the procedure for calculating the
present value of short-term loans received and the present value of their
repayments, shown in Table 9.7.
Let us suppose that at the beginning of period k the project receives a loan
Pk to be repaid within 180 days whose value at year zero prices is
P\ = Pkl(\ -\-p)k.3 At the end of the period, the project will have to repay the
loan for a total at year zero prices of P\ (1 +/)/(! +/?). At the same time, it
will obtain another loan for an amount at year zero prices equal to what is
3. The hyphen above the variables p and further on i and d indicates that the variable is
defined for the duration of the loan. For example, if the period is three months, d will indicate the
quarterly discount rate equivalent to annual rate d.
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AN INDUSTRIAL PROJECT
necessary to replace the previous loan, plus the project's additional working
capital requirements AF£. Thus, in period k+1
At the end of this period, the project will pay P*k+l (1 +/)/(! +p) and will take
out a loan P*k+2, and so on until the period k+n+l begins when it will repay
P'k+n+i (l+i)/(l+p). The flows resulting from these operations are given in
schematic form in Table 9.8. The present value of the loans received, less the
present value of their repayments, both at year zero constant prices, will be
equal to
By rearranging the terms, the above expression can be rewritten as
[9-1]
where the expression between square brackets indicates the proportion of the
present value of the loans that the project receives (grants) as a transfer due to
a real interest rate that is less (greater) than the discount rate. Note that if this
interest rate is equal to the discount rate, the transfer is nil.
Formula [9.1] is valid when the term limit for all the loans is the same
which, although not necessarily true in practice, is a reasonable approxima-
tion if we keep in mind that we will be working with annual estimates of the
use of short-term loans.
Furthermore, recall that the financing being considered is for working
capital and not for current assets, even though the value of current assets
better approximates the additional needs for short-term financing for the econ-
omy as a whole attributable to the project. For example, if the firm makes
Table 9.8 Receipt and Repayment of Short-Term Loans
Year
Source
Loans
Repayments
k
p;
-
k+1
p;+,
Pt*(1+7)
1+p
k+2
p;+!
p;+,(i+oi+p
k+n
p*
• • • ' k+ti
P^-id+O
1+p
k+n+"\
—
P;+n(1+7)
1+p
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SUMMARY OF INCOME CHANGES
purchases of $100 per month due in 30 days and sells goods for $250 payable
in 30 days, the monthly demand for 30-day finance created is $350. However,
the need for working capital for the project is $350—$100 = $250 since the
remaining $100 is financed by the supplier.4
9.4 Summary of the Distribution of Income Changes
Generated by the Project
Having analyzed the distribution of income changes generated by the project
(sections 9.2 and 9.3), we can now group together such effects according to
their source and the groups affected. This grouping is shown in Table 9.9, in
which each row corresponds to the Total row of one of the preceding tables.
The total in the first column coincides, of course, with the corresponding one
in Table 9.1, since both show the present value of the income changes for the
project sponsors. The totals in the remaining columns show the gains or losses
of the others affected. The purchasers of input A increase their profits by not
transferring through prices the saving in transport costs. The unskilled work-
ers gain the difference between the wages paid in their new jobs and their
income from alternative jobs. The Government has a positive net tax balance,
while the banks are shown granting the transfer contained in short and long-
term credits. The total of the effects on the groups in question is the value of
net benefits at efficiency prices. However, to complete the distributional
effect, it is necessary to reconsider the allocation of transfers implied in bank
loans.
The NDB is shown transferring $38,000 caused by a real interest rate below
the discount rate. This explains why the Government has to periodically make
capital transfers to the NDB in order to maintain the volume of promotional
credit growing pan passu with industrial investment. Consequently, it is the
Government, which in reality pays the transfer received by the project, and
which would not be required to compensate the NDB for the transfer had the
loan not been granted. As the reader will remember from Chapter 1, the fact
that in the without project situation another industrial project would have
received the transfer, is connected with the distribution of net income changes
attributable to the project. This will be discussed in the following section.
In the case of short-term loans granted by the commercial banks, the depos-
itors can be considered, for the time being, the ones who grant the transfer
since they receive on their deposits an interest rate that is lower than the
4. Strictly speaking, the $100 overestimates the requirements for short-term financing for the
economy as a whole by the component (direct and indirect) of profits plus depreciation, and
underestimates it by the increases in stocks of raw materials, semi-finished and finished goods
required to expand production.
139
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 b
y 
th
e 
In
te
r-
A
m
er
ic
an
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t B
an
k.
 A
ll 
ri
gh
ts
 r
es
er
ve
d.
Fo
r 
m
or
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
vi
si
t o
ur
 w
eb
si
te
: w
w
w
.ia
db
.o
rg
/p
ub
Ta
bl
e 
9.
9 
Di
st
rib
ut
io
n
 
o
f t
he
 
In
co
m
e 
Ch
an
ge
s 
Br
ou
gh
t a
bo
ut
 
by
 
th
e 
Pr
oje
ct—
Fir
st 
Ap
pr
ox
im
at
io
n
(ln
$)
So
ur
ce
Sa
les
Cu
rre
nt 
Co
sts
an
d 
Sto
cks
Inv
es
tm
en
t C
ost
s
Fin
an
cin
g
•
 
Lo
ng
-te
rm
•
 
Sh
ort
-te
rm
Dir
ec
t T
ax
es
To
ta
l
Pr
oje
ct
63
0,0
)0
-
46
2,2
00
-
14
5,0
00
38
,00
0
6,5
00
-
6,
73
0
60
,57
0
Pu
rc
ha
se
rs
o
M 4,2
00
4,2
00
U
ns
ki
lle
d
W
or
ke
rs
16
,51
2
1,7
20
18
,23
2
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
70
,75
4
-
19
,94
4
-
11
,21
7
6,7
30
46
,32
3
N
D
B
-
38
,00
0
-
38
,00
0
C
om
m
er
cia
l
Ba
nk
s
-
6,
50
0
-
6,
50
0
To
ta
l a
t
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y
Pr
ic
es
70
4,9
54
-
46
5,
63
2
-
15
4,
49
7
84
,82
5
So
ur
ce
: 
Ta
bl
es
 
9.
2,
9.
3,
9.
5 
a
n
d 
9.
7.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 b
y 
th
e 
In
te
r-
A
m
er
ic
an
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t B
an
k.
 A
ll 
ri
gh
ts
 r
es
er
ve
d.
Fo
r 
m
or
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
vi
si
t o
ur
 w
eb
si
te
: w
w
w
.ia
db
.o
rg
/p
ub
140
NET INCOME CHANGES
discount rate.5 In short, the Government and depositors would grant the
transfers contained in long and short-term financing respectively. If we in-
clude such changes, we obtain Table 9.10, which shows the estimate of the
distribution of project costs and benefits.
9.5 Distribution of Net Income Changes Attributable to the Project
As we saw in Chapter 1, in order to estimate the distribution of net income
changes from the project, i.e. those that are attributable to the project, it is
necessary to know the distribution of income changes from the alternative
course of action, or without project situation. In this case, it is clear that,
given that an NDB loan is granted on preferential terms and is rationed, in the
absence of the project, the NDB would use these funds to finance other
project(s) displaced by the one being analyzed. The first row in Table 9.11
shows the distribution of the income changes of the project being analyzed, in
which the effects on the Government have been separated into two parts: the
transfer contained in the NDB loan and the remaining transfers. The second
row shows the distribution of the income changes of the alternative project, on
the simplifying assumption that it would require the same long-term credit as
the project being analyzed. Thus, in the without project situation, the alterna-
tive project would receive the transfer of $38,000 plus a transfer of $7,500
from the "depositors," since the alternative project requires more short-term
finance. Since it is a project that would produce exported goods, it does not
affect domestic consumers and only the Government and unskilled workers
are the remaining groups affected.
The distribution of the net income changes from the project being analyzed
will be the difference between the distribution of its income changes and the
distribution of those from the alternative course of action. Each one of the
groups affected gains (or loses) the difference between what it receives from
the project and what it would have received from the alternative course of
action, which in this case is another project. It should be noted, however, that
the balance in the Depositors column shows that they would gain 1,000 with
the project, which is not true, since the project's lower demand for short-term
credit compared with its alternative will not affect depositors' incomes, but
will enable other lenders to gain the 1,000. Finally, the total net benefits at
efficiency prices are the sum of the net incomes of all the groups affected.
5. The analysis assumes equality between lending and borrowing rates and consequently omits
quantification of financial intermediation costs.
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AN INDUSTRIAL PROJECT
Table 9.12 Present Value of Flows Attributable to Financing
(ln$)
Loan Received
Repayments
Total
Project
86,000
-48,000
38,000
Foreigners
-86,000
48,000
-38,000
Government
8,600
-4,800
3,800
Total
8,600
-4,800
3,800
9.6 Effects of Changes in Financing
The objective of this section is to discuss the consequences of changes in
financing on profitability at efficiency prices and on distributional effects.
Consider first a change in the financing of fixed investment resulting in a
reduction of (the present value of) long-term financing, which is compensated
by an increase in internal funds. The effect of this change will be to reduce the
present value of net income for the project's owners since the real interest rate
is below the discount rate. This reduction in income will be compensated by
an increase in the income of those who receive loans not granted to the
project. This will affect the distribution of income changes from the project
without any impact on its profitability at efficiency prices.
Secondly, the case may be considered in which the foreign suppliers of
machinery provide all the long-term credit. In order not to introduce numeri-
cal complications, it will be assumed that credit conditions are the same.
Table 9.12 shows the present value of the corresponding flows, considering
that the suppliers' credit is "tied" to the project.6
The project receives a present value of $86,000 to finance the purchase of
imported machinery and equipment. The loan is provided by the "foreigner,"
who receives the present value of the respective repayment flow. Since the
machinery was valued at its c.i.f. price times the APRFE when investment
costs were being considered, the credit received must be regarded as foreign
exchange income and, consequently, also corrected by the APRFE. Thus,
what is actually paid for the machinery is its c.i.f. value (105,000), less the
loan received (86,000), plus repayment of it (48,000), all multiplied by the
APRFE, i.e.
Now, as cost-benefit analysis takes into account the CVs of the effects on
"nationals," the loss to the "foreigners" must not be shown as a project
6, Financing would not be received if the project were not carried out, i.e. income and
repayment of the loan are flows of foreign exchange attributable to the project.
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CHANGES IN FINANCING
"cost." In other words, one of the benefits of the project would be, in this
case, obtaining a 38,000 transfer in foreign exchange from the foreigner,
whose value at efficiency prices is7
Consequently, the effect of the financing will be recorded in the cost-benefit
analysis accounts as shown in Table 9.13 and the total effects of the project on
nationals will then be those shown in the column Total at Efficiency Prices.
This table is the same as 9.10, except that the column Foreigners has been
included, and the Financing row has been replaced by the results obtained in
Table 9.12. We can now see that the present value of the project at efficiency
prices has increased, compared to the case with long-term financing from
national sources (Table 9.10), in the value at efficiency prices of the foreign
exchange transfer received from the "foreigners" (38,000 X 1.1 =41,800).
Finally, we should consider the possibility of the project being carried out
with foreign investment. For example, let us consider the case described in
Table 9.14, in which total fixed investment will be financed by long-term
loans granted by the National Bank (86,000) and the remainder by contribu-
tions from national (60%) and foreign (40%) shareholders.8 The latter will
make their contribution in foreign exchange and will receive profits in propor-
tion to their contributions, i.e. 40%. The effects of this financing on profit-
ability at efficiency prices and the distributional effect can be recorded by
including an additional column in Table 9.10 for foreign investors, as shown
in Table 9.15. To begin with, we would assume that the foreign investors
bring their share in cash and send the income obtained from their investments
abroad as they receive it. Thus, they deposit foreign exchange for a domestic
currency equivalent of $23,600. In addition, over the useful life of the
project, they remit the capital invested that they have recovered, plus profits
equivalent to a profitability rate equal to the discount rate, so that at the end of
the useful life of the project they will have remitted a present value equal to
their original investment. Now, as the project's profitability is greater than the
discount rate, the foreign investors receive (and remit) 40% of these "excess
profits". As both the capital contribution and subsequent remittances consti-
tute flows of foreign exchange, these flows have been corrected by the
APRFE and the corresponding transfers allocated to the Government. Note
that, assuming that the change in the source of financing has no effect on
7. The fact that the "transfer" could be compensated by a higher price for equipment or by
payments for technology, does not change this because these payments have already been entered
as project costs.
8. The reader should keep in mind that working capital will be financed by short-term credit
from the national banking system.
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Table 9.14 Financing the Project with Direct Foreign Investment
(InS)
Source
Long-term Credits
National Shareholders
Foreign Shareholders
Total
Amount
86,000
35,000
23,600
-145,000
Percentage
59.3
24.4
16.3
100.0
production and costs, the result is a reduction in benefits at efficiency prices.
This reduction is equal to the share of foreign investors in the "excess profits"
of the project multiplied by the APRFE.
It could be argued that the investors would not remit all of their income but
would reinvest at least part of it instead. Let us assume initially that a certain
sum / is invested for a year at profitability rate after taxes q, and that after-
wards it will be remitted. Consequently, instead of remitting /, the foreign
investor remits
one year later. The present value of this remittance (Rt +,) will be
in which it can clearly be seen that the present value of the remittance at t +1
will be equal to what was not remitted at t when private profitability q is equal
to the discount rate. If q were greater than d, the present value of the future
remittance would be even greater than the present one and this would even
further reduce the benefits at efficiency prices.9 When reinvestment takes
place at profitability q lower than the discount rate, it will reduce the foreign
exchange cost of remittances. Given the unlikelihood of this situation for
plausible discount rate values, the criterion followed in Table 9.15 appears
conservative.
Although the aim is not cost-benefit analysis of direct foreign investment,
the example given here may cast light on some key variables to be borne in
mind during the negotiating process that normally precedes an investment
from abroad.10 Firstly, there is the problem of the so-called "transfer prices"
in international transactions. If that were the case, it is obvious that the
9. The total effect of re-investment on benefits at efficiency prices will also depend on its
profitability at efficiency prices.
10. The interested reader may consult Sen (1971), Weiss (1980) and Kumar (1984).
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CHANGES IN FINANCING
project's purchases or sales should be valued at such prices and not at the
"world market" prices, since it is the former that determine effective flows of
foreign exchange. Secondly, there is the problem of the valuation of the
equipment that may constitute the capital contribution. It is logical to expect
the foreign investor to try to overvalue it, since it is the book value (and not
the real market value) that becomes the legal basis for the distribution of
private profits from the project. Finally, in the example shown, it can clearly
be seen that an important part of net income to investors comes from the
transfers implicit in financing, this point being of greater importance the
lower the real interest rate and the greater the proportion of financing from the
national banking system.
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CHAPTER 10
SELECTING EXPANSION PLANS
FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION:
A COST-BENEFIT APPROACH
10.1 Introduction
The analysis of expansion plans for electricity generating systems is a field in
which examples of applied cost-benefit analysis are scarce. In an effort to
contribute to discussion, therefore, part of this chapter will deal with this
topic.
Cost-benefit analysis, in its traditional form, takes as its point of departure
the comparison of situations with and without the project in order to estimate
costs and benefits attributable to the course of action consisting in carrying out
the project. When the "output" of the project is sold on the market, the price
will change by the amount required for the transition from one situation to
another, and that price change constitutes the starting point for estimating
income changes. Price changes will bring about changes in the production
plans of the remaining production units, and in the quantities demanded by
The author is grateful to T. Powers, G. Westley, L. Gutierrez Santos and J. Millan for their
comments on a preliminary version of this chapter.
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INTRODUCTION
consumers. In particular, changes in production plans are forecast on the basis
of the knowledge available concerning the demand function for the product,
the respective cost functions and the expected reactions of producers who seek
to maximize profits.
In the field of electricity production and distribution, the situation is some-
what different. Production is normally in the hands of very few firms, gener-
ally one or two, and there is no market that determines prices equating supply
and demand. Prices are fixed by the Government and the firms endeavour to
supply the quantity requested at that price, i.e. they are responsible for de-
signing and implementing the expansion plan. Individual projects are part of
these plans, and the plans are normally designed to meet expected demand at
the lowest possible cost. Since investment, particularly that for generation,
features lengthy gestation and maturity periods, long-term planning is practi-
cally unavoidable.
If the projection of the quantity demanded is a datum, designing the expan-
sion plan is restricted to seeking a solution that minimizes the economic cost.
Conversely, if the objective is to maximize the economic benefits that can be
obtained from the resources available, it is necessary to compare the costs and
benefits of alternative expansion plans for different projections of the quantity
of electricity demanded, and to define the instruments to be used for reaching
each projection. When the tariff level is the instrument used, each course of
action to be analyzed includes the combination between a tariff level and the
associated expansion plans1 (see Section 10.2). Once the alternatives have
been defined, it is possible to compare the economic costs (benefits) resulting
from increasing (reducing) the level of tariffs, in order to reduce (increase) the
consumption of electricity, with the resulting benefits (costs) in terms of lower
(greater) costs associated with expansion of the system. Changes in the fore-
cast of the quantity to be supplied (demanded) normally affect all the projects
incorporated in the expansion plan. Section 10.3 is therefore devoted to the
selection of expansion plans in the framework of cost-benefit analysis when
the tariff level is used to adjust the quantity demanded. Connecting new users
to die network, or not doing so, as an alternative mechanism, is better dealt
with in the analysis of distribution projects.2 The reliability aspects of the
generating sub-system also require separate treatment, although they can be
included in the analysis through supply costs (Munasinghe and Gellerson,
1979) or the costs (benefits) to users (Westley, 1981).
The reader will note that in the example presented, some "drastic assump-
tions have been made, particularly with respect to the electricity demand
function. This is due to the lack of detailed studies on the topic, which
1. See Turvey and Anderson (1977, Chapter 10).
2. Castagnino(1980).
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EXPANSION PLANS FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION
explains why in many cases, the data used reflect the minimum desired, rather
than those actually available. As a result, the analysis indicates areas where
further research would be desirable.
To determine the expansion plan and the generating costs for each projec-
tion of the quantity demanded, the simulation model known as WASP II is
used.3 A simulation model is used because it is a practically irreplaceable tool
for the type of results it provides and because many countries in the region
have some model of this type. The WASP II model was used because it was
the one available to the author at the time the work was carried out.4 It is a
dynamic programming model designed to find the expansion plan for generat-
ing capacity that minimizes the present value of the respective investment and
operating costs within a set of constraints imposed by the user.
The user has to provide the model with the following main data, among
others:
(a) the power and energy requirements as well as the shape of the correspond-
ing load duration curves that the solution has to meet for each period;
(b) the description of the existing generating system, the additions already
decided on and the dates on which some plants will be retired;
(c) the type of units that the model has to consider as candidates for the
expansion plan, and their characteristics;
(d) the minimum reliability acceptable for the generating system.
The model will produce the configurations (sets of plants) that meet the
desired requirements, will calculate the costs associated with each of the
possible expansion plans within the constraints imposed, and will select the
least cost expansion plan, indicating on what date each of the plants in it has
to enter into service.5 These costs will be calculated at prices (for example,
market or accounting prices) that the analyst has used to value the data
required by the model.
Based on the results of the analysis described above, Section 10.4 provides
an estimate of the distributional effect of the alternative courses of action. For
this purpose, beneficiaries have been classified as "low-income persons" and
"other private beneficiaries". A person is here said to belong to the low-
income group when his per capita disposable income does not exceed a certain
limit known as the "low-income level". When a person does not belong to the
low-income group, he belongs to the group of "other private beneficiaries".
3. The acronym stands for Wien Automatic System Planning Package, a model developed by
Jenkins and Joy (1974). See also IAEA (1976).
4. There is now a later version of the model known as WASP III. See IAEA (1980).
5. Readers interested in a more detailed description of the model may consult Jenkins and Joy
(1974).
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INTRODUCTION
However, it is not only the private sector that receives the impact of the flows
of income changes generated by a project or investment program; the public
sector is also affected. What matters is how the public sector uses its funds,
and how this use affects people's situations. It is nevertheless useful to treat it
in the analysis as a separate beneficiary and analyze at the end the distribu-
tional impact of the use of its funds. Consequently, we will offer some criteria
for quantifying the distribution of income changes between: (i) the low-
income group; (ii) the other private beneficiaries; and (iii) the public sector.
Whether to treat the public sector as a single unit or differentiate between
some of its parts will have to be decided in each case. However, a crucial
element for this type of decision is whether the project or program gives rise
to flows of funds from or to the public sector whose use is ear-marked, that is,
funds that will only be spent on a defined subset of public activity. The
distributional effect of a variation in the availability of funds for use in this
subset may differ from the distributional effect of the public sector activity as
a whole, and this is a reason for distinguishing between ear-marked public
funds and those that are freely disposable. The electricity system whose
expansion plan is being analyzed is administered by a public enterprise
(henceforth ELEC), responsible for generating, transmitting and distributing
electricity. ELEC is the owner of all the generating plants as well as the
transmission and distribution grid. The public sector will therefore be sub-
divided initially into ELEC and the Central Government.
The low-income level is defined here as the annual disposable income per
person needed to reach a certain per capita consumption level, assuming that
all income is spent. Each person whose disposable income (assumed equal to
his consumption expenditure) is equal to or less than this level will be consid-
ered as "low-income". Furthermore, it should be considered that a person
does not necessarily spend for his own consumption all the disposable income
that he obtains per given period. He usually puts his earnings into a family
budget, and it is from the expenditure of that budget that the consumption
level of each of its members is derived. That consumption level is compared
with the low-income level established, assuming that each member of the
family spends the same amount on consumption.
Consequently, to determine whether or not a person belongs to the low-
income group, the income available to his family is divided by the number of
members. If this value is less than or equal to the low-income level estab-
lished, then the person belongs to the low-income group. The relevant dispos-
able income for the classification is the one in the without project situation at
the time of the analysis, even if the recipient were above the low-income level
in the situation with the project, or in the future. In either of the last two cases,
the total increase in his disposable income would be considered as accruing to
the low-income group.
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EXPANSION PLANS FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION
10.2 Formulating Alternative Expansion Plans
An expansion plan selected by a cost-minimization model involves a set of
data that are extraneous to the model itself, such as the projects to be consid-
ered, the system's minimum acceptable reliability and the projection of the
quantity demanded. However, the results do not show that the benefits result-
ing from executing the selected expansion plan are higher than the respective
costs, since the (WASP II) model does not calculate benefits. Moreover, its
use implicitly assumes that, given a level of reliability, the additional benefits
from supplying electricity at the pace required by the projection of the quan-
tity demanded instead of at a lower (higher) one are greater than the additional
(reduction) costs resulting from supplying the difference between the projec-
tion used and a lower (greater) alternative.6 Cost-benefit analysis, conversely,
begins with the following question: are the benefits resulting from supplying
an additional amount of electricity at a certain level of reliability greater than
the costs required for such a purpose?7 For this purpose, it is necessary to
quantify these benefits and then compare them with the costs of supplying the
additional amount of electricity. At the same time, we must specify the means
that the electricity firm will use to change the quantity demanded.
The projection of the quantities demanded of power and energy corresponds
to certain assumptions concerning the evolution of the tariff level, the ex-
pected growth of the population connected to the grid and its per capita
income, the pace of urban development, and so on. Although these variables
are exogenous to the simulation model, at least one of them is not exogenous
to the decision making "model" for expanding the system. This variable is
the tariff. An increase in the tariff level will in fact bring about a reduction in
the quantity of electricity demanded, which will modify the expansion plan by
bringing forward, postponing, replacing or eliminating projects, thus giving
rise to an alternative expansion plan at lower cost. Accordingly, it is reason-
able to ask whether it is worth implementing the expansion plan initially
selected by the simulation model, as opposed to the alternative of raising
tariffs, executing the second lowest-cost plan, and thus releasing resources to
carry out for example, other projects which have been marginally displaced
from the budget. The effect that a given reduction in the quantities demanded
of power and energy has on the alternative expansion plan will determine the
savings in investment and operating costs associated with the tariff increase,
6. The same type of assumption is present in comparisons between hydro-electric power
stations and "equivalent" thermal developments, as explained in van derTak (1966).
7. In this analysis, the reliability level was imposed as an exogenous variable, which is
equivalent to assuming that the cost to the user of increasing it is equal to the cost of avoiding the
increase. For an approach that includes the cost of unserved energy, see Munasinghe (1979) and
Munasinghe and Gellerson (1979).
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ALTERNATIVE EXPANSION PLANS
Table 10.1 Main Effects
Source
ELEC Cost Savings
Market Value of Reduction G0 - fi,
Increase in the Market Value of G,
Willingness to Pay for G0 - 6,
of a Tariff Increase
ELEC Customers
+ tfCEP
- G,ACG0
+ PfiAPu
-
-
+ G,/ICG0
- |0l%0
- G,eCG0
Total
+ AfCfP
-
-
- G,BCGa
Source: Figure 10.1.
which can be compared with the losses experienced due to the reduction in
electricity consumption. In other words, a tariff level p0 over a period of time
is associated with a projection of the quantity demanded G(p0), which corre-
sponds to a least cost expansion plan EP0 whose total economic cost (includ-
ing investment and operating costs until the user is reached) is CEP0. If the
tariff level increases to p{ > p0, the projection of the quantity of electricity
demanded will diminish to G(/>,) < G(p0), for which there will exist an
associated expansion plan £P, with economic cost CEP,. In schematic form
the increase in the tariff Ap = pl - pQ gives rise to a reduction in consumption
AG = G{p0) — GO?,) and consequently to a fall in the economic cost of
expansion plan ACEP.
It will now be useful to analyze the main effects of a tariff increase,
concentrating on the flows valued at the prices paid by the two main parties
directly affected: ELEC and its customers. It has already been pointed out
that an increase in tariff levels will bring about a reduction in the quan-
tity of electricity demanded, which in turn will give rise to a new expan-
sion plan. The reduction in the financial cost of the expansion plan
(AFCEP = FCEP0 - FCEPJ will be a saving of funds for ELEC.8 For this
reason, a positive value for ELEC equal to AFCEP is shown in Table 10.1,
which outlines the effects of the tariff increase. For the remaining flows
brought about by the tariff increase, Figure 10.1 is used. In addition to the
reduction in costs AFCEP, ELEC will stop receiving (the present value of)
annual income G,/1CG0 due to lower sales, but will receive piBAp0 due to
higher prices. The consumers undergo a loss measured by the CV of the tariff
increase and estimated by the area p}BCpQ. This can be broken down into the
additional cost of energy G,, which they consume with the tariff increase
(p^BApo), plus the difference between their willingness to pay for the energy
8. "Financial costs" is the term used for cost valued at the prices actually paid by ELEC.
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EXPANSION PLANS FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION
Figure 10.1 Electricity Demand
that they stop consuming (G,BCG0) and what is actually paid for it (G^ACG0).
According to efficiency analysis distributional value judgments, the net eco-
nomic effect of the project is the present value of the sum of the CVs of effects
on ELEC and consumers each year, plus the net balance of transfers explain-
ing the discrepancy between prices paid and efficiency prices. The tariff
increase will be appropriate if this present value is positive, that is, if the loss
resulting from increasing the tariff by pl - pa is less than the saving in costs
AC£7>.
For the above layout, we need to know the form of demand function G(p)
and to have a method for calculating the costs CEP associated with each
expansion plan. The second problem is solved by the WASP II model as
regards the generating sub-system, but needs to be completed with estimates
for transmission and distribution costs.
The following presents what proved to be possible regarding the demand
function G(p). A tariff increase does not only affect the maximum power
demanded each day but also off-peak demand. Consequently, it is possible
that the tariff change, in this case one that does not distinguish the time at
which a Kwh is consumed, will modify the shape of the daily load curve and
consequently the annual load duration curve.9 Very few studies exist on the
effect on hourly demand of changing a tariff that makes no distinction be-
tween hours of the day. Those that do exist do not seem to offer decisive
conclusions on whether or not there are important differences in price elastic-
ity for the peak, middle and the bottom of the load curve. In this example, it is
assumed that a variation of X% in the tariff affects the power demand by Y%
9. In other words power demand functions DMWh = fh(p) exist for each hour h of the day.
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ALTERNATIVE EXPANSION PLANS
whatever the time of day and, consequently, the tariff changes do not affect
the shape of the load duration curve.
The next problem to be solved can be expressed in two questions: (a) what
is the effect of an increase of X% in the tariff on the quantity demanded? and
(b) given that the adjustment of the quantity demanded to the tariff change is
not immediate, how soon is it necessary to increase the tariff to achieve the
desired reduction in demand (Y%) on the date required? The first question
refers to the long-run price elasticity of demand and the second to the transi-
tional period between the short-run and long-run adjustments, matters that
will be discussed below.
Most of the studies on electricity demand functions that have been carried
out up to now deal with developed countries.10 While conducting a recent
study by the Bank, Westley (1981) found that with the exception of a study for
a Colombian city, there were no detailed econometric studies on electricity
demand functions for countries in the region. Until the results of such studies
become available and, hopefully, some conclusions can be drawn from them
on a plausible range of values for price elasticity," the lack of data leaves us
no alternative but to abandon attempts to carry out a cost-benefit analysis or
base them on tentative judgments on the value of price elasticity. Here the
second alternative has been adopted, since the objective is to illustrate the
estimation of the distribution of costs and benefits.
According to estimates by Westley (1981), the long-run price elasticity of
demand for electric energy by the residential and commercial sectors of Para-
guay is between -0.40 and -0.60, the author leaning towards the top end of
the range. A subsequent study on Costa Rica (Westley, 1984) found values
between —0.45 and —0.55 for the price elasticity of residential demand and
between -0.40 and 0.60 for commercial demand. Given the lack of a specific
study for the country corresponding to the case examined, a value of -0.60
will be used for the demand of each of these sectors in this study and, for the
same reason, for the industrial sector.12
Both the results of econometric studies and common sense indicate that
price elasticity in the short run is considerably lower than that in the long run.
In the first case, the consumer can only vary the utilization rate of a given
stock of electricity-consuming equipment, whereas he requires more time to
adjust the stock of equipment to changes in the relative prices of available
10. The interested reader may consult Taylor (1975) and Bohi (1981).
11. In the United States, the results obtained in recent studies for the long-run price elasticity
of residential demand generally fall within the range -0.45 to -1.20. Bohi (1981) sets forth
arguments for tending towards an absolute value of less than one.
12. According to Bohi (1981), the studies on commercial demand are less numerous and
reliable than those on residential demand. As regards industrial demand, studies seem to show
that it is more price elastic than residential demand, although this author presents arguments on
possible upward biases in the estimation of the price elasticity of industrial demand.
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EXPANSION PLANS FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION
energy sources. Accordingly, it is logical to expect that in response to a tariff
increase, in the first year, the quantity demanded will be reduced by a lesser
quantity than that indicated by long-run elasticity. The difference between the
short-run and the long-run adjustment will take place gradually over the
following years. This raises the problem of the length of time required for the
adjustment, which will depend on the useful life of the electricity-consuming
equipment and on the possibility of replacing it by other equipment that uses
alternative energy sources. This aspect is analyzed later where an alternative
projection of the quantity demanded is given.
We will assume that the Government's consumption is insensitive to tariff
changes. This appears reasonable considering that the consumption of public
enterprises is included in that corresponding to the industrial tariff, and that
reductions are not expected in electricity consumption for public lighting or in
public offices, hospitals, schools and so on.
As for the tariff, this consists of a fixed (/) and a variable (p) charge. In this
case, the total cost to the user of the electricity consumed (C) will be
while in simplified form, B(Kwh) will be the total benefits that the user
obtains from the Kwh consumed. The net benefits B—C that the customer
obtains from electricity consumption will be at a maximum when B' = C', (in
which ' indicates the first derivative with respect to Kwh) that is,
This simplified formulation is presented in Figure 10.2(a), where it can be
observed that a change in the fixed charge from/0 to/, (parallel displacement
of C) does not change the Kwh demanded by the client, which depend on
variable charge p (Figure 10.2(b)), although it does reduce the customer's
total benefits and increases the electricity firm's revenue.13 However, a sub-
stantial increase in the fixed charge—such as to /2 in Figure 10.2(a)—could
result in the customer ceasing to demand electricity, because the total benefit
he obtains is less than the total respective cost. In the case in hand, the
objective is to reduce customers' demand for energy (and power) and not to
increase the income of the firm or restrict the number of customers. Conse-
quently, only the variable component of the tariff will be increased. In other
words, the "marginal" price or rather the marginal cost of a Kwh for the user
will increase.
13. This is valid only for small changes in the fixed charge since it ignores the income effect
caused by increasing it.
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ALTERNATIVE EXPANSION PLANS
Figure 10.2 Effects on Consumption of Changes in the Fixed and
Variable Charges
The above applies to tariffs for the residential and commercial sectors. In
the industrial sector, the tariff includes a charge for the maximum power
demanded during the day plus a charge per Kwh consumed. An increase in the
charge per Kwh does not take into account at what time of the day this Kwh is
demanded and will tend to reduce the energy (and power) demand at all times.
Conversely, the effect of an increase in the charge for power can be broken
down into two parts: (a) hourly reallocation of daily consumption; and (b) a
reduction in daily consumption due to inflexibility in the hourly consumption
pattern. In this case, it is assumed that only the energy charge of the industrial
tariff would be increased.
Table 10.2 presents data on the variable component in tariffs according to
class of customer. For residential customers, the variable component changes
according to the consumption block the user is in. For this reason, and in
order to facilitate subsequent estimation of the distributional effect, a distinc-
tion has been made between two groups: (a) low-income residential cus-
tomers; and (b) other residential customers. The first group was defined in the
Table 10.2
(In S/Kwh)
Variable Charges by Group of Customers
Customers
Low-Income Residential
Remainder of Residential
Commercial
Industrial
Tariff in Effect
0.043
0.049
0.063
0.052
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EXPANSION PLANS FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION
following way. The electricity consumption of people at the low-income level
was determined on the basis of the Kwh/year consumption by income brack-
ets according to data from a household survey on income and expenditure.
Then, anyone whose consumption was less than or equal to that of the low-
income level according to the survey data, was defined as a low-income
customer. The rest of the energy consumed by the residential sector was
allocated to the "remainder of residential customers" group. Note that this
approach has some weaknesses. A vacation home will have a low annual
consumption, even though its owner is not a low-income person. In the same
way, a low-income person who has a small business or workshop at home that
makes intensive use of electricity will have high consumption and will not
appear in the low-income group. A better procedure would be to use the
survey to estimate the percentage of residential consumption corresponding to
low.-income customers, which was not possible in this case.
The average variable charge (p) per group of customers (c) was calculated
as
in which pd is the variable charge paid by consumer i from class c and gd is
the energy purchased by this consumer.l4 It is to these tariffs that the projec-
tion of the quantity demanded corresponds. That projection, presented in
Table 10.3, is the one that determines the expansion plan being analyzed.
For the purposes of comparing the existing expansion plan with alternative
courses of action consisting of reducing the quantity demanded by increasing
the variable tariff charge, four alternative projections were worked out. Each
of these will give rise to alternative expansion plans, called alternative plans
(AP). The tariff increases considered and their effects on the quantity de-
manded are shown in Table 10.4.
The long-run effect of the tariff increase on the quantity of electricity
consumed can be calculated on the basis of the formula for long-run price
elasticity of demand
[10.1]
14. Appendix C presents the assumptions implied in the use of this average.
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Table 10.4 Tariff Increases and Their Effects
on the Quantity Demanded
Expansion
Plans
AP,
AP2
AP3
APt
Tariff Increase3
(in percentages)
4.4
8.8
13.2
17.6
Long-run Reduction in
Consumption"
Mwh
57,193
114,387
171,579
228,771
MW
10
20
30
40
a. At the beginning of 1981.
b. Mwh and MW at the plant.
in which G'(p) is the long-run demand function in year t. Assuming that the
long-run demand function is linear, and that it shifts parallel over time15
(Figure 10.3), the long-run effect of the tariff increase on the quantity of
electricity consumed will be constant and can be estimated on the basis of
[10.1] as
bearing in mind that consumption G'(p0) corresponds to the same year t as the
estimation of E'.
To prepare the alternative projections of the quantity demanded, we should
first consider the short-run adjustment and the process of transition to the
long-run position. To do this, it is useful to break down the electricity de-
manded by a consumer in period t, which begins with the tariff increase.
Without the tariff increase, the quantity demanded will be given by:
(a) the previous year's stock of electrical equipment Kwt_\(pQ), the volume
and composition of which is adjusted to tariffs p0, and the use Ht_}(p0) of
this equipment in the previous period;
(b) the increase in the utilization of old stock AH(p0) due to, for example, an
increase in consumer's income;
(c) the increase in the stock of equipment AKw(pQ) during year t and its
utilization ff(pQ).
15. It is assumed that the shift of the demand function for a given price brings together the
effects of the increases in consumption per customer and the number of customers. Results for
other assumptions on the shape and displacement of the demand function can be obtained by
using the SIMOP model. See Powers and Valencia (1978).
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ALTERNATIVE EXPANSION PLANS
Figure 10.3 Electricity Demand Function and Its Displacement
Thus, consumer's demand for electricity in year / (G) will be:
[10.2]
In response to a tariff increase, the consumer would like to be able to:
(a) adjust his old stock of equipment Kwt_, (p0) to the new tariff level;
(b) adjust the use he made of his stock of old equipment #,_[(p0) to one that
reflects the effect of the tariff increase //,_,(/?,);
(c) reduce partially or totally the planned increase in this use to
A#(p,) < A#(p0);
(d) reduce partially or totally the planned increase in his stock of equipment
to AKw(pt) < AKw(p0);
(e) If AKw(pl) is not nil, adjust use Hn(p0) to Hn(pi).
Although the above outline is a simplification that leaves aside interaction
between use and stock, it enables us to discuss possible adjustments in re-
sponse to a tariff increase. The old stock of equipment cannot be adjusted
rapidly and it is likely that the change in its composition will occur gradually
as it is renewed; in other words, this is an adjustment that will take time.
Conversely, the use of this stock can be adjusted rapidly. In this regard, the
consumer may reduce both the use he made the previous year and the respec-
tive planned increase AH(p0). It is only the first of these effects that is shown
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EXPANSION PLANS FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION
by the short-run price elasticity, since the demand function assumes that all
other variables (such as income) that give rise to AH remain constant. The
latter (AH) will be one of those most drastically reduced, since it is to be
expected that these are less "valuable" Kwh than the previous ones. Finally,
the additional stock of equipment (AKw) and its planned use (//") can be
adjusted to the new tariff level. Here too drastic reductions ought to be
expected since the consumer would be including equipment whose services
would be less "valuable" than those he obtains from the old stock.
Since there are no data on the aspects mentioned above, we will have to
make some assumptions on the type of adjustment expected. In the case of
residential demand, we assume that:
(a) short-run price elasticity is half that in the long-run;
(b) the consumption of old customers grows by 2 % per year;16
(c) the increase in the consumption of old customers is reduced by
two-thirds.
(d) new consumers adjust in accordance with long-run elasticity.
From the above, we can conclude that in the first year, approximately 60% of
the long-run effect takes place. Since an important part of the previous adjust-
ment will come from changes in the composition of equipment stocks, it is to
be expected that subsequent reductions will be considerably smaller. These
reductions are assumed to be 20% of the long-run effect in each of the
following two years. In the commercial sector, there are no major possibilities
for replacing energy sources. Adjustment will be determined by the effect of
the tariff increase, through the prices of goods and services, on the volume of
commercial transactions, and by the reduction in the utilization level of the
stock of equipment for a given volume of sales, effects which will soon be
felt. If this is the case, the adjustment pattern in the commercial sector should
not differ much from the residential sector and would probably even be
shorter. We will assume here that it is equal to that of the residential sector.
The industrial tariff increase will result in an increase in prices. The conse-
quent reduction in the quantities of products demanded will reduce the ex-
pected use of installed capacity from the previous year, #r_,(/?0) + AH(p0) in
expression [10.2], and that of the capacity introduced in the year of the
increase (H"(p0)) since investments were decided on beforehand. In other
words, the impossibility of postponing increases in capacity whose entry into
operation was decided for the year in which the tariff increase is effected will
be compensated by a reduction in the planned utilization levels (H,_,, AH and
H") imposed by the reduction in the quantities demanded of products. Given
16. Consumption growth rate for a given tariff level when the customer is in a long-run
equilibrium position.
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ALTERNATIVE EXPANSION PLANS
that the average useful life of industrial equipment is longer than that of
residential equipment, adjusting the composition of the stock to adapt to the
new prices will take longer. However, it must be noted that this substitution
will only be important for those industries in which electrical energy is a
significant proportion of costs. Considering that almost all industry in the
country in question is light industry, we will assume that the adjustment is
completed in five years in the following sequence: 50% of the long-run
adjustment in the first year, followed by 20% the next year, and 10% in each
of the three remaining years.
The basic information for preparing alternative projections is given in Table
10.5. In that table, the reduction in the quantity of electricity demanded is
expressed in Mwh consumed, while the WASP model has to be provided with
the energy demanded at the plants. In other words, the data must be adjusted
for transmission and distribution losses. In the case in hand, 1.16 net Mwh
has to be generated for each Mwh consumed by the residential and commer-
Table 10.5 Data Used to Estimate the Effects of the
Tariff Increase
ELEC Customers
Low- Remainder
Income of
Data Used
£ (absolute value)
(1 + ft//JG»'
(In Mwh at the plant)3
G§1 (Mwh consumed)
PD (in $/Mwh)
Increase of 4.4%
Pi -Po
GO - G,b
Increase of 8.8%
Pi -Po
G0 - Gf
Increase of 13.2%
Pi-Po
GO - Si"
Increase of 17.6%
P,-Po
GO - G,6
Residential
0.60
91,100
78,535
43
1.892
2,073
3.784
4,147
5.676
6,220
7.568
8,293
Residential
0.60
820,100
706,983
49
2.156
18,664
4.312
37,329
6.468
55,993
8.624
74,657
Commercial
0.60
306,900
264,569
63
2.772
6,985
5.544
13,969
8.316
20,954
11.088
27,938
Industrial
0.60
946,900
839,204
52
2.288
22,155
4.576
44,310
6.864
66,465
9.152
88,620
Total
2,166,400
1,889,291
49,877
99,755
149,632
199,508
a. tell = transmission and distribution losses as a proportion of energy consumed.
b. Final long-run effect, in Mwh consumed.
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EXPANSION PLANS FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION
Table 10.6 Effects of an 8.8% Tariff Increase on
Quantity Demanded
Effects on
Consumption (in Mwh)
Generation (in Mwh)a
Power (in MW)b
1981
-55,421
-63,624
-11.1
1982
-75,373
-86,502
-15.1
1983
-90,893
-104,372
-18.3
1984
-95,324
-109,380
-19.1
1985
-99,755
-114,387
-20.0
a. Net generation required from plants.
b. Net power required from plants.
cial sectors and 1.13 Mwh for each Mwh consumed by the industrial sector.17
Finally, Table 10.6 shows the annual reductions expected in the quantity
demanded in the case of an 8.8% increase in the tariff level.
Each of the alternative projections for the quantity demanded gives rise to
its corresponding expansion plan, presented in Table 10.7, which shows that
the main immediate effect of plans AP2, AP3 and AP4 is to postpone the entry
into operation of a 120-Mw thermal power station and to advance by a year
the entry into operation of the first hydro-electric project.18 Conversely, the
tariff increase in AP\ (4.4%) is small enough not to introduce changes in the
expansion plan until 1994. In the following section, we will consider the
comparison of expansion plans for the purposes of selecting the best one
according to the assumptions and value judgments of efficiency analysis.
10.3 Comparison of Expansion Plans
We now have the expansion plans corresponding to five projections of the
quantity demanded. The first is the original projection, which led to the
expansion plan being analyzed. The remainder correspond to alternative pro-
jections, resulting from the tariff increases shown in Table 10.5.
Table 10.8 shows the present value of the investment, fuel, operating and
maintenance costs of the generating sub-system for each of the projections of
the quantity demanded, expressed at efficiency prices. Note that the alterna-
tive expansion plans result in considerable savings in relation to the original
expansion plan. However, these are not all the cost savings that can be
expected since there will also be savings in the transmission and distribution
sub-systems. The total cost savings valued at efficiency prices for each alter-
native to replace the existing expansion plan are presented in Table 10.9.
As Section 10.2 pointed out, the tariff increase affects customers and ELEC
as indicated in Table 10.1. That level of disaggregation of the effect of the
17. The smaller losses for industrial consumption are due to the fact that part of the energy is
supplied at medium voltage.
18. The entry into operation of a 125-Mw thermal power station in 1982 corresponds to a
project already being carried out and its entry date was imposed on the model as a constraint.
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Table 10.8 Investment and Operating Costs of the Generating
Sub-System for Alternative Expansion Plans, at Efficiency Prices
(In thousands of $)
Expansion Plan
Existing
AP,
APt
AP3
AP,
Investment
Costs3
336,008
334,645
329,481
327,812
324,521
Fuel, Operation &
Maintenance Costs
808,297
795,665
780,384
768,065
756,887
Total
1,144,305
1,130,310
1,109,865
1,095,877
1,081,408
a. Net of residual values of the plants after the year 2000.
Table 10.9 Present Value of Savings at Efficiency Prices for
Alternative Expansion Plans
(In thousands of $)
Savings in Costs
Generation
• Investment
• Fuel, Operation &
Maintenance Costs
Transmission and Distribution
• Investment
• Operation &
Maintenance Costs
Total
AP,
1,363
12,632
4,057
2,131
20,183
APZ
6,527
27,913
8,114
4,261
46,815
AP3
8,196
40,232
12,172
6,392
66,992
AP,
11,487
51,410
16,229
8,522
87,648
tariff increase is useful for distributional analysis. For the selection of the
expansion plan according to the efficiency criterion, it is sufficient to value
energy G^ — G\ (see Figure 10.1) in accordance with willingness to pay for
the reduction in consumption in each year t.19 This willingness to pay will be
measured according to the customers' actual substitution, reflected in the
slope of the demand curve resulting from the adjustment they were able to
make in their stock of equipment during the previous period.
19. If the market prices of the alternative sources of energy differed considerably from their
efficiency prices, the use of willingness to pay would include an error; the bigger this price
difference and the bigger the substitution brought about by the tariff change, the bigger this error
would be.
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COMPARISON OF EXPANSION PLANS
Figure 10.4 Adjustment to a Tariff Increase
The example of Figure 10.4, which reflects the adjustment of a residential
customer over a period of three years, will clarify the above. At time t = 1,
when tariff increase p{ — p0 occurs, if the consumer could adjust his stock of
equipment immediately, he would be prepared to forego the consumption of
other goods up to a maximum of G\ABCG10, provided that he did not do
without G0 - G| units of energy. However, he does not adjust his stock of
equipment immediately and this stock will initially be higher than desired at
the new tariff p,. Until he adjusts his stock to the desired level (for example,
by replacing his refrigerator with one that consumes less for the same cooling
capacity), the reduction GQ — G} in energy consumption will be more valu-
able than it would be if the adjustment had already been made (and with the
more efficient refrigerator, he could chill to the same degree with less energy
consumption). This is why, if it were necessary, in year / = 1 he would forego
as much as Gj/?' CG$ of other goods before doing without GQ — Gj. Given that
for Gj — G| he has to pay less (G\BB'G{) than what he is willing to pay, he
consumes these units and substitutes only those (G^> - Gj) whose value in
terms of other goods that year (G[A'B'CG§ is less than the new price />,. In
the following period (t = 2) the consumer has been able to partially adjust his
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EXPANSION PLANS FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION
Table 10.10 Comparison of Alternative Expansion Plans9
(In thousands of $)
Present Value of Effects
of the Tariff Increase
Value of the Reduction in
Electricity Consumption
Cost Savings
Total
AP,
-20,164
20,183
19
APZ
-41,203
46,815
5,612
AP3
-63,097
66,992
3,895
AP*
-85,866
87,648
1,782
a. Plans AP, correspond to increases in the tariff level of 4.4%, 8.8%, 13.2% and 17.6%,
respectively.
stock of equipment, which improves his substitution possibilities. For this
reason, he substitutes some additional units of electricity. Thus, in year t = 2
he reduces his electricity consumption by Gg — G" units for a total value of
G"B"CGl in terms of other goods. In other words, the value the consumer
attributes to a unit less of energy depends on the adjustment he actually made
in his stock of equipment, and that adjustment takes time. As a result, the
value of the energy no longer consumed can be calculated in the following
way:
This has been the method used in this study. Values p} + p0 for each alterna-
tive and the respective annual reductions in energy consumption come from
Tables 10.5 and 10.6. On the basis of these data, we calculated the present
value of the flows corresponding to willingness to pay for the difference
between the electricity that would be used under the existing plan and the
electricity that would be used with the tariff increases described above. The
results appear in the first row of Table 10.10 as the value of the reduction in
electricity consumption. The second row shows the savings in generating,
transmission and distribution costs for each alternative brought about by the
supply of a smaller quantity of electrical energy. These savings exceed cus-
tomers' willingness to pay for that energy in any of the four alternatives
studied. It is therefore advisable, on the basis of the "efficiency" criterion, to
increase the tariff and modify the existing expansion plan. However, AP2 is
better than the three remaining plans in terms of this criterion, in that the tariff
level can be increased by 9% with advantages in relation to increases of 4%,
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DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECT
13% and 18%. The estimate of the distributional effect, which will be made
in the following section, will be based on plan AP2.20
10.4 Distributional Effect of Tariff Increases
The distributional effect generated by the saving in investment and operating
costs of the generating, transmission and distribution sub-systems can be
traced to two main points:
(a) who stops paying (saves) these costs, valued at the prices actually paid;
and
(b) who receives or grants the transfers that explain the difference between
market and efficiency prices.
For the corresponding allocation, it is necessary, therefore, to know the cost
saving (corresponding to the tariff increase being analyzed) valued at the
prices paid, these savings valued at efficiency prices and the transfers that
explain the difference.
The valuation criteria used for costs can be summarized as follows:
(a) traded goods and services were broken down into foreign exchange,
which was corrected by the respective APRFE, and other domestic costs,
which were added to non-traded goods (as a public enterprise, ELEC is
exempt from the payment of import taxes);
(b) non-traded goods and services were valued at their market prices;
(c) unskilled labor was valued at its wages in alternative employment; and
(d) skilled labor was valued at its market wages.
The APRFE was calculated on the basis of expression [3.33] already pre-
sented in Section 3.5, that is
in which M is the GIF value of imports, X is the FOB value of exports, Tm is
revenue from import taxes and Tx is the revenue from taxes (net of subsidies)
on exports. The resulting APRFE was 1.15.
The investment cost at efficiency prices of the generating sub-system for
20. Appendix D shows the relation between the approach followed in this section and the long-
run marginal cost tariff.
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EXPANSION PLANS FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION
each expansion plan is provided by the WASP II model, but no simple method
exists for obtaining this cost at the prices paid. Furthermore, there is no way
of identifying transfers.21 For this reason, in this case we could only make a
rough estimate of the breakdown of investment costs at efficiency prices, and
from there, estimate costs valued at prices paid, bearing in mind that pur-
chases by ELEC are exempt from import tariffs. In the case of fuel, operating
and maintenance costs, the main source of discrepancies lies in the price of
fuel. However, it is possible here to estimate transfers by using data provided
by the WASP II model. For fuel, operating and maintenance costs, the model
provides the annual expenditure flow classified as external and internal expen-
diture. Since the model treats operating and maintenance costs as domestic
expenditures, these components can be separated by entering in the data files
expenditure on fuel as foreign expenditure.
The results are shown in Table 10.11, where the savings in investment
costs, like the others, have been broken down into foreign exchange, un-
skilled labor and other domestic costs. The first have been corrected in accor-
dance with the APRFE, while for the other domestic costs, market prices have
been accepted as being equal to their efficiency prices. In the case of unskilled
labor, no detailed estimate is available of its accounting price. So, the wages
paid were compared with the prevailing wages in the informal sector for
similar activities, the latter proving to be approximately 60% of the wages
paid for project activities. This wage in the informal sector was interpreted as
the CV of the corresponding job or minimum income required to accept a job
in project work, so the remaining 40% is additional income for these workers.
The Government pays a 10% subsidy on the fuel used by ELEC, which is
imported at the margin. This subsidy is paid directly to the refinery according
to its sales to ELEC. For this reason, Table 10.11 shows a present value of
2,141 for the Government for the subsidies that it will not have to pay due to
the fuel saving.
The estimated breakdown of the savings in investment, transmission and
distribution costs was based on data from projects being carried out. The
components were then valued at efficiency prices, recording the respective
transfers. The operating and maintenance costs of the generating sub-system
have been broken down into foreign exchange and other internal costs (the
unskilled labor element is practically nil) and valued in the same way as the
previous cases.
To choose between the alternative expansion plans, the analysis concen-
21. Costs at prices paid could be obtained by replacing the unit costs ($/Kw, $/Kwh) in the
WASP data files and making the model consider only the sequence of plants integrating each
plan. It would be possible in this way to quantify the total of transfers but not to identify them.
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DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECT
Table 10.11 Breakdown of the Present Value of Cost Savings
Valued at Efficiency Prices
(In thousands of $)
Cost Savings
Generation
Investments
• Foreign Exchange
• Unskilled Labor
• Other Domestic Costs
Fuel
• Foreign Exchange
• Subsidies
• Other Domestic Costs
Operation and Maintenance
• Foreign Exchange
• Other Domestic Costs
Transmission
and Distribution
Investment
• Foreign Exchange
• Unskilled Labor
• Other Domestic Costs
Operation and Maintenance
• Foreign Exchange
• Unskilled Labor
• Other Domestic Costs
Total
ELEC
6,146
3,688
430
2,028
21,414
23,235
-2,141
320
821
346
475
7,615
4,950
609
2,056
4,153
2,160
540
1,453
40,149
Government
553
553
5,626
3,485
2,141
52
52
743
743
324
324
7,298
Unskilled
Workers
-172
-172
—
-
-
-244
-244
-216
-216
-632
Total at
Efficiency
Prices
6,527
4,241
258
2,028
27,040
26,720
320
873
398
475
8,114
5,693
365
2,056
4,261
2,484
324
1,453
46,815
trated on ELEC's cost savings and users' willingness to pay for the reduction
in electricity consumption. Since estimating the distributional effect means
estimating the income changes of the main parties involved, the appropriate
starting point is a table that shows not only users' willingness to pay for
electricity, but also the income changes that they and ELEC experience as a
consequence of the tariff increase. This set of data for the tariff increase in
question, excluding ELEC's cost savings, is provided by Table 10.12 and
constitutes the starting point for the subsequent analysis.
The effects on residential consumers already constitute a final effect on their
incomes. Thus, for example, in the case of low-income consumers, 5,502 is
the estimate of the sum of the CVs of the tariff increase. In turn, part of the
loss to these consumers (5,434-1,388) is additional income for ELEC. The
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EXPANSION PLANS FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION
algebraic sum of the CVs of the customers and ELEC, equal to the total
willingness to pay, indicates the minimum cost savings necessary to make
compensation possible.
In the case of the Government, the reader should remember that its con-
sumption was assumed to be insensitive to small tariff changes. Conse-
quently, the tariff increase results only in a transfer to ELEC equal to the
present value of the increase in the corresponding payments.
For industrial consumers, the effect of the tariff increase appears initially as
an increase in costs, which firms will try to transfer through prices. The
outcome of doing this will depend on market characteristics. If electricity is
used to produce imported or exported goods at the margin, whose domestic
prices are determined by international prices, the tariff increase cannot be
transferred and in the short run will have to be absorbed by producers as a
reduction in profits. As producers adjust to the new situation (higher costs),
they will cut back production and, consequently, the supply of foreign ex-
change will be reduced (less exports), and/or its demand will increase (less
production of imported goods). This will give rise to an increase in the price
of foreign exchange (the EER), thus increasing the prices of traded goods,
which will directly or indirectly increase the prices of consumer goods. Given
that, in the long run, it is unlikely that the tariff increase will significantly
affect the people's relative nominal income, the basic effect will be to reduce,
through price increases, their real incomes in proportion to expenditure and
thus transfer the equivalent income to the electricity firm. In the case of the
production of non-traded goods, the expected effect is similar. Although
initially, part of the tariff increase could result in reduced profits, in the long
run, the prices of consumer goods will increase, reducing consumers' real
incomes and increasing the electricity firm's real income.
The restructuring of production resulting from the tariff increase may bring
about some changes in relative incomes, for example by resulting in relative
less employment of unskilled labor in the formal sector.22 However, due to the
minor relative importance of electricity costs in the total cost of each firm, the
long-run adjustment is made basically through an increase in the prices of
consumer goods, which reduces consumers' real incomes by an amount ap-
proximately equal to the increase in real income of the electricity firm.
This should make it clear how difficult it is to identify the distributional
effect of the tariff increase on the industrial sector. However, considering that
in the first few years, short-run considerations take priority, i.e. part of the
effect could result in reduced profits, it is likely that the present value of the
22. See Mishan (1968).
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EXPANSION PLANS FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION
total effect on the final purchasers will be less than its share of consumption.
For this reason, and in order to obtain a reasonable range for the distributional
effect of the industrial tariff increase, the following two extreme hypotheses
were considered:
(a) the industrial firms succeed in transferring a minimum of 60% of the
effects of the tariff increase to domestic final consumers; and
(b) the firms succeed in transferring 100% of the effects of the tariff increase
to domestic final consumers.
In the case of commercial customers, it is reasonable to expect that a higher
percentage of the tariff increase will be passed on to consumers through prices
for three basic reasons: (a) the vast majority of commercial establishments
operate in the consumer goods markets, where there are fewer transactions
until the final purchaser is reached, reducing the instances in which part of the
increase cannot be transferred in the short-run and has to be absorbed as
smaller profits; (b) adjustments due to substitution will be expected to be
more rapid than in the industrial sector; and (c) entry and exit of firms will
take place more quickly than in the industrial sector. For these reasons, we
will assume that a minimum of 80% and a maximum of 100% of the tariff
increase is transferred to the final consumers through prices.
Now that a range has been estimated for the distribution of the effects of the
industrial and commercial tariff increases, between profit reductions and in-
creases in the prices of goods and services, we need to consider how the
groups of beneficiaries considered (the Government, low-income people and
the remainder of the private sector) absorb these effects. Assume that the
reductions in profits are in the private sector, and that only those persons with
incomes above the low-income level are owners of firms.23 With regard to the
price increase, not only is the private sector affected, but the Government will
also see the real value of its expenditure on goods and services (excluding
wage payments) reduced. According to a recent household survey, low-in-
come people account for 38% of total private expenditure on consumption,
and general Government expenditure on goods and services (excluding
wages) is 9% of private expenditure on consumption. Given those percent-
ages, the effects of the price increase can be distributed among the groups
considered as follows:
23. This includes an error for public enterprises, which represent a small percentage of indus-
trial demand.
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DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECT
Government 8.2
Low-incomes 34.9
Remainder 56.9
Total 100.0
The final results for the two hypotheses appear in Table 10.13 for industrial
customers, and in Table 10.14 for commercial customers.
The various aspects of the distributional effect of the tariff increase can now
be brought together. Tables 10.15 and 10.16 summarize the data obtained in
the previous sections for each of the two hypotheses for transfer to the final
consumers. Hypothesis (a) corresponds to the assumption that 60% of the
increase in the industrial tariff and 80% of the commercial tariff is transferred.
Hypothesis (b) is that 100% of the increase in both tariffs is transferred. As
for Government consumption of electricity, it was assumed that its demand is
totally inelastic with respect to tariff changes, so that only a transfer between
the Government and ELEC occurs. The remaining cost savings come from
the estimates made in the two previous sections.
In order to simplify the presentation, it will be useful to group the various
sectors affected according to our purposes. Thus, since both low-income final
consumers and unskilled workers are low-income people, they can be com-
bined into a single category. Similarly, neither the owners of firms nor the
remainder of the final consumers belong to the low-income group and are
listed separately. As for ELEC, this is an enterprise that is running a deficit
and whose investment plans depend to a large extent on compensatory trans-
fers from the Government. Consequently, the greater availability of funds that
the tariff increase will produce for ELEC will in reality be a reduction in
Government transfers. Consequently, both values can be added together into a
single one under the heading Government.
Table 10.17, which provides the results after the consolidation mentioned,
shows that those on low incomes will absorb between 19% and 27% of
the effect of the tariff increase on the private sector. However, this does
not measure the net effect on these people, since it does not consider the
benefits that they will receive from the additional income accruing to the
Government when it reduces the compensating transfers to ELEC. If it were
possible to know the distribution of the income changes generated by the
use of additional funds for the Government, it would be possible to
calculate the net effect on low-income people. This information is not
available, which is why the analysis limits itself to what has been explained
up to now.
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EXPANSION PLANS FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION
Table 10.17 Consolidation of the Distributional Impact of the
Tariff Increase
(In thousands of $)
Private Sector
Hypothesis
Hypothesis (a)
Hypothesis (b)
Persons
on Low
Incomes
-30,811
-43,923
Remainder
of Private
Sector
-134,161
-117,968
Government
170,584
167,503
Total at
Efficiency
Prices
5,612
5,612
Source: Tables 10.15 and 10.16.
10.5 Data Requirements
The analysis presented in the preceding sections rests on a set of assumptions,
not all of them explicit, on the values of certain key variables for the outcome
of distributional analysis. The objective of this section will be to explain the
main assumptions and provide guidance on alternatives to improve approxi-
mations.
Let us begin with the projections of the quantity of electricity demanded
according to the type of customer. Given that the quantity of electricity
demanded for type of customer i in year t depends on the price p't and on other
variables jcj
projection G\ requires exogenous projections of the tariff and the remaining
variables jc(J. The tariff was assumed to be constant throughout the planning
period, since it is considered the signal that encourages or discourages elec-
tricity consumption. Given that, as discussed in Section 10.2, adjustments in
consumption require adjustments in equipment stocks, which take time, the
system of signals should ideally not change from year to year. This does not
exclude the possibility of short-run adjustments in response to exceptional
situations (for example, rainfall far below the average in a predominantly
hydro-electric system) provided the users are aware that the change is a short-
run change, and that decisions on equipment have to be taken on the basis of
the long-run tariff. Consequently, the quantity of electricity demanded can be
presented as a function of a price, which is constant over time
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DATA REQUIREMENTS
The breakdown of residential demand by income groups and its separate
projection is an important element in estimating the distributional effect. This
projection can be conceptualized as the number of residential clients of type i
in year t (N!) times the average consumption per customer (g/)
It should be borne in mind that in most Latin American countries, cus-
tomers who have no access to the grid are mainly low-income people, and that
this access is determined principally by the electricity firm's connection pol-
icy. Furthermore, elasticity of consumption per customer with respect to
variables x^ will in general be different for different income levels. Conse-
quently, projections per type of customer should ideally take account of these
effects. All this will result in different annual growth rates for the quantity
demanded for each group. This of course requires an effort in the estimates of
functions N! and g/ which did not exist for the case in hand, in which a
uniform growth rate was used for each group (see Table 10.3).
As a result of the above, there will be different price elasticities of demand
for each group. In particular, price elasticity is expected to diminish (in
absolute value) as the customer's income level increases.24 This aspect was
not taken into account either in the analysis carried out, in which price
elasticity was assumed to be equal for both groups of residential customers.
Lack of data also made drastically simplifying assumptions necessary with
regard to the price elasticity of industrial and commercial demand.
In summary, the application of cost-benefit analysis to the field of selecting
expansion plans and, in particular, estimating the distribution of income
changes, requires a considerable effort with regard to estimating electricity
demand functions, an effort that has scarcely begun.25
A second set of problems concerns the transfer and final effect of the
change in industrial and commercial tariffs. In the case of relatively small
tariff increases, which do not give rise to strong substitution effects, it is very
likely that assuming a transfer (in the long run) to the final consumers of
100% of the effect will be a reasonable approximation. However, the dearth
of studies on this subject makes it advisable to use a second transfer hypothe-
sis, as in the case presented. This approach will provide a range that is likely
24. See Westley (1981).
25. Westley (1981 and 1984) gives estimates for residential and commercial demand in Para-
guay and Costa Rica.
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EXPANSION PLANS FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION
to include the real effect, but hopefully not too wide as to make the results
useless.
Finally, there is the problem of which part of the increase in the industrial
and commercial tariffs will be absorbed by the final consumers. In section
10.4, we assumed that it was proportional to the expenditure on consumption
of each group. However, the indirect content of electricity in consumer bas-
kets, i.e. the direct and indirect requirements for electricity of the goods
making up the basket, will not be identical for all groups. Using the input-
output model presented in section 7.4, the indirect requirements for electricity
in the consumption basket can be approximated. To simplify presentation, let
us assume that there is a simple model with only three sectors corresponding
to the "products" agriculture (X,), industry (X2) and electricity (X3), and that
the final demand matrix D can be broken down into the following vectors:
consumption by low-income people (Cb), consumption by the rest of the
private sector (CO, Government consumption (C8) and the remainder of final
demand (DO- Thus, according to expression [7.2], production values can be
expressed as
Total direct and indirect requirements for electricity corresponding to the low-
income group's consumption basket will be
which can be interpreted in the following way. To supply one peso's worth of
industrial output (1) it is necessary to produce T3, pesos of electricity, so that
T3l C\ indicates the value of electricity production "contained" in C\ pesos'
worth of consumption. Thus, X3(Cb) will be the electricity "content" of the
low-income group's consumption basket, made up of its direct consumption
C* and its indirect consumption through the electricity needed to produce
basket C*. Direct consumption of electicity C* is low-income residential
consumption, the effect of which has been dealt with separately (see Table
10.12), while indirect consumption will be
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DATA REQUIREMENTS
Similarity, the indirect consumption of electricity by the rest of the private
sector and Government consumption could be calculated, thus yielding the
indirect requirements of each group of consumers
Then the share of the tariff increase that the industrial and commercial sectors
are assumed to transfer to the final consumers through prices, can be distrib-
uted in proportion to the share of indirect consumption of each group of final
consumers in total indirect consumption.
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CHAPTER 11
THE USE OF INPUT-OUTPUT
TECHNIQUES FOR ESTIMATING
ACCOUNTING PRICES
11.1 Accounting Prices for Non-Traded Goods
We have assumed up to now that the market prices of non-traded goods are
equal to their efficiency prices. Part II is an introductory presentation on the
procedures for correcting these market prices by using input-output tech-
niques, and on their use in estimating distributional effects.
As the reader will recall from the analysis of the industrial project in
Chapter 9, the value of construction at market prices was not accepted as
being equal to its value at efficiency prices. Instead, the corresponding cost
structure was revalued on the assumption that the market prices of non-traded
inputs were equal to their efficiency prices, but with imported inputs and
unskilled labor valued at their efficiency prices. This allowed for the value at
efficiency prices of construction to be approximated. The same backwards
breakdown procedure following the output-input chain could have been con-
This chapter is only an introduction to the topic. The reader can find more detailed presentations
in Powers (1981) and Scott, et al. (1976).
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INPUT-OUTPUT TECHNIQUES
tinued, in order to reduce even more the influence of market prices of non-
traded goods in the valuation. For example, the value of bricks could, in turn,
have been broken down into non-traded inputs, foreign exchange, taxes on
foreign trade, wages for unskilled labor, etc. and all these valued at their
efficiency prices. The procedures presented in this chapter for the valuation of
non-traded goods follow the logic of this backwards breakdown along the
output-input chain.
To simplify presentation, suppose initially that: (a) the long-run supply of
all non-traded goods and services is infinitely elastic, i.e. that any additional
demand will be met by expanding production at approximately constant long-
run marginal costs; (b) foreign exchange is in fixed supply, so that what was
presented in Section 3.2 on the APRFE applies; (c) there is only one type of
labor, the supply of which is perfectly elastic at the wages in force, which are
above the corresponding "willingness to receive," i.e. the information pre-
sented in Table 6.5 applies; and (d) there are no "capital costs."
Changes in the "production" of foreign exchange by changing the produc-
tion of imported or exported goods are beyond the scope of this chapter, as
this would require a more extensive treatment of the preparation and use of
input-output matrices.1 As for labor, Chapter 13 discusses unskilled labor in
detail, which is, in most cases, where the most important distributional effects
are to be found. Finally, considering "capital costs" may also lead to identify-
ing significant distributional effects, but taking them into account would
require an explanation of how long-run marginal costs may be represented in a
matrix. For this reason, some of these aspects are only mentioned, but not
fully developed, in sections 11.2, 11.3 and 11.4.
To calculate the value at accounting prices of a certain additional quantity
AQ of a non-traded good valued at market prices, we need to know the long-
run marginal cost of producing this additional quantity and the accounting
(and market) prices of the inputs comprising these costs. To know the ac-
counting prices of these inputs, we also need to know those of the inputs that
go into the production of the inputs of AQ, and so on. In other words, it is
necessary to break down the market value of AQ backwards in successive
stages following the output-input chain. At each step back, the prices paid for
inputs can be broken down into the following four main categories:
(a) the market value of other non-traded inputs, the additional demand for
which is met by additional production;
(b) the market value of foreign exchange, which by being in fixed supply is
withdrawn from other alternative uses;
(c) the value of taxes on foreign trade; and
(d) the market value of labor.
1. See Londero (1994).
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AP FOR NON-TRADED GOODS
Table 11.1 Breakdown of a Value at Market Prices, Iterative
Procedure
First Round
Second Round
Third Round
Fourth Round
Total After Four Rounds
Non-
Traded
40.0
10.0
2.0
0.5
0.5
Foreign
Exchange
30.0
20.0
4.0
0.6
54.6
Wages
25.0
9.0
3.6
0.8
38.4
Taxes
5.0
1.0
0.4
0.1
Ifs
Value at
Market
Prices
100.0
40.0
10.0
2.0
100.0
Since foreign exchange has been assumed to be in fixed supply, the increase
in the exchange rate brought about by the additional demand for foreign
exchange, caused by the additional production of non-traded goods, will not
lead to an increase in the production of exports. Furthermore, neither un-
skilled labor nor taxes are "produced," so that the backwards breakdown is
done only for non-traded items, while successive requirements for foreign
exchange, labor and taxes build up. In this way, at each step backwards in the
output-input chain, a higher proportion of the market value of Ag is decom-
posed into categories (b), (c) and (d), yielding a lower one in (a). It is then
possible to take a sufficient number of steps in order for the percentage of the
value of Ag that still remains as the market value of non-traded inputs to be as
small as desired. Through a sufficient number of steps, it can be brought
down practically to zero; in other words, the remainder of inputs in categories
(a) tends towards zero when the number of steps backwards tends towards
infinity.
An example will help to clarify the procedure. In Table 11.1, the first row
shows the cost of providing a production value of 100 at market prices of, for
example, construction in the industrial project in Chapter 9. This cost is
broken down into 40 of additional production costs for non-traded inputs
(category (a)) and 60 of what will be called non-produced inputs (foreign
exchange and labor) and transfers.2 In turn, the 40 of non-traded inputs (for
example, cement, bricks, etc.) can also be broken down backwards, yielding
10 of additional production of inputs and 30 of non-produced inputs and
transfers, and so on. After only four steps back along the chain, 99.5 % of the
original value of 100 at market prices is expressed as direct requirements (first
row) and indirect requirements (total of the following rows) for foreign ex-
change, wages and taxes.
Once 100% of the value at market prices has been broken down in such a
way, foreign exchange, labor and taxes can be valued at efficiency prices, as
set forth in Part I. Thus, in the first column of Table 11.2, the value at market
2. Foreign exchange, although obtained from the production of exported goods, is not pro-
duced at the margin, since it is assumed to be in fixed supply.
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INPUT-OUTPUT TECHNIQUES
Table 11.2 Valuation of a Non-Traded Input
Non-Traded Inputs
Foreign Exchange
Wages
Taxes
Total
Project
-0.50
-54.60
-38.40
-6.50
-100.00
Workers
23.04
23.04
Government
-5.46
6.50
1.04
Total
-0.50
-60.06
-15.36
-75.92
prices of non-traded inputs is given in accordance with the results of the
backwards decomposition obtained in Table 11.1. Foreign exchange has been
valued in accordance with the corresponding APRFE (APRFE =1.1) and the
wages of unskilled labor broken down into willingness to receive
(WR = 15.36) and transfer w - WR = 23.04 on the assumption that all this
labor was previously unemployed. The error implied in accepting the market
price of the non-traded good as being equal to its accounting price has been
reduced to a minimum since it now represents only 0.5% of total. However,
this does not imply that the entire effect of market prices has been eliminated.
The reader will recall from Chapter 3, that an APRFE calculated on the basis
of a weighted average of taxes on foreign trade includes assumptions of
equality between market and efficiency prices.
If at this stage, the reader feels skeptical about the practical possibility of
effecting the backwards breakdown by manual methods even for a single non-
traded input, his skepticism is well grounded. Although the long-run marginal
cost structures can be estimated, the breakdown process by manual methods is
a gigantic task and consequently impractical. However, there are simple alge-
braic procedures for calculating these total (direct and indirect) requirements
for non-produced inputs and transfers using input-output techniques. This will
be the topic of the following section.
11.2 Calculating Accounting Price Ratios for Non-Traded Goods:
Some Formulas
Let us begin by recalling that the accounting price ratio of goody (APRp was
defined as the quotient between its accounting price (pj) and its market price
(Pj), i.e.
The following explanation will show a way of calculating APRs for non-
traded intermediate goods, on the basis of the long-run marginal costs of these
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APRs, SOME FORMULAS
goods expressed at market prices. For this purpose, it is useful to begin by
writing these marginal costs as
[11.1]
in which
= physical quantity of non-traded good or service j required to
produce AQ, additional units of intermediate good or service i
= quantity of non-produced input h (h = 1, ..., k; for the moment
foreign exchange and unskilled labor) required to produce A<2,
additional units of intermediate good or service i
= value of transfers h(h = k + I , ...,m; for the moment taxes on
foreign trade) brought about by the production of A<2;.
Ideally, these marginal costs will be the present value of the cost of expand-
ing production of good i by A£>, annual units, i.e.
in which PV indicates present value and t the period.3 Consequently, the
respective investment costs will be included in Ag,^, &Fihph and ATih. Those
costs that correspond to non-traded goods will be included in AQjjpj, while
traded goods will be broken down into foreign exchange (included in AFihph),
taxes on foreign trade (A 7^) and other non-traded intermediate goods and
services such as port, transport and trading costs (included in the respective
AQijPJ)- Since these present values will be calculated using the discount rate,
we can rewrite equation f 11.1] as
[11.2]
in which AB, is the difference between the present value of the value of
additional production and the present value of long-run marginal costs. This
difference (A 5,) will be positive if the present value of the value of additional
3. Note that prices do not have subscript t because it is assumed that the relative prices remain
constant.
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INPUT-OUTPUT TECHNIQUES
production A<2,- at market prices is greater than the present value of the long-
run marginal costs, also at market prices, that is, if the internal rate of return
on investment, at market prices and before direct taxes (q), is greater than the
discount rate (d).
Dividing both sides of [11.2] by A£> yields
The accounting price of good i (pi = APR^^ will be equal to the correspond-
ing marginal cost valued at accounting prices, that is,
from which the accounting price ratio of i can be expressed as
If we now assume that the coefficients for inputs (AQy/AQ,; AF;A/AQ,), trans-
fers (ATjj/AQ,- p,) and net benefits at market prices per unit of production
value (AB/AJ2,- p,) are independent of the size of A£J,, the above expression
can be written in simpler form as
[11.3]
in which aijt fih, tih and bt are value coefficients of the inputs or transfers per
additional unit of production value and bt are the net benefits at market prices
per additional unit of production value. Expression [11.3] indicates that to
calculate the APR of non-traded good i (APRt) it is necessary to know not only
APR{, APR'h and APRf, but also the APRs of its non-traded inputs
j = 1, ..., n. The APRs of the non-traded inputs of good i ought also to be
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APRs, SOME FORMULAS
calculated on the basis of their respective expressions [11.3]. It will thus be
necessary to have a complete system of equations [11.3] for all the non-traded
intermediate goods. For this purpose, and to simplify notation, tih, bi and their
respective APRs can be included within the common notation^ and APR{. In
this way, the complete system of equations for non-traded goods
j = 1, . . . ,« can be written as
The same system can also be written using matrix notation
and, more concisely still, as
from which the vector of the APRs of the non-traded intermediate goods can
be obtained as
[11.4]
Expression [11.4] can be interpreted in the following way. Each row of the
matrix [f*h] = (I — A)'1 X F provides the total requirements, direct and
indirect, of non-produced inputs and transfers per unit of production value.
Thus, in the case of non-traded good k,
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INPUT-OUTPUT TECHNIQUES
Table 11.3 Hypothetical Intersectoral Relations Matrix
Inputs
Outputs
(D
(2)
(3)
(1)
0.14
0.09
(2)
0.37
0.14
(3)
0.05
0.06
fe
0.30
0.40
0.70
uw
0.15
0.20
0.05
sw
0.10
0.15
0.15
t
0.03
0.03
bp
0.02
bg
-0.13
Total
1.00
1.00
1.00
Then the product [f^ APRf = (I - A)~{ x F x APRf, which in the case of
non-traded good k corresponds to
will be these total requirements multiplied by their respective APR{. If we
now make the comparison with the example of Table ll.l,thefk*h correspond
to the last row of this table in which the remainder of non-traded goods has
been reduced to zero. When the assumptions and value judgments of effi-
ciency analysis are adopted, [11.5] is equivalent to the total of the last column
of Table 11.2 per unit of production value, since taxes and benefits above the
discount rate are transfers and, consequently, their APR{are zero.
11.3 A Numerical Example
Let us assume there is a simplified system in which there are only three non-
traded intermediate goods. The first (1) is machinery and the other two (2 and
3) are current inputs. The long-run marginal cost structures are those shown in
Table 11.3. All the sectors use the machinery as well as the other two inputs.
However, the elements in the main diagonal (the a,-,-) in the transactions matrix
A = [tfy] are nil because consumption in the sector has been subtracted from
production. In addition to the non-traded inputs, the sectors purchase foreign
exchange (fe), unskilled (uw) and skilled (sw) labor, and pay import duties
(f). In sector (1) the market price is equal to the long-run marginal cost, so that
there are no excess profits (bpl = 0). Conversely, in sector (2) the price of the
product is higher than these costs (bp2 > 0), a difference resulting from the
discount rate being lower than the minimum total profitability (at market
prices) necessary for firms in the sector to expand production. Finally, sector
(3) is the responsibility of a public firm, which charges a tariff lower than the
long-run marginal cost, so that bg3 < O.4 On the basis of Table 11.3, equa-
tions system [11.4] can be set out as
4. Note that, due to interest in the distributional aspects, a distinction has been made between
excess profits in the private sector and for the Government.
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A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
By now solving (I - A)'1 total direct and indirect requirements for foreign
exchange, unskilled and skilled labor wages, taxes and excess profits can be
calculated as
in which h indicates the type of non-produced input or transfer. By working
out the product (I — A)"1 Fwe obtain
which is the matrix of total requirements sought. The reader can check that the
sum of total requirements of non-produced inputs and transfers in each sector
&hf*h) verifies that
fe* + uw* + sw*+ t* + bp* + bg* = I
It is now possible to value, for example, the machinery produced by sector
(1) in accordance with the criteria already presented. Assuming that the
present value of the purchases of this machinery for a project is 100, this cost
can be broken down into its total requirements by using the corresponding
vector F*h and thus obtaining the first column of Table 11.4. Then, the
income changes created by producing and selling the machinery can be calcu-
lated on the basis of total requirements for non-produced inputs and transfers.
Thus using an APRFE =1.1, valuing unskilled labor at its alternative wages
in the informal sector and accepting the wages of skilled labor as equal to their
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INPUT-OUTPUT TECHNIQUES
Table 11.4 Breakdown of the Present Value of Purchases of
Machinery (1)
Foreign Exchange
Unskilled Labor
Skilled Labor
Taxes
Excess Profits
(Private)
Excess Profits
(Government)
Total
Unskilled Other
Project Workers Firms
-53.50
-24.40 14.64
-17.90
-4.40
-0.80 - 0.80
1.00
-100.00 14.64 0.80
Government Total
-5.35
—
4.40
—
-1.00
-1.95
-58.85
-9.76
-17.90
—
—
-
-86.51
accounting price, we obtain the results in Table 11.4. While the first four
columns do not require further explanation, since this is simply what we have
done up to now, the last two deserve at least a brief discussion. For the
moment, this will be in the framework of efficiency analysis and on the
assumption of equality between the marginal rate of return on investment and
a common discount rate for all persons.5 The entrepreneurs receive, through
the expansion of machinery production by 100, profits of 0.80 in excess of
those strictly necessary to compensate their investment, given the common
discount rate d. This private net benefit is the result of the project paying 0.80
for the machinery above its long-run marginal production cost. However, the
Government grants a transfer of 1.00 to the project by charging a lower tariff
than the respective long-run marginal cost. The final result is that the cost at
market prices exceeds the cost at efficiency prices by approximately 15 %, and
that this difference is explained mainly by the difference between the cost to
employers and the efficiency wage of unskilled labor.
11.4 Cost Structures for Non-Traded Goods
In preceding sections, it was simply taken for granted that the long-run mar-
ginal cost structures for non-traded goods [aijt fih\ were available. In this
section, we will briefly consider the type of data desirable in order to calculate
these cost structures, and move towards the type of data most frequently
encountered in practice.
Strictly speaking, the rows of the matrix ought to contain the structure of the
5. With all the problems that this implies, already discussed in Chapter 8. Interpretations based
on other assumptions and distributional value judgments will be given in Part III.
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COST STRUCTURES
difference between the present value of the production costs of projection Qit
of the supply of output i, and the present value of those for projection
Gtf + ACa,i.e.
in which one of the Fiht, let us say Fiht, captures the difference between the
present value of production value and the present value of private costs.6
Since the costs in each year t include investment costs, Fibl will be what are
sometimes called net benefits at market prices. However, in practice, this
ideal approach can only be pursued in a few cases. One of these is electricity,
in which the use of simulation models can provide an approximation of the
long-run marginal cost by means of a procedure similar to that used in
Chapter 9.
However, in most cases the above procedure will not be feasible. A close
substitute would be to construct cost structures based on investment projects,
which can provide a good approximation when the main long-run effect of the
increase in the quantity demanded of a non-traded input is to advance execu-
tion of the project. Table 11.5 shows an outline of a cost structure obtained in
this way, which corresponds to the case of the industrial project analyzed in
Chapter 9 on the assumption now that it produces non-traded goods. The
disadvantage of this procedure in relation to the previous one is that it leaves
aside the effects resulting from changes in the use of already installed capac-
ity, which are taken into account by simulation models of the electrical sys-
tems type. The main advantage in relation to other procedures is that it allows
for the composition of investment costs to be dealt with better.
Finally, the third alternative is to use the cost structures that can be calcu-
lated on the basis of industrial censuses or surveys, or their equivalent for
other sectors. These data usually provide a good description of current costs,
but are incomplete as regards investment costs, since they only provide data
on the gross operating surplus.7 Normally this leaves no alternative but to
consider the gross operating surplus as the capital cost, but it does not solve
the problem of breaking that cost down at least into traded and non-traded
goods. The latter can be worked out only in a very approximate way on the
6. Note the assumption that p,, the pt and the />{ are constant over time.
7. Although some surveys ask for data on capital stock, these correspond to the accounting
valuation, which raises problems not only because of the tax aspects involved but also because of
the effects of inflation, which are not always properly corrected by the procedures for revaluing
assets.
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INPUT-OUTPUT TECHNIQUES
Table 11.5 Example of a Long-Run Marginal Cost Structure for
the Preparation of the Matrix (Producer Prices)
Source In $ Coefficients
Non-Traded Input 1 \
Non-Traded Input 2 |
167,625 0.266
Non-Traded Input n J
Construction
Transport
Trade
Foreign Exchange
Taxes on Foreign Trade
Skilled Labor
Unskilled Labor
Long-Term Loan
Short-Term Loan
Direct Taxes
Indirect Taxes
Excess Profits
Total
30,000
10,002
15,229
310,176
2,223
39,558
32,387
-38,000
-6,500
6,730
18,900
41,670
630,000
0.048
0.016
0.024
0.492
0.003
0.063
0.051
-0.060
-0.010
0.011
0.030
0.066
1.000
Note: The reader may reconstruct the data in this table by using those in Tables 9.1,
9.3,9.5 and 9.9 and the following additional information: (a) sales from the project
are non-traded goods subject to an indirect tax of 3%; (b) in Table 9.5, the $350 of
imported inputs are composed of $328 of foreign exchange and $22 of import
taxes; and (c) to value the cost structure at producer prices, 1 % for transport and
6% for trade were deducted from non-traded inputs and added to the respective
entries.
basis of secondary information or through an average breakdown according to
the composition of industrial investment. This procedure has the obvious
disadvantage of blurring the differences between sectors and can give rise to
significant errors when the import substitution process in the area of machin-
ery and equipment has advanced to a considerable degree.
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CHAPTER 12
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF AN
IRRIGATION PROJECT
12.1 The Project
This chapter has two main objectives: (a) to present the cost-benefit analysis
of a project in which various types of participants intervene and between
whom various transfers take place; and (b) to illustrate the use of total require-
ments of non-produced inputs and transfers calculated using input-output
techniques. The simplified version of a real irrigation project used is but an
example, and not a complete presentation of cost-benefit analysis of this type
of project. Nevertheless, a short discussion is included on the characteristics
of the project and of the steps followed to draw up the data that will provide
the basis for analysis.
The project consists of the introduction of gravity irrigation in an area
where dry farming is practiced. The Government, through the National Irriga-
tion Institute (Nil), will be responsible for the construction, operation and
The author is grateful to Alejandra Masi's for her assistance on the preparation of the financial
flows of the project.
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AN IRRIGATION PROJECT
maintenance of the system.1 Since new agricultural technology is being intro-
duced, the Nil will provide the necessary agricultural extension services.
Furthermore, it will be responsible for training and organizing producers in
order to set up an agricultural co-operative that will provide three main serv-
ices: (a) leasing machinery and equipment to farms of up to 10 hectares; (b)
storing and marketing produce; and (c) marketing seed, pesticides and fertil-
izers. Table 12.1 shows the costs for these activities valued at the prices
actually paid.
The Government finances investment with budget funds and with a loan
from a multilateral financing organization. However, since this loan would
have been available and would have been used even in the absence of this
specific project, the transfers between lender and borrower to which it gives
rise are not attributable to the project, i.e. they would have existed without it.
As for the co-operative, it will receive credits from the National Agricultural
Bank (NAB) to finance its investment, including replacement. In addition, it
will receive short-term finance, particularly during the first few years. Since
these credits are granted at a real interest rate below the discount rate, the co-
operative will receive a transfer equal to the difference between the present
value of the credits received and the present value of the repayment flow.
Finally, the Nil will receive revenue for water charges and the co-operative
income for the leasing of machinery and equipment, for storage and market-
ing services and for the trade margins on seed, fertilizer and pesticides. This
revenue is the counterpart of the respective payments in the farmers' cost
accounts which are shown below.
In agricultural production, the introduction of irrigation leads to major
changes in agricultural technology and crop composition. The situation with-
out the project is extensive dry farming, with little use of industrial inputs and
yielding only one crop a year. In the situation with the project, there will be
intensive farming, with abundant use of fertilizers and pesticides, which will
result in two, and in some cases as many as three, crops per year. Table 12.2
presents the budgets of a typical two-hectare farm, with and without the
project, for the first year of operations of the irrigation system. These farm
budgets can be broken down into three large groups. The first is the cash flow
from farming, the total of which is shown in row (e). To this income is added
that from other activities, in this case paid work away from the farm, giving
the total monetary income shown in row (g). Finally, the net balance of the
CVs of other costs and benefits attributable to the project, which do not
appear directly as monetary flows are added together. The result is the
1. The real project also includes improvements to access roads leading to the area, which also
benefit farmers not affected by the irrigation itself. Since inclusion of this aspect would compli-
cate analysis without increasing its instructional value, it was excluded.
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THE PROJECT
Table 12.1 Present Value of Costs and Revenues of Irrigation,
Extension and Marketing Systems
(InS)
I. COST OF IRRIGATION SYSTEM
Infrastructure Works
Imported Machinery & Equipment
Skilled Labor
Unskilled Labor
Non-Traded Inputs
Imported Inputs
Operation & Maintenance
Skilled Labor
Unskilled Labor
Imported Machinery & Equipment
Non-Traded Inputs
II. COST OF SUPPORT SERVICES
Commercial Infrastructure
Construction
Silos
Equipment
Agricultural Machinery
Vehicles
Current Costs
Skilled Labor
Unskilled Labor
Imported Inputs
Non-Traded Inputs
III. COSTS SUB-TOTAL (I + II)
IV. REVENUE
Water Charges
Machinery & Equipment Services
Storage & Marketing
Sales
Less Purchases Of:
Seed
Fertilizer
Pesticide
V. FINANCE
Credit from the NAB
Repayments
VI. TOTAL (III + IV + V)
Government
-1,045,655
-700,589
-41,826
-62,739
-94,109
-146,392
-142,991
-102,472
-19,009
-14,586
-6,924
—
—
—
-
-
-15,020
-48,475
-43,740
—
-1,508
-3,227
-1,252,141
185,983
—
-
—
—
_
-
_
-
-1,066,158
Co-operative
—
—
_
—
—
-
—
—
—
—
-
-49,540
-7,257
-13,404
-28,879
-36,130
-36,074
-31,767
-10,935
-3,443
-7,092
-10,297
-153,511
_
47,946
126,568
987,623
-158,317
-573,177
-206,749
222,836
-191,422
101,797
Total
-1,045,655
-700,589
-41,826
-62,739
-94,109
-146,392
-142,991
-102,472
-19,009
-14,586
-6,924
-49,540
-7,257
-13,404
-28,879
-36,130
-51,094
-80,242
-54,675
-3,443
-8,600
-13,524
-1,405,652
185,983
47,946
126,568
987,623
-158,317
-573,177
-206,749
222,836
-191,422
-964,361
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AN IRRIGATION PROJECT
Table 12.2 Comparison of Income and Costs, Monetary and
Non-Monetary, of a Typical 2-ha Farm, With and Without the
Project. Year 2
(ln$)
(a) Sales
Dry Maize
Production
Home Consumption
Seed
Soft Maize
Wheat
Barley
Beans
Peas
Potatoes
Vegetables
(b) Production Costs
Hired Labor
Purchased Seed
Machinery & Equipment Services
Fertilizers
Pesticides
Materials & Tools
Water Costs
(c) Storage & Marketing
(d) Finance
Credit Received
Repayments
(e) Monetary Income of the Farm
[(a) + (b) + (c) + (d)]
(f) Wages away from the Farm
(g) Total Monetary Income
[(e) + (f)]
(h) Non-Monetary Income
Home Consumption
CV of Family Work
CV of Work away from the Farm
(i) Total Income [(g) + (h)]
Without
the Project
16,611
942
(5,064)
(-3,890)
(-232)
585
412
251
_
5,168
9,253
-
-8,598
—
-1,713
-3,711
-1,017
-51
2,106
-
-
-249
10,872
-11,121
7,764
20,000
27,764
-16,922
12,600
-9,522
-20,000
10,842
With
the Project
47,997
819
(5,880)
(-4,945)
(-116)
3,700
_
—
_
16,876
26,602
-
-24,246
—
-3,173
-4,776
-7,145
-2,031
-2,596
-4,525
-1,108
5,219
22,472
-17,253
27,862
8,000
35,862
-9,469
15,900
-17,369
-8,000
26,393
Incremental
31,386
-123
(816)
(-1,055)
(116)
3,115
-412
-251
_
11,708
17,349
-
-15,648
_
-1,460
-1,065
-6,128
-1,980
-490
-4,525
-1,108
5,468
11,600
-6,132
20,098
-12,000
8,098
7,453
3,300
-7,847
12,000
15,551
farmer's total "real" income. The third column of Table 12.2 is the farm's
incremental budget, that is, the difference for the farmer between the situa-
tions with and without the project. These effects are attributable to the project
and constitute the starting point for quantifying the benefits of introducing
irrigation and the technological package that goes with it. Consequently, it
would be useful to discuss in greater detail the way data are presented.
204
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 b
y 
th
e 
In
te
r-
A
m
er
ic
an
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t B
an
k.
 A
ll 
ri
gh
ts
 r
es
er
ve
d.
Fo
r 
m
or
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
vi
si
t o
ur
 w
eb
si
te
: w
w
w
.ia
db
.o
rg
/p
ub
THE PROJECT
Sales, as the name indicates, record the monetary income for that part of
production that is for the market. In the case of small farms, and as seen in
Table 12.2 for dry maize, sales are equal to production minus home consump-
tion and minus the part kept as seed for the next sowing season. Since home
consumption is income in kind for the producer, total home consumption of
all produce is shown as part of non-monetary income. Agricultural costs
include wages for hired labor, and therefore not the cost attributable to family
labor, since the upper part of Table 12.2 refers only to monetary flows. The
CV of the work performed by members of the family is included as a cost in
non-monetary income. Agricultural costs also include payments to the Nil for
the irrigation water used, which were referred to above. When farmers' ac-
counts are consolidated with those of the others affected by the project, these
payments will be revenue for the Nil. Payments to the co-operative for
storage and marketing services (i.e. sales are valued at the co-operative gate)
are included separately, and when added to revenues for the leasing of ma-
chinery and equipment will constitute co-operative income. As for financing,
the credits that the NAB will provide to farmers and their repayments are
shown. The algebraic total of sales, agricultural costs, payments for storage
and marketing services and financing is monetary income for the farm as a
unit of agricultural production.
The project will be carried out in an area where there is a large number of
family small holdings, of which only some will receive irrigation. The in-
comes of the farmers on these small holdings in the situation without the
project are insufficient to finance a minimum level of consumption due to the
low agriculture yields per surface unit and the high ratio between the labor
available per family and the area that can be cultivated. For these reasons,
these farmers supplement their income by working for a salary on the bigger
farms. However, the widespread nature of this situation in the region results in
smallholders and landless farmers being unemployed or under-employed
practically the entire year and being willing to work for a market wage equal
to the CV of this job. Consequently, a family's monetary income is equal to
that for agricultural work on the farm, plus wages for work away from the
farm. The latter is equal to the respective CV, so that this CV is shown as a
cost under the heading "non-monetary income." Since the project will in-
crease income from the farm and employment of farmers on their smallhold-
ings, wages received for work away from the farm in the situation with the
project will fall as the project develops and the CV of family work rises (see
Table 12.3 below).
On the basis of farm budgets for situations with and without the project for
the various years, a table such as 12.3 can be prepared for each typical farm,
which shows the flow of additional monetary and non-monetary income for
the estimated useful life of the project. Each column in this table corresponds
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BREAKDOWN OF INPUTS
to a comparison between the situations with and without the project similar to
that made for year 2 in Table 12.2. Only the column corresponding to year 1
deserves any particular explanation. In that year, the farmers will have to
prepare the farm land for the beginning of irrigated farming the following
year. They will therefore have additional expenditures on materials and
tools (-1,320). They will also have to use labor available in the family unit
(-15,000) and they will have to reduce their paid work away from the farm.
The latter will reduce their income under this heading (—10,000), a reduction
that is equal to the corresponding CV. Since this would involve a reduction in
monetary income, which small farmers could not afford, they would receive a
loan from the NAB (15,000) with a grace period of a year and a half which, as
a result, they will start repaying once they begin to receive additional income
from irrigated farming.
Finally, Table 12.4 shows the consolidation of the present value of the
incremental budgets of all the farms affected by the project. Thus, for exam-
ple, the column for farms of zero to five hectares corresponds to the present
value column of Table 12.3 multiplied by the equivalent number of farms of
that size. This table is the starting point for quantifying the income changes
brought about by the project.
12.2 Breakdown of the Value of Inputs into Non-Produced Inputs and
Transfers
The results of the preceding section, Tables 12.1 and 12.4, summarize the
flows of additional income of the three main groups affected: the Govern-
ment, the co-operative and the farmers. To identify the income changes of
others affected as a result of purchases from the project, it is necessary to have
the total requirements, direct and indirect, of non-produced inputs and trans-
fers attributable to supplying the inputs required for the project. These re-
quirements can be obtained by a method similar to that followed in Chapter
11. Those for non-traded inputs are given in simplified form in Table 12.5 and
are conceptually equivalent to the results obtained in expression [11.6]. The
gross value of production to which they correspond is at producer prices, that
is at the factory gate, and therefore excludes the transport and trading costs
necessary to put them where they will be used (the project). This is because
these costs vary from project to project.
Consequently, in order to value the inputs delivered to the project, these
total requirements first have to be corrected. This can be done by one of two
equivalent procedures. The first is to break down the value of the project
inputs into
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AN IRRIGATION PROJECT
Table 12.4 Present Value of the Incremental Income and Costs,
Monetary and Non-Monetary, of All Farms According to Size
(InS)
Size in Hectares
(a) Sales
Dry Maize
Soft Maize
Wheat
Barley
Beans
Peas
Potatoes
Vegetables
(b) Production Costs
Hired Labor
Purchased Seed
Machinery & Equipment Services
Machinery & Equipment
Fertilizers
Pesticides
Materials & Tools
Water Costs
(c) Storage & Marketing
(d) Finance
Credit Received
Repayments
(e) Monetary Income of the
Farm[(a)+(b)+(c)+(d)]
(f) Wages away from the Farm
(g) Total Monetary Income
[(e)+(f)l
(h) Non-Monetary Income
Home Consumption
CV of Family Work
CV of Work away from the Farm
(i) Total Income [(g)+(h)]
0-5 5-10
7,150,620 639,309
14,532 60,618
58,696 98,364
-3,422 -7,843
-2,085 -9,948
4,843 83,572
169,862 75,198
258,813 -2,118
249,381 341,466
-328,013 -350,123
-7,870 -102,660
-29,545 -7,808
-28,914 -19,032
— —
-152,578 -112,612
-48,301 -40,546
-23,219 -36,779
-37,586 -30,686
-23,898 -20,354
16,862 21,624
228,653 240,267
-211,791 -218,643
415,571 290,456
-164,101 -18,196
251,470 272,260
6,718 -27,810
39,692 8,604
-197,075 -54,610
164,101 18,196
258,188 244,450
10-50
1,357,345
135,243
114,898
-18,729
31,796
195,563
356,641
541,933
-
-723,357
-226,095
-76,908
—
-83,464
-189,123
-64,912
-20,417
-62,438
-43,215
59,967
522,820
-462,853
650,740
-
650,740
-37,477
—
-37,477
-
613,263
50 or More
1,228,143
123,990
227,763
-69,963
96,289
163,170
426,783
260,111
-
-664,013
-226,811
-52,388
—
-102,466
-149,031
-63,871
-14,173
-55,273
-39,101
62,197
498,856
-436,659
587,226
-
587,226
—
—
—
—
587,226
Total
3,975,417
334,383
499,721
-99,957
116,052
447,148
1,028,484
1,058,739
590,847
-2,065,506
-563,436
-166,649
-47,946
-185,930
-603,344
-217,630
-94,588
-185,983
-126,568
160,650
1,490,596
-1,329,946
1,943,993
-182,297
1,761,696
-58,569
48,296
-289,162
182,297
1,703,127
and then value each component as if it were a specific input. In other words,
when the project demands an input delivered to the site, in reality it demands
the input at the factory gate plus the necessary transport and trade to deliver it
to the site. An equivalent procedure is to recalculate the total requirements of
Table 12.5 at purchasers' prices. The latter procedure will be simpler since a
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BREAKDOWN OF INPUTS
Table 12.5 Unitary Total Requirements of Non-Traded Inputs at
Producer Prices
Outputs
Non-Traded Inputs
Construction
Silos
Transport
Wholesale Trade
Seed
Fertilizers
Pesticides
Foreign
Exchange
0.50
0.35
0.60
0.65
0.32
0.38
0.70
0.68
Skilled
Labor
0.17
0.33
0.14
0.13
0.39
0.40
0.05
0.08
Unskilled
Labor
0.20
0.22
0.17
0.02
0.21
0.20
0.08
0.07
Taxes
0.13
0.10
0.09
0.20
0.08
0.02
0.17
0.17
Total
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
number of them will be used in different parts of the project. By way of
example, the one corresponding to non-traded inputs will be recalculated.
Converting total requirements at producer prices to purchasers' prices also
involves starting from the breakdown of the price of the good at the project
site. This breakdown for non-traded inputs is as follows:
at-project-site producer wholesale
price = price + transport +
 trade
1.00 = 0.88 + 0.02 + 0.10
On this basis, the breakdown into total requirements of the price at the project
site can be calculated, using the transport and trade total requirements (Table
12.5), as follows:
In other words, total requirements of non-produced inputs and transfers will
be a weighted average of the requirements for the good valued at producer
prices, of transport and of trade requirements respectively, in which the
weights are the share of each one in the purchasers' price. The results ob-
tained for the purchasers' price structures given in Table 12.6 are shown in
Table 12.7. A comparison of Tables 12.7 and 12.5 will show that, up to the
second decimal place, the breakdowns vary only to a very small degree.
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AN IRRIGATION PROJECT
Table 12.6 Composition of Purchasers' Prices (Project) of
Non-Traded Inputs
Outputs
Non-Traded Inputs
Construction
Silos
Transport
Wholesale Trade
Seed3
Fertilizer3
Pesticides3
Producer
Price
0.88
0.97
0.95
1.00
1.00
0.97
0.98
0.99
Transport
0.02
0.03
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.02
0.01
Trade
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Total
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
a. Trade margins are not included in seed, fertilizers and pesticides since they are
included in the co-operative's costs (Table 12.1).
A similar situation arises with imported goods. If these were simply valued
at their foreign exchange prices, expressed in the national currency plus
import taxes, breakdown would be simple. However, they are valued at the
prices actually paid by the purchaser and, consequently, include the respective
domestic transport and trade margins.
In the same way as for non-traded goods, two alternative procedures may be
followed. The first consists in considering expenditure as being payment for
four different components: foreign exchange, taxes, transport and trade. The
second, simpler one is to recalculate total requirements for non-produced
goods and transfers at the appropriate purchasers' prices.
Let us consider the case of imported inputs purchased by the Government.
Their price includes the transport and trade margins of the national distribu-
Table 12.7 Unitary Total Requirements of Non-Traded Goods, at
Purchasers' Prices (Project)
Non-Traded Inputs
Construction
Silos
Transport
Wholesale Trade
Seed
Fertilizers
Pesticides
Foreign
Exchange
0.48
0.36
0.60
0.65
0.32
0.39
0.70
0.68
Skilled
Labor
0.19
0.33
0.14
0.13
0.39
0.39
0.05
0.08
Unskilled
Labor
0.20
0.21
0.16
0.02
0.20
0.20
0.08
0.07
Taxes
0.13
0.10
0.10
0.20
0.08
0.02
0.17
0.17
Total
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Source: Calculated on the basis of Tables 12.5 and 12.6.
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BREAKDOWN OF INPUTS
tors from whom they are purchased but not import taxes, since Government
purchases are brought in free of taxes, or they are refunded in the case of
products purchased on the domestic market. Thus, the breakdown of the
purchasers' price is as follows,
and the total requirements sought can also be calculated by using those for
transport and trade (Table 12.5) in the following way:
In the case of the project analyzed, Table 12.8 shows the breakdown of the
prices paid by those affected by the project, with a distinction between the
Government and the private sector (co-operative and farmers), because of the
former's special tax treatment. The resulting total requirements are shown in
Table 12.9 and a comparison of them with Table 12.8 indicates that they are
substantially different from those that would result from assuming that the
valuation of imported inputs merely corresponded to foreign exchange plus
import taxes.
Once total requirements are available, it is possible to break down the costs
incurred by the Government and the co-operative. Thus, for example, pur-
Table 12.8 Composition of Purchasers' Price (Project)
of Imported Inputs
Inputs (govt.)
Mach. & Equip, (govt.)
Equipment (private)
Agricultural Mach. (co-op.)
Vehicles (govt.)
Vehicles (private)
Inputs (private)
Foreign
Exchange
0.89
0.88
0.83
0.82
0.85
0.80
0.81
Taxes
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.06
0.00
0.05
0.10
Transport
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.01
Trade
0.10
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.15
0.15
0.08
Total
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
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AN IRRIGATION PROJECT
Table 12.9 Unitary Total Requirements of Imported Inputs, at
Purchasers' Prices (Project)
Inputs (govt.)
Mach. & Equip, (govt.)
Equipment (private)
Agricultural Mach. (private)
Vehicles (govt.)
Vehicles (private)
Inputs (private)
Foreign
Exchange
0.93
0.93
0.87
0.87
0.90
0.85
0.84
Skilled
Labor
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.06
0.06
0.03
Unskilled
Labor
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.02
Taxes
0.01
0.01
0.07
0.07
0.01
0.06
0.11
Total
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Source: Calculated on the basis of Table 12.5 and 12.8.
chases of non-traded inputs by the Government for infrastructure works
($94,109) are broken down using the first row of Table 12.7. This shows
that to increase production by $1.00 at purchasers' prices involves using
$0.48 of foreign exchange, so that the Government's demand for non-traded
inputs will mean a use (direct and indirect) of foreign exchange equal to
$94,109 X 0.48 = $45,172. In the same way, the remaining total require-
ments for non-produced inputs and transfers can be obtained:
The same procedure allows for the breakdown of the remaining inputs
demanded by the Government and the co-operative to be calculated in order to
obtain the results shown in Tables 12.10 and 12.11. It should be noted that in
these tables, the Income figures are kept as they were since this income is
financial transfers between farmers, the Government and the co-operative,
whose costs are already considered in the remaining accounts. For example,
Government revenue from water charges is equal to payments by farmers, and
the costs of providing it are those of the irrigation system. The same occurs
with co-operative revenue for machinery and storage services, in which the
respective costs are included in the support services as expenditure on con-
struction, silos, machinery, labor, etc. As regards the sales of seed, fertilizers
and pesticides by the co-operative, income is equal to the payments to farmers
for these items and it is the purchase of these inputs by the co-operative,
which has been broken down into its total requirements for non-produced
inputs and transfers. Finally, it should be noted in Table 12.10 that when the
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BREAKDOWN OF INPUTS
Government purchases, for example, non-traded inputs for infrastructure
works for $94,109, $12,234 correspond to taxes included in the value at
purchasers' prices of those inputs. These are taxes paid by the manufacturers
of the inputs and constitute Government revenue.
It now remains for us to break down the value of additional agricultural
production attributable to the project. First we need to consider separately the
three parts making it up, viz: seed, home consumption and sales. In turn, this
will help justify the particular way in which the farm budgets were prepared
(Tables 12.2, 12.3 and 12.4). Seed from the previous period's production (as
opposed to that purchased) needs to be valued at its production cost at the
farm since this is what actually happens, especially in the situation without the
project.2 As these costs have already been calculated in Farming costs, their
breakdown and subsequent valuation takes into account the additional produc-
tion intended for consumption on the farm as seed. A similar situation arises
with home consumption. Since the small farmers, the only ones for whom
increased home consumption exists, do not purchase those products that they
themselves produce, but instead only sell the surpluses, greater home con-
sumption merely reflects a better diet. Any effect on additional supply takes
place through changes in sales. The net effect of greater production for home
consumption is calculated as the difference between the value of home con-
sumption and its production costs (as opposed to those for sales). The former
has to be valued at the CV of the additional consumption, estimated here by
the difference between the sales value for the co-operative and payments for
storage and marketing services, since these are a percentage on sales. In other
words, it is assumed that at the margin, farmers value additional home con-
sumption at what for them is the opportunity cost. The corresponding produc-
tion costs are already included in the farm budget under that title.
Soft maize, wheat, barley and beans are imported at the margin, so the
project will substitute imports in this regard. Consequently, purchaser's prices
for imports and project output have to be compared, as well as their respective
breakdowns. This comparison shows that the wholesale and retail trade mar-
gins are not affected by the source of outputs and that differences in domestic
transport costs are insignificant. As a result, the sales price of the co-opera-
tive, which sells at the co-operative gate, will be equivalent to the GIF value
plus taxes paid for the imports replaced. The breakdown of prices appears in
Table 12.12, and using those figures to break down the additional supply of
imported agricultural outputs enables us to obtain the results in Table 12.13.
2. Note that this is valid regardless of whether the output in question could have been imported
at the margin. The effect of keeping a larger or smaller proportion of production as seed will affect
supply through sales.
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AN IRRIGATION PROJECT
Table 12.12 Breakdown of the Sales Price of Agricultural
Outputs Imported at the Margin
Dry Maize
Wheat
Barley
Beans
Foreign
Exchange
0.95
0.90
0.90
0.95
Taxes
0.05
0.10
0.10
0.05
Total
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
The remaining outputs are non-traded and, according to Section 7.3, we
need to ascertain whether the technical change introduced by the project
changes production conditions at the margin and, consequently, prices, or
whether it merely displaces marginal producers to other activities without
discernible effects on prices. The project is in the latter category, so that the
additional supply of non-traded goods ought to be valued according to what
was presented in Table 7.3. However, no information is available on the
production costs of marginal producers, so that additional production is val-
ued at its market price. As pointed out in Section 7.3, this amounts to assum-
ing that this price is equal to the production cost at efficiency prices of the
displaced producers.
The lower part of Table 12.13 provides a breakdown of purchases of inputs.
There the reader will see that those purchases whose breakdown is already
included in Tables 12.10 and 12.11 for the Government and the co-operative
have been omitted. This is the case for seed purchased, machinery and equip-
ment services, fertilizers, pesticides and water.
12.3 Consolidation of the Income Changes Brought About by the Project
All the information needed to consolidate the income changes generated by
the project is now available. The first seven columns of Table 12.14 corres-
pond to the consolidation of the income changes already presented in preced-
ing sections. Six of these columns are for the Government, the co-operative
and the four sizes of farms. The seventh is for the National Agricultural Bank
(NAB) and is included to complete the entries for the income flows between
the co-operative, the farmers and the bank. The eighth column, Government
(taxes), is included to record the changes in Government revenue from the
taxes included in the prices of the goods purchased and sold as well as those
that account for the difference between the exchange rate and the APRFE.
The Government thus appears twice. The first time is as the source of expen-
diture on the irrigation system and support services, as well as the recipient of
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Table 12.14 Consolidation of the Income Changes Brought
About by the Project
(ln$)
Government
Co-
operative NAB
I. GOVERNMENT & CO-OPERATIVE COSTS
Cost of the Irrigation System
Foreign Exchange
Skilled Labor
Unskilled Labor (FS)
Taxes
Cost of Support Services
Foreign Exchange
Skilled Labor
Unskilled Labor (FS)
Unskilled Labor (RS)
Taxes
Purchases of Seed, Fertilizers & Pesticides
Foreign Exchange
Skilled Labor
Unskilled Labor (FS)
Taxes
Loan to the Co-Operative
Repayments
II. FARMERS
Sales
Foreign Exchange
Taxes
Soft Maize
Peas
Potatoes
Vegetables
Production Costs
Foreign Exchange
Skilled Labor
Unskilled Labor (FS)
Taxes
Hired Labor
Purchased Seed
Machinery & Equipment Services
Fertilizers
Pesticides
Water Costs
Storage & Marketing
Loan Received
Repayments
Wages away from the Farm
Non-Monetary Income
TOTAL ADDITIONAL INCOME
-849,753
-197,957
-119,186
-21,750
-16,469
-45,315
-1,126
—
-585
-
—
-
-
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
-
—
—
—
—
_
—
-
—
—
185,983
-
-
-
-
-
-1,066,158
—
—
—
—
-108,775
-22,140
-8,252
-3,443
-10,900
-603,557
-106,943
-91,989
-135,753
222,836
-191,422
—
—
—
—
—
-
—
—
—
—
_
166,649
47,946
603,344
217,630
-
126,568
-
-
-
-
101,799
-
—
—
-
-
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
-222,836
191,422
—
—
—
—
—
-
—
—
—
—
—
—
-
—
—
-
-
-1,490,596
1,329,946
-
-
-192,064
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Farms Size (in hectares)
0-5
-
-
13,450
418
58,696
169,862
258,813
249,381
-11,145
-4,412
-4,644
-3,018
-7,870
-29,545
-28,914
-152,578
-48,301
-37,586
-23,898
228,653
-211,791
-164,101
6,718
258,188
5-10
-
-
120,969
5,430
98,364
75,198
-2,118
341,466
-17,654
-6,988
-7,356
-4,781
-102,660
-7,808
-19,032
-112,612
-40,546
-30,686
-20,354
240,267
-218,643
-18,196
-27,810
244,450
10-50
-
-
326,026
17,847
114,898
356,641
541,933
—
-82,414
-7,218
-5,753
-8,497
-226,095
-76,908
—
-189,123
-64,912
-62,438
-43,215
522,820
-462,853
-
-37,477
613,262
50 or Government
more (Taxes)
-84,975
21,750
-12,524
11,485
-60,356
135,753
296,495 75,694
16,991 -40,686
227,763
426,783
260,111
— —
-95,948 -20,716
-6,792
-4,884
-9,015 25,311
-226,811
-52,388
— -
-149,031
-63,871
-55,273
-39,101
498,856
-436,659
- -
- -
587,226 50,736
Workers
Unskilled Total
-934,728
-197,957
35,756 -83,430
-137,768
-67,455
2,813 -6,565
-3,443
-663,913
-106,943
27,597 -64,392
-
832,634
— _
499,721
- 1,028,484
1,058,739
590,847
-227,877
-25,410
6,791 -15,846
— —
- -563,436
— —
— —
— —
— —
- -
— —
_ —
— —
-182,297
-58,569
72,957 670,396
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AN IRRIGATION PROJECT
the water charges paid by farmers. In both cases, flows originating directly in
the financial statements of the project are involved. The second appearance
relates to the effects on tax revenue, and is included separately to facilitate
interpretation of the vertical totals of the columns, which, as can be seen,
coincide with those of Tables 12.1 and 12.4. Finally, the Unskilled Workers
column is included to record the additional income which, as will be seen,
explains the difference between the wages paid to these workers in the formal
sector of the economy and their income in the sector from which they come.
As regards the rows, the upper part of Table 12.14 contains irrigation and
support services costs already broken down into their total requirements of
non-produced inputs and transfers originating in Tables 12.10 and 12.11.
These costs are classified according to whether they are paid by the Govern-
ment or the co-operative. The costs for purchasing seed, fertilizers and pesti-
cides by the co-operative are shown in the same way. Its income for machin-
ery and equipment leasing, storage, marketing and sales of inputs to farmers
is included as the counterpart of payments by the latter in the lower part of the
table, which is merely a different way of presenting Table 12.4. The differ-
ence is that the sales of imported agricultural outputs and the purchases of the
remaining inputs are shown broken down into their total requirements for non-
produced inputs and transfers.
To complete the income changes brought about by the project, only the
effects of the net production of foreign exchange on the collection of taxes and
the additional income of unskilled workers need to be included. It is estimated
that for each $1.00 of additional foreign exchange, the Government receives
$0.10 in taxes as the net balance between greater receipts for imports and
lower receipts for exports, i.e. the APRFE =1.1. The change in tax receipts
attributable to the use and production of foreign exchange is shown in the
Government (taxes) column. As for unskilled labor, a distinction has been
made between wages paid in the formal urban sector (FS) of the economy (or
equivalent) and in the rural sector (RS). This is because in the formal urban
sector, wages are considerably higher than those in the informal sector due to
high unemployment and widespread under-employment. Since at the margin,
unskilled labor comes from under-employment in the rural sector, the prevail-
ing wages in this sector were taken as an approximation of the CV of addi-
tional employment, which turned out to be equal to 70% of the wages in the
formal sector. Consequently, the difference between the two is shown as
additional income for unskilled workers in the formal sector. In the rural
sector, the wages paid are considered good approximations of the correspond-
ing CV, and thus no additional income is entered under this heading.
220
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 b
y 
th
e 
In
te
r-
A
m
er
ic
an
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t B
an
k.
 A
ll 
ri
gh
ts
 r
es
er
ve
d.
Fo
r 
m
or
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
vi
si
t o
ur
 w
eb
si
te
: w
w
w
.ia
db
.o
rg
/p
ub
DISTRIBUTION OF NET BENEFITS
12.4 Net Benefits and Their Distribution
The reader will recall from Part I of this study, that in order to obtain a
measure of "total" benefits attributable to the project, an aggregation criterion
or interpersonal distributional value judgment is needed. If this value judg-
ment corresponds to that of the operational version of efficiency analysis, an
additional unit of income is equally valuable whatever the income level of the
recipient, and the sum of the Total column will be the net benefits from the
project at efficiency prices each time there is equality between the discount
rate and the rate of return on marginal investment. This last column is all that
is required by the operational version of efficiency analysis. However, if the
interpersonal distributional value judgment were different, or the discount rate
and the rate of return on marginal investment were not equal, the calculation
of "total" net benefits would require us to know, as we will see in Part III, the
distribution of the net changes in income. As pointed out earlier, this is the
difference between the distribution of income changes generated by the
project and by the alternative course of action. Since the decision to construct
the irrigation system is the element that gives rise to all the other income
flows, and since the funds financing its construction are those on which a
decision is being taken, the alternative course of action is what corresponds to
the other use that would be made of these funds if the project were not carried
out. The income changes that this alternative use of funds would lead to, and
their distribution, constitute the without project situation.
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CHAPTER 13
EXTENSIONS OF THE USE OF
INPUT-OUTPUT TECHNIQUES:
UNSKILLED LABOR
In Chapter 10, the APRs of non-produced inputs and transfers, elements of
the APR? vector, were treated as exogenous to the solution of the equation
system [11.4]. Clearly this is not the case in reality, since estimating the APR^
relies on accepting, at some point in the analysis, the assumption that the
market price is equal to the efficiency price. Remember that this took place,
for example, in Chapter 3 in discussing the APRFE when there are imports of
intermediate goods, and in Chapter 6 in discussing the valuation of skilled
labor. To avoid it would require formulating a general equilibrium model and
its adjustment rules for demand and supply changes of each of the goods and
services involved. Since estimating a model of this type is considered beyond
practical possibilities, this approach will not be attempted. However, in this
chapter we will consider a type of extension of the model presented in Chapter
10, which could be applied provided the data are available. This type of exten-
sion uses input-output analysis logic to incorporate the effects of some changes
in the production of goods and services resulting from changes in the demand
for non-produced inputs. The procedure consists in treating the direct require-
ments for some non-produced inputs as endogenous to the system of equations
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TREATMENT IN THE MATRIX
Table 13.1 Preparation of the Column "Producing"
Unskilled Labor
Breakdown
Increase in the Monetary
Income of the Worker
Increase in ISS Income
Compensating Variation of
Additional Work
Income in Export Agriculture
Total
General
Notation
Aw
>As
d>
w*
~^
Cost to the
Employer
13,712
2,232
9,566
6,377
31,887
Co-
efficients
0.43
0.07
0.30
0.20
1.00
Notation
in the
Matrix
'»
'„,
'.,
a
«
a. Values corresponding to the numerical example in Section 6.6.
[11.4]. As an illustration, the case of unskilled labor will be presented using
the example from Section 6.6, in which the cost to the employer of unskilled
labor was broken down into: (a) the increase in the worker's monetary income
(Aw); (b) the increase in the income of the Institute of Social Security (ISS);
(c) the compensating variation of the additional work (df); and (d) the wages
earned in export agriculture (w*).
13.1 Treatment in the Matrix
In order to estimate the APR of unskilled labor, we can start by treating it as if
it were a produced input, incorporating into the matrix [a-; fih] a row ;' that
"produces" labor and from which other sectors demand according to their
respective coefficients representing the cost to the employer of unskilled
labor. This "labor-producing" row consists of the coefficients resulting from
the breakdown of the cost to the employer mentioned above (see Table 13.1).
Following the traditional criterion in cost-benefit analysis of ignoring the
indirect effects resulting from expenditure of additional income, transfer Aw
and the cost of the non-produced good df are assigned to the matrix [fih\.
Income changes in export agriculture represent changes in exports, the results
of which on foreign exchange and some non-traded services can be included
in the matrix.
As indicated in preceding chapters (see [6.13]), if we accept that w1 is equal
to the farm gate value of the marginal product, then
Namely, the salary paid is equal to the foreign exchange value (expressed in
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UNSKILLED LABOR
Table 1 3.2 Preparation of the Column for the
in Exports
Reduction in the Supply
of Foreign Exchange
Export Taxes
Savings in Transport Costs
Savings in Trading Costs
Total
General
Notation
q'p""
-q'p'0"',
-q'pM>tra'
-q* pto6 com'
w*
Cost to the
Employer
7,873
-315
-79
-1,102
6,377
Reduction
Co-
Efficients
1.23
-0.05
-0.01
-0.17
1.00
Notation
in the
Matrix
'*
'»
a
«
an
the national currency at the EER) of the reduction in exports minus the
corresponding export taxes, minus the savings in transport and trading costs.1
The structure corresponding to wx can be included in the matrix as indicated in
Table 13.2, which uses the numerical example from Section 6.6. The reduc-
tion in the supply of foreign exchange and export taxes will be in the matrix of
non-produced inputs and transfers [fih] and the reduction in demand for trans-
port and trading services will appear in the transactions matrix. Finally,
contributions to the ISS appear as a transfer brought about by hiring unskilled
workers, who would not have joined the social security system if not hired.
13.2 A Numerical Example
By way of example, the treatment of unskilled labor presented in the previous
section will be included in the matrix used in Chapter 12, Table 12.3. To
simplify the explanation, columns bp and bg in Table 11.3 have been incorpo-
rated into a single one as if sectors (2) and (3) were both private (or public). It
will be useful to begin by repositioning column wnc as a column in the matrix
[atj\. That is column (4) of Table 13.3. Next, it is necessary to include the
corresponding row that "produces" unskilled labor whose coefficients are
those from the Coefficients column in Table 13.2. This row "demands"
w* = 0.20 backwards to incorporate the effects of the reduction in exports (f.
It also contains transfers Aw = 0.43 #* and wtss = 0.07, since these are
workers who at the margin join the social security system, and the CV of
additional work d? = 0.30. Row (5) corresponds to the breakdown of w* in its
effects on foreign exchange (1.23), transport and trading costs (—0.18) and
1. If the exported output is processed to any degree, the respective costs would also have to be
deducted.
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UNSKILLED LABOR
Table 13.4 Matrix of Total Requirements for Non-Produced
Inputs and Transfers
F;f\hFih
F*
^4ft
Fffl
fe"
0.588
0.576
0.844
0.215
1.078
Aw*
0.105
0.103
0.045
0.428
-0.008
**'„
0.017
0.017
0.007
0.070
-0.001
dr
0.073
0.072
0.032
0.299
-0.006
we
0.177
0.185
0.192
-0.007
-0.035
f
0.041
0.034
0.008
-0.010
-0.051
to*
-0.001
0.013
-0.128
0.005
0.023
Total
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
Source: Calculated on the basis of the matrix in Table 13.3.
the collection of export taxes (-0.05). Now, using the new matrix of inter-
sectoral relations, we can calculate the total requirements, direct and indirect,
of non-produced inputs and transfers, which are shown in Table 13.4. Row
(4) of the matrix,
[^] = [0.215; 0.428; 0.070; 0.299; -0.007; 0.010; 0.005]
will be the total requirements of non-produced inputs and transfers associated
with hiring unskilled labor per peso of cost to the employer. Thus, for exam-
ple, the cost to the employer of unskilled labor hired for the industrial project
in Chapter 9 ($31,887 in Table 9.3) can be broken down according to the first
column of Table 13.5. The remaining columns contain the changes (direct and
indirect) in the incomes of the others affected, calculated and allocated in the
same way as in the previous cases, the total of which is equal to the value at
efficiency prices. Note that the row for contributions to the ISS corresponds to
the example in Table 6.7. There it is assumed that the benefit that the worker
Table 13.5 Breakdown of the Cost to the Employer and
Valuation at Efficiency Prices of Unskilled Labor
Foreign Exchange (fe")
Increase in Income (AW*)
Contributions to the ISS (wQ
Compensating Variation (d1*)
Skilled Labor (we')
Taxes (f)
Excess Profits (b")
Total (Cost to the Employer)
Project Government
-6,856 -686
-13,648
-2,232 -568
-9,534
223
319 -319
-159
-31,887 -1,573
Unskilled
Workers
-
13,648
2,800
-
-
-
-
16,448
Other
Firms Total
-7,542
- -
-
-9,534
223
- -
159
159 -16,853
Source: Table 6.7 and row (4) in Table 13.4, for APRFE = 1.1.
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NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Table 13.6 Breakdown of Valuation at Efficiency Prices of
Unskilled Labor
(In percentages)
Project
-100.00
Government
-4.93
Unskilled
Workers
51.58
Other
Firms
0.50
Total
-52.85
Source: Table 13.5.
receives by belonging to the system is equal to the cost of providing it (valued
at market prices) and that the difference between this cost and the contribution
to the ISS is financed by the Government.
The breakdown of the valuation of unskilled labor shown in the rows in
Table 13.5 does not pretend to suggest that this breakdown must be included
when presenting the distributional effect of the project being analyzed. For
our purposes, it will be sufficient for the project analyst to have the composi-
tion in percentages of the Total row, taking the cost to the employer as a base,
since this will be the figure available in project documentation. This break-
down, derived from Table 13.5, appears in Table 13.6.
Finally, we should point out that a similar procedure can be used for for-
eign exchange. In fact, since foreign exchange has been treated as a non-
produced input at the margin, total requirements fe* must be interpreted as
changes in demand. This can affect the exchange rate and, consequently, the
production of traded goods. The effects of the latter can be included in the
matrix, thus avoiding postulating equality between the market price and the
long-run marginal cost of producing traded goods.2
2. See Section 3.5 and Londero (1994).
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PART
DIFFERENT
ASSUMPTIONS AND
VALUE JUDGMENTS
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CHAPTER 14
ACCOUNTING PRICES OF INVESTMENT
The case studies presented so far correspond to the most frequently used
version of "efficiency" analysis. As pointed out in Chapters 1 and 8, this
operational version involves the assumption of equality between the discount
rate and the rate of return at efficiency prices of marginally displaced invest-
ment. This chapter includes a brief presentation on the modifications required
in this analysis when the above assumption is not valid, while the remaining
value judgments on which efficiency analysis rests are maintained. In particu-
lar, we will try to highlight the importance acquired, in this case, by the
quantification of income changes according to beneficiaries.
In general, the UNIDO (1972, Chapter 14) presentation, which can be
referred to for a more detailed explanation of some of the topics considered,
will be followed. Readers already familiar with the work of UNIDO will find
in this chapter a simple presentation of accounting prices of investment (val-
ued at efficiency prices) and of investment funds. In addition, the reader will
see that in order to apply these accounting prices, it is necessary to have
available the distribution of income changes brought about by the project
analyzed and by the one marginally displaced.
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ACCOUNTING PRICES OF INVESTMENT
14.1 The Concept
Let us assume that a project is being considered whose investment at effi-
ciency prices is /, the profitability of which is qm during the only period of
useful life, and the benefits of which will be entirely for consumption. In this
case the flow of costs and benefits at efficiency prices will be
If the discount rate d is equal to qm, the present value of the consumption
generated by this investment will be equal to the consumption lost by invest-
ing /, that is,
and in this sense, an additional unit of investment is said to be just as valuable
as an additional unit of consumption. The situation does not change if, at the
end of the first period, a proportion sm of the benefits obtained is reinvested at
qm and the benefits of reinvestment are consumed in the second period. In this
case, the flow of changes in consumption (costs and benefits) generated by the
project and reinvestment will be
In period zero, consumption / is lost in order to put it into investment. In
period 1, benefits / (1 + qm) are obtained, of which only a proportion (1 — sm)
is consumed and the remainder reinvested. Finally, in period 2 what is in-
vested in period 1, sm I (1 + qm) is recovered, plus additional benefits qm per
unit reinvested. Since d = qm, the present value of the flow of consumption
will be nil
and consequently
[14.1]
the value of the reduction / in consumption in year zero is equal to the present
value of the consumption generated by the project and reinvestment. Thus,
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CONCEPT
when d = qm, a unit of investment is said to be, at the margin, as valuable as
one of consumption in the sense that the reduction in present consumption is
equal to the present value of the future additional consumption generated by
investment. The reader will also find the above referred to as follows: the
accounting price of a unit of investment valued at efficiency prices, or ac-
counting price of investment, is equal to one, i.e. an additional peso's worth
of investment generates a flow of consumption whose present value is one. In
the simplified example of expression [14.1], the accounting price of invest-
ment / will be the present value of consumption generated by the investment
(right-hand side of expression [14.1]) expressed per unit, that is,
[14.2]
which will be equal to one, since it was assumed that d = qm. However, if qm
were greater than the discount rate, the present value of the flow of consump-
tion generated by an additional peso's worth of investment would be more
than one (Pinv > 1). In this simplified example, the accounting price of
investment depends on the values of qm and sm. The bigger qm is, the bigger
Pinv will be for a given discount rate and a given marginal propensity to save.
At the same time, given a positive difference between qm and d, the greater the
marginal propensity to save of the recipient of the income, the bigger the Pim
would be.
If the present value of consumption generated by an additional unit of
investment is greater than one, that is Pinv > 1, the present value of the
additional net consumption generated by a project will depend on how the net
changes in income generated are distributed between consumption and invest-
ment. In other words, it will depend on the distribution between consumption
and investment of the income changes brought about by the project and by the
alternative course of action. Consequently, acceptance of the interpersonal
distributional value judgment of efficiency analysis will not be enough to
aggregate the income changes until they have been distributed between con-
sumption and investment and the latter expressed in consumption units. Only
then will it be possible to speak of contributions to "total economic welfare"
or benefits. This procedure involves using consumption (whatever its distribu-
tion) as a numeraire, although nothing prevents investment from being se-
lected as a unit of account and expressing additional consumption in such
units.1
1. The reader may have encountered the recommendation in literature on the subject that when
q > d either <?ora weighted average of q and rfmust be used as the discount rate(e.g. Harberger,
1973). UNIDO (1972, Section 13.4), Feldstein (1973) and Ray (1984) have shown that these
approaches are generally incorrect and they are only mentioned here because they are, curiously
enough, very widespread.
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ACCOUNTING PRICES OF INVESTMENT
14.2 Some Simple Formulas for Calculating the Accounting Price
of Investment
In the preceding section, the use of an example of only two periods enabled us
to define the concept of the accounting price of investment and to work out a
simple expression for it. In this section, some simple formulas will be de-
duced for the P'"v that are also based on simplifying, although! less restrictive
assumptions.
To start with, let us assume that a project is being analyzed whose invest-
ment, which is all effected in year zero, is 70 valued at market prices and
70 — T0 valued at efficiency prices, where T0 represents the transfers explain-
ing the difference between the value at market prices and at efficiency prices.
Beginning in year 1, the project will produce annual income Y, (t = 1,2, ...)
in perpetuity, which is entirely devoted to consumption, so that it is expressed
in the numeraire. The flow of income changes brought about by the project
will then be
[14.3]
The alternative course of action to the one analyzed is a different use of
funds I0, since this is the variable controlled by whoever takes decisions and
which in turn gives rise to the income changes Y[ generated by the project. Let
us suppose that this alternative use is another project, the investment in which
is also 70 valued at market prices and 70 — T% valued at efficiency prices. This
alternative investment produces a constant stream of income changes equal to
q (70 - TQ ) per year in perpetuity, which is also entirely devoted to consump-
tion. Consequently, the flow of income changes brought about by the alterna-
tive project will be
[14.4]
in which q is the change in income, excluding transfer T™, per unit of invest-
ment expressed at efficiency prices. Since in this example q is a yield in
perpetuity, it is also the project's internal rate of return.2 In fact, the present
value of flow [14.4] will be
2. See Appendix E for clarification of the difference between q and the rate of return.
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SOME FORMULAS
and recalling that for all / > 0,
[14.5]
the present value of income changes from the alternative project will be zero
at rate q.
It is now possible to calculate the present value of the net income changes
brought about by the project being examined, as the present value of the
difference between flows [14.3] and [14.4], i.e.
Using expression [14.5] and effecting the operations between the first two
terms of the right-hand side, we arrive at
Since the income changes generated (excluding investment) by both projects
were assumed to be for consumption, if T0 — T™ is nil or also goes to
consumption, expression [14.6] will be the present value of the net (effi-
ciency) benefits attributable to the project analyzed. If we assume that the
difference TQ — T% is nil for all practical purposes, the above expression is
identical to that provided by UNIDO (1972) for the case in which all the
income generated by investment is consumed.3 The reader should note here
that the last term in [14.6] is the present value of consumption generated by
investing, in the alternative project, goods and services for a value of 70 — T%
at efficiency prices. Since qld expresses this present value per unit of invest-
ment valued at efficiency prices, it will be the value of the accounting price of
investment, that is
3. See UNIDO (1972, Chapter 14, Section 14.1)
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ACCOUNTING PRICES OF INVESTMENT
This expression enables us to compare the "recipes" for the operational
version of efficiency analysis, that is when the q = d equality is achieved,
with the results of assuming that q 4= d when all the income generated is
consumed. If the approximation T0 = T™ is accepted and if q = d, expression
[14.6] can be written as
which is the present value of the net benefits from the project calculated
according to the operational version of efficiency analysis. Although there are
no reasons to assume that the T0 = T% equality is strictly verified, in most
practical cases, the differences will be minimal and the problem can be
disregarded. However, the q = d equality cannot simply be assumed. It can
only be the conclusion of a more detailed discussion on the discount rate and
an empirical investigation into the profitability at efficiency prices of margin-
ally displaced investment.
The presentation of the flow of income changes from the alternative project
on the basis of investment valued at efficiency prices (expression [14.4])
made it possible to deduce the accounting price of investment as it is defined
in UNIDO (1972), the most widespread version of this concept. However, as
the reader will see below, it is more useful to present the flow of income
changes from alternative investment in a slightly different way. Instead of
using q, the income per unit of investment from the alternative project when
flows are expressed at efficiency prices, a coefficient of income per unit of
investment funds (q1) can be used so that
Consequently, the flow of income changes from the alternative project will be
[14.8]
and the present value of net income changes attributable to the project being
analyzed will be
Assuming now that TQ = T% is also devoted to consumption, and following
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REINVESTMENT
the same steps as in the previous case, [14.9] can be expressed as the present
value of net benefits.
is the accounting price of investment funds /„.
in which
14.3 The Accounting Price of Investment Funds When Part of the
Benefits is Reinvested
In the preceding section, an accounting price of investment funds was de-
duced for the case in which all income generated by both projects, the one
being examined and the alternative, is devoted to consumption. However, part
of the investment will be reinvested so that the expression for the Pf'nv will
also have to take into account the present value of consumption coming from
reinvesting the income generated. Suppose initially that the marginal propen-
sities to save on the changes in income brought about by both projects are both
equal to s and that these savings are reinvested in both cases at rate q', from
which in turn a proportion (1 — s) is consumed and a part 5 is reinvested, also
at rate q', and so on. In this case, the present value of the additional flow of
consumption (benefits) attributable to the project analyzed will be
The difference between this way of expressing net benefits and that used in
f 14.10] is that each change in income has been broken down into consumption
(1 — s) and investment (s) and the latter has been expressed in units of
consumption through the Pfim or present value of consumption generated per
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ACCOUNTING PRICES OF INVESTMENT
unit of investment funds. If AC is used to indicate the present value of
consumption generated by the use of 70 in the alternative project, then
Using identity [14.5] and dividing both sides by 70 yields
[14.12]
from which Pf'nv becomes
[14.13]
This expression is similar to the accounting price of investment deduced in
UNIDO (1972), except that the latter is a corrector of investment valued at
efficiency prices whereas Pfim is a corrector of investment funds. The expres-
sion for the Pinv of UNIDO (1972) can be deduced by the same procedure used
here —expressing the income flows generated by the projects (the one ana-
lyzed and the alternative) according to the value at efficiency prices of the
goods and services that are "invested."
Now, on the basis of [14.12] the present value of consumption generated by
investing funds 70 in the alternative marginal project can be obtained as
follows:
Consequently, the present value of additional consumption attributable to the
project being analyzed (expression [14.11]) can now be written as
If we now assume that the alternative use of funds I0 is only partially
investment, the previous expression for PV(AB) has to be modified. For
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REINVESTMENT
example, if in the absence of the project analyzed, only a proportion a of the
funds would have been invested and the remainder (1 - a) devoted to con-
sumption, expression [14.14] would become
In these formulations, the reader should note that the marginal propensities
to save on total benefits are assumed to be equal for both projects, the one
being analyzed and the alternative. Given that the savings produced on in-
come changes Yt can be expressed as
in which / indicates the individual or group of individuals, and those of the
alternative project as
the assumption that the marginal propensities to save (s = sa) are equal
implies, from a practical point of view, either a coincidence or an identical
distribution of income changes per group defined according to their marginal
propensities to save. This explains why the results in expression [14.14] and
[14.15] are independent of the distribution of the income changes brought
about by the alternative project. This and other simplifying assumptions can
be discarded without significant complications. In the first place, the projects
being compared do not need to have an infinite useful life, which is why from
now on they will have a useful life of n years. Secondly, we will now assume
that the marginal propensities to save on the income changes generated by
each of the two projects are different since the distributions of these incomes
according to those affected (gainers and losers) are different for each project.
The assumption that investment is made in the first year and starts to generate
benefits in the second will also be discarded. Finally, the assumption that the
marginally displaced project yields constant annual income will be discarded.
However, the assumptions of a single marginal propensity to save on income
generated by reinvestment and a coefficient q' of benefits in perpetuity per
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ACCOUNTING PRICES OF INVESTMENT
in which the subscripts or superscripts represent the following:
m: the marginally displaced project
g: the recipients of transfers T. No distinction is made between recipi-
ents of transfers from one project or the other to avoid complicating
notation even more
a: the project being analyzed
It is now easy to demonstrate that Pfinv depends only on the coefficient of
benefits from reinvestment (<?') and on the marginal propensity to save on the
income generated by these reinvestments. For that purpose any of the flows
included in expression [14.16], for example the one for the marginally dis-
placed investment, can be considered. This will generate the consumption and
savings flows shown in Table 14.1. Each one of these savings Y™ sm will be
invested at rate q', producing a present value in year t equal to
in which j = (t + 1) — t, i.e. the year after the one in which the savings
(investment) are made. Following the same steps as in the previous cases we
have
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unit of reinvested funds will be retained. With these changes, expression
[14.14] can be rewritten as
Table 14.1 Income Flows Generated by the Marginally Displaced
Project
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AN EXAMPLE
The present value of consumption generated per unit of investment funds or
accounting price of these funds will then be
from which we obtain
This /*'"" is the one that will now be used to calculate the present value of
consumption originating in the reinvestments resulting from the flows of
additional income in expression [14.16].
The reader may now go back to expression [14.16] and note that it can also
be presented as a total of the net additions to consumption and savings (ex-
pressed in units of consumption) attributable to the project analyzed. How-
ever, the savings produced by each of the projects will depend on the marginal
propensities to save of those affected, gainers or losers. For example, these
propensities will depend on income levels, on whether the groups are urban or
rural, and so on. In other words, in order to estimate the savings attributable
to a project, the analyst needs to estimate not only the distribution, by group
of beneficiaries, of income changes generated by the project but also that
distribution generated by the alternative. In addition, given the objective,
beneficiaries ought to be grouped together according to their marginal propen-
sities to save. Since this distribution of additional income is the synthesis of
the changes in income attributable to the project, the corresponding proportion
of savings will have to be corrected by an accounting price for investment
funds.
Finally, we should point out that different marginal propensities to save or
different profitabilities q' between, for example, the public and private sec-
tors, require sector-specific accounting prices of investment. The formulas for
these prices depend on the income changes that reinvestments in one sector
bring about for the other, a topic that lies beyond the scope of this study.4
14.4 An Example
The analysis of an industrial project in Chapter 9 was based on the assumption
of equality between the discount rate and the rate of return at efficiency prices
of marginally displaced investment. In fact, the present value of the displaced
4. See UNIDO( 1972)
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ACCOUNTING PRICES OF INVESTMENT
project was close to zero. In this section, the project will be analyzed under
the assumption that the profitability of marginally displaced investments is
greater than the discount rate. This analysis will be carried out first assuming
that the distribution of income changes generated by the alternative project is
not known, and second, assuming that it is.
The first step is to obtain an estimate of Pfinv, i.e. to know the discount rate
and to have estimates of the parameters q' and s. As an example, let
from which it follows that
The second step is to identify the distribution of the income changes gener-
ated by the project analyzed. This appears in Table 14.2 and corresponds to
Table 9.10, with some changes in form to facilitate analysis. In particular,
details of the project financing have been provided in order to make discus-
sion of the alternative use of such funds possible. Investments valued at the
prices paid by the project (145,000 + 11,600) are financed with long-term
credit (86,000), a renewable line of short-term credit (11,600) and the inves-
tors' own funds (59,000).
The reader will remember from Chapter 9 that the project was one submit-
ted to the National Development Bank (NDB) for financing, and that the
objective of its cost-benefit analysis is to provide information on whether or
not to finance the project, i.e. whether or not to grant the long-term loan for a
present value of $86,000. Since the decision to carry out the project is not in
the hands of the NDB, it can only consider the following alternatives; (a)
grant the loan, which is equivalent to the situation with the project; and (b) not
grant it, which is not necessarily equivalent to a without project situation since
its sponsors can seek and obtain financing elsewhere.
Let us begin by assuming that the decision against financing it is equivalent
to a without project situation since no alternative sources exist. Now, the
specific nature of the without project situation requires that the alternative use
of the funds be identified. The NDB knows that the alternative use of its
$86,000 is the financing of other industrial projects, although it does not
know which ones. The Bank also knows that if the loan is not granted, the
$59,000 from the sponsors would also be invested through their participation
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ACCOUNTING PRICES OF INVESTMENT
in association with other industrial firms, thus reducing their demand for
investment credit and allowing for additional investment to be financed for
$59,000. Finally, as for short-term credit, we assume that the investments that
would be undertaken in the without project situation would require an approx-
imately equal volume of funds. Consequently, in the without project situation,
the $156,600 would also be invested, although the Bank does not know on
which specific projects. Thus, it follows that transfers within the Industrial
Firms sector, and between this sector and the Government, would also take
place in the without project situation, so that they cancel each other out when
the "with minus without" net flow is calculated. With regard to the transfer to
unskilled workers brought about by investment, this would vary between
different projects, but as the alternative investments are not known, we as-
sume that they would generate the same transfer, so that this too is cancelled
when the net flows are calculated.
The only characteristic of the alternative investments that we know is their
profitability, so the net benefits from the project (the additional consumption
generated) can be calculated by using expression [14.14]:
in which the Yt correspond to the row Current Income & Costs in Table 14.2.
It is now necessary to break these income changes down into consumption and
savings. For this purpose, the analyst must ensure that the distribution of
income changes with which he is working is the final one, and that there are
no transfers yet to be recorded. For example, in Chapter 9, the $4,200
received by the Other Firms as additional income originating in the Current
Income and Costs, correspond to a reduction in prices which, we assume,
these firms do not pass on through prices. If this transfer existed and had not
yet been recorded in the distribution of income changes, it would have to be
shown before the breakdown of these changes into consumption and invest-
244
Since in this case T0 and Tm are assumed to be equal in amount and distribu-
tion, the expression for net benefits is reduced to
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 b
y 
th
e 
In
te
r-
A
m
er
ic
an
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t B
an
k.
 A
ll 
ri
gh
ts
 r
es
er
ve
d.
Fo
r 
m
or
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
vi
si
t o
ur
 w
eb
si
te
: w
w
w
.ia
db
.o
rg
/p
ub
AN EXAMPLE
ment. Otherwise, marginal propensities to save could be used that did not
correspond to those of the real final recipients.
In accordance with the data available, the following marginal propensities
to save have been estimated:
(a) the marginal propensity to save of firms, which includes the project and
the other firms, is 0.35;
(b) that of unskilled workers is nil; and
(c) that of the Government on its current income is 0.20.
Consequently, the income changes in question can be broken down as shown
in Table 14.3.
We can now calculate the present value of the net benefits generated by the
project as
which for pf'm = 2.09 turns out to be
This result shows that the present value of consumption generated by the
project analyzed is greater than that resulting from using the investment funds
on the financing of other projects, with a coefficient of benefits in perpetuity
q' of 8%, on which 28% is reinvested.
It is thus evident that the distribution by beneficiary of the income changes
generated by the project plays a vital role in the result, since the use of the
funds for either consumption or investment depends on it. A redistribution of
the income changes generated by the project changes the result. For example,
the reader can check that a change in direct taxes affects the present value of
net benefits because, in the hypothetical example used, the propensity to save
of firms is different from that of the Government.
Let us now consider the case in which those projects that would be financed
in the event that the loan to the project analyzed were not granted, are known
Table 14.3 Use of Current Net Income from the Industrial Project
(ln$)
Firms
Workers
Government
Total
Consumption
114.965
16,093
46,426
177,484
Investment
61,905
11.607
73,512
Total
176,870
16,093
58,033
250,996
Source: Calculated on the basis of Table 14.2.
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ACCOUNTING PRICES OF INVESTMENT
to the analyst. In order to compare the income changes of the projects, we also
need to identify the distribution of these incomes for the alternative projects,
which is shown in summary form in Table 14.4.
The expected result of the alternative use of the $86,000 yields a coefficient
q practically identical to that of the project analyzed earlier, but differs consid-
erably in the distribution of the income changes generated. This will affect the
proportions of this income that will be devoted to consumption and to invest-
ment and, in that way, the outcome of comparing the alternatives. To make
this comparison, we can begin by breaking down the income changes brought
about by each alternative into: funds whose alternative uses are either con-
sumption or investment; or funds that will end up being saved or spent on
consumption. Next, we calculate the incremental consumption and invest-
ment balances resulting from executing the project being analyzed and, conse-
quently, not carrying out the alternative project. Finally, we value the addi-
tional investment funds with the pfmv and add them to the respective additional
consumption funds.
In the example analyzed (Table 14.2), the project uses funds whose alterna-
tive use is investment for a present value of $156,600, generating transfers to
unskilled workers of $2,139 and to the Government for -$11,710. This
investment will generate an income flow, the present value of which is
$250,996, consisting of $177,484 of estimated expenditure on consumption
and $73,512 of estimated expenditure on investment. Consequently, and ac-
cording to the marginal propensities to save being used, the income generated
by the project being analyzed can be broken down as shown in Table 14.5.
For the alternative projects, let us suppose, for example, that the alternative
use for the investors' own funds and the short-term financing is also invest-
ment, and that the same marginal propensities to save of firms, unskilled
workers and Government are applied. Now, since we know the alternative use
of the financing and the propensities to save on current net income, we can
follow the same procedure used for the project analyzed to calculate the
distribution between consumption and investment of the income changes from
the alternative projects. The results appear in Table 14.6.
To compare the project analyzed with the alternative course of action, we
consider the difference between what is obtained from the former and what
would be obtained from the latter. This amounts to calculating the difference
between Tables 14.5 and 14.6, to come up with the following:
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Project Analyzed
Alternative Project
Consumption
170,255
-173,085
-2,830
Investment
-85,430
-(-88,210)
2,780
Total
84,825
-84,875
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ACCOUNTING PRICES OF INVESTMENT
Table 14.5 Distribution of the Income Changes Generated by the
Industrial Project, by Source and Use (In $)
Use
Source
Investments
• Financing
• Transfers to Workers
• Transfers to the Government
Current Income & Costs
• Net Income of Firms
• Transfers to Workers
• Transfers to the Government
Total
Consumption
-7,229
2,139
-9,368
177,484
144,965
16,093
46,426
170,255
Investment
-158,942
-156,600
-2,342
73,512
61,905
11,607
-85,430
Total
-166,171
-156,600
2,139
-11,710
250,996
176,870
16,093
58,033
84,825
Source: Tables 14.2 and 14.3.
This shows that the project analyzed generates less direct consumption but
uses more net investment funds. When valuing these investment funds with
the pa™ = 2.09,
we can see that when the consumption generated by the differential effect of
projects on investment funds is considered, the project analyzed generates
more total consumption (direct and indirect) than the alternatives.
Table 14.6 Distribution of Income Changes Generated by the
Alternative Projects by Source and Use (In $)
Use
Source
Investments
• Financing
• Transfers to Workers
• Transfers to the Government
Current Income & Costs
• Net Income of Firms
• Transfers to Workers
• Transfers to fhe Government
Total
Consumption
-3,931
5,045
-8,976
177,016
123,630
23,530
29,856
173,085
Investment
-162,244
-160,000
-2,244
74,034
66,570
7,464
-88,210
Total
-166,175
-160,000
5,045
-11,220
251,050
190,200
23,530
37,320
84,875
Source: Tables 14.2 and 14.3.
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CHAPTER 15
INTERPERSONAL DISTRIBUTIONAL
WEIGHTS
Each time that the problem of the interpersonal aggregation of CVs has arisen
so far, the efficiency analysis value judgment has been applied, i.e. the CVs
of all those affected receive the same weight. This chapter briefly presents the
implications of discarding this value judgment, and replacing it by another,
which assigns different weights according to the consumption level of the
person affected. The principles for calculating these weights will be dealt with
in an introductory manner; the reader interested in more detailed discussions
may consult Ray (1984) and Lai (1972). It should also be mentioned that
discarding the interpersonal distributional value judgment of "efficiency"
analysis has given rise to considerable controversy, which is outside the scope
of the following presentation.1
1. In this regard, Balassa (1977), Harberger (1978 and 1980), Layard (1980), Little and
Mirrlees (1974, Ch. 4), Mishan (1974 and 1982b), Ray (1984) and Schwartz and Berney (1977)
can be consulted.
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DISTRIBUTIONAL WEIGHTS
15.1 Introduction
If different people receive different weights, the value judgments on which
these weights are based must be made explicit. The approaches summarized
below are based on the following one: one additional unit of consumption is
equally valuable for all people who have the same level of consumption, but
one additional unit of consumption is more valuable (i.e. it receives a greater
weight) the lower the consumption level of the recipient.
Thus, an additional unit of consumption for any individual i, whose level of
consumption in year t is c\, will receive a weight w(c/), while one for any
individual j, whose consumption is greater (c't > c't), will receive a smaller
weight [w(c/) < w(c/)]. This value judgment may be represented, for exam-
ple, in the form chosen in Figure 15.1, in which ct indicates the per capita
consumption level in year t. Now we have to select a consumption level per
person for each year as a unit of account for that year. To facilitate comparison
with the treatment of the discount rate in Section 8.4, per capita consumption
each year will be chosen.2 Thus, the weight for the CVs of individual i in year
t will be
which indicates how much more valuable an additional unit of consumption is
in year t for a person with a consumption level c\, in comparison with a person
with the per capita consumption level.
Let us now consider a case in which total investment can be increased until
all the projects are included whose rate of return (at the prices resulting from
the interpersonal distributional value judgment being used) is higher than the
discount rate. Consequently, an additional unit of consumption for the per
capita level is as valuable as an additional unit of investment and the analysis
does not require the use of an accounting price of investment. If a project
affects person i in year t in CV\, then u\ CV\ expresses the CV of the person
with consumption c\ in units equivalent to those for the person with the per
capita level. Consequently,
2. Some authors prefer to choose as the basis for comparison what they call the "critical
income level" (Scott et al., 1976, Chapter 3) or "base consumption level" (Little and Mirrlees,
1974, Section 13.13).
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INTERPERSONAL AND INTERTEMPORAL
Figure 15.1 Greater Weights Assigned to Lower Consumption Levels
will be the benefits in year t expressed in equivalent units for the per capita
level. In other words, increasing the consumption of individual i in year t by
CV\ is, according to the interpersonal distributional value judgment, equiva-
lent to increasing the consumption of a person with the per capita level by
u\CV\.
It can now be seen clearly that as far as interpersonal distributional value
judgments are concerned, efficiency analysis is a particular instance of what is
presented here and implies a function w(c) which, in Figure 15.1, would be a
straight horizontal line. Consequently, the weights u\ are all equal to one and
the benefits at efficiency prices in a year t can be calculated simply as follows:
15.2 Interpersonal and Intertemporal Weights
The discussion in Section 8.4 on a discount rate based on the principle of
"diminishing marginal utility of consumption", included a reference to the
fact that this approach was not consistent with equal interpersonal weights for
all those affected. If an additional unit of future consumption is discounted in
relation to one in the present because the future generation will have a higher
per capita consumption level, by the same token, an additional unit of present
consumption for a rich man should receive a lower interpersonal weight than
one for a poor man. It is now possible to compare the expression for the
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DISTRIBUTIONAL WEIGHTS
interpersonal weight u\ with that for the discount factor obtained in Section
8.4. These expressions are as follows:
in which w, in [8.2] is identical to w(c:), i.e. the contribution to "total
welfare" of an additional unit of consumption for the person with the per
capita level. Consequently, both expressions compare in the same way the
valuation of additional units of consumption for people with different levels of
consumption. The first, u\, does this between people with different levels of
consumption at the same moment in time, expressing additional consumption
in units that are equivalent for the per capita level at that time. The discount
factor compares the increases in consumption, already expressed in equivalent
units for the per capita level at each point in time, in order to take into account
the changes in per capita consumption over time and to express annual in-
creases in equivalent additional units for the per capita level of the year
selected as the point of comparison, normally year zero. The discount factor
also depends on the population growth rate because in a future year, a given
additional consumption will be a smaller increase in the per capita consump-
tion of that year, the greater the growth in population.
The reader should remember that when the formula for the discount rate
was worked out, weights w(c) were assumed to diminish at a constant rate
and, assuming that the population growth rate was also constant, we arrived at
the following expression:
that is, at a constant discount rate over time, which must be interpreted as a
simplification of an operational nature. Now, since in practice the long-run
growth rate of per capita consumption is also taken as being constant, this
implies that parameter e is a constant. Consequently, the implicit w(c) func-
tion will be one of constant elasticity, whose general form is
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THE USE OF INTERPERSONAL WEIGHTS
On the basis of this function, weights u\ can be expressed as
and will depend on the relation between the consumption of person i in the
without project situation in year t and the per capita level the same year.
However, this creates the need to forecast the consumption level over time of
those affected by a project. Since this is not feasible, in practice the relation
between consumption levels in year zero is assumed to be constant over time,
which gives constant weights u' over time. In this case, the weights u' are
calculated on the basis of the data for year zero and by making the distribu-
tional value judgment implicit in parameter e, numerically explicit.3
15.3 The Use of Interpersonal Weights
We begin discussion of the use of interpersonal weights on the simplifying
assumption that the rate of return of marginally displaced investment, calcu-
lated using the weights, is equal to the discount rate, and that consequently,
there is no need to be concerned with the distinction between consumption
and investment. The step is merely illustrative, since the implausibility of this
assumption will be discussed later.
Let the compensating variation of the project being analyzed for individual i
in year t be denoted by CV] and that for the marginally displaced project by
CK™. As a result, the net benefits attributable to the project being analyzed in
year t will be
in which u' is the interpersonal weight of individual /. The present value of the
flow of net benefits will then be
3. Note that the equal weights of efficiency analysis imply that e = 0.
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DISTRIBUTIONAL WEIGHTS
and can be separated into the present value of costs and benefits from the
project analyzed less that of the marginally displaced project. Thus we obtain:
However, since the present value of benefits minus costs from the marginal
project was assumed to be equal to zero (its rate of return is equal to the
discount rate), the second term on the right is equal to zero and the present
value of the net benefits of the project analyzed is simply
the present value of its costs and benefits.
Now, how plausible is the assumption that the present value of the costs and
benefits of the alternative project is nil? From a theoretical point of view, this
would require subjecting all the investments to cost-benefit analysis, doing it
with a single set of weights «' and making the total investment budget big
enough to include all the projects for which the present value of costs and
benefits is positive. Thus, and as a hypothetical example, in societies where
there is a public sector in which a single set of weights u' could be used and
the public investment budget could be of unrestricted size, together with a
private sector which uses another set of weights, either explicitly or implic-
itly, the condition would not be met. In this hypothetical case, the condition
could be met within the public sector but not in the private sector, so that the
accounting price of private investment would not be equal to one. Conse-
quently, to analyze public sector projects, we have to know the accounting
price of investment corresponding to the private sector and, as discussed in
the preceding chapter, the distribution of the income changes corresponding to
the alternative use of the funds. This accounting price of investment will be
different from the one worked out in Chapter 14 since the flow of consump-
tion generated by reinvestment will have to be valued using weights u'. Thus,
this accounting price can be expressed as
in which u is the average weight derived from applying the u' to the particular
"average" distribution generated by the reinvestment. The above expression
clearly results from a highly simplified example and attempts only to show the
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GOVERNMENT WEIGHTS
lines along which the expressions deduced in the previous chapter have to be
modified.
15.4 Changes in Government Revenue
Application of the analysis presented in the preceding sections runs into a
particular difficulty when the issue of an interpersonal distribution weight for
changes in Government revenue or expenditure arises. The system of Govern-
ment revenue and expenditure functions in reality as a system of transfers
between individuals, so that changes in Government revenue or expenditure
have to be "translated" in terms of their effects on people according to the
distributional effect of this system at the margin. This will allow for those
changes in Government to be expressed in terms of changes in peoples'
income. Thus, for example, a change AG0 in Government expenditure in year
zero will give rise to a set of compensating variations CV\ of the individuals
affected and the interpersonal weight of Government funds in year zero (u\}
will be the one that satisfies
Note that a change AG in one year gives rise to the present value of a flow of
CVs, whenever part of those funds is used for investment. Clearly, in practice
it would not be possible to calculate a weight «f for each year t. It would be
necessary to use a single weight ug calculated taking into account the distribu-
tional effects of the variations AC, for only a few years considered "represen-
tative" of Government activity.4 The important thing is that this would require
estimating the impact at the margin of Government revenue and expenditure,
something about which very little is known, particularly in quantitative terms.
4. Although expressed in a different context, the reader may find some ideas in this connection
in Londero and Morales Bayro (1982).
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CHAPTER 16
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT
BANK
Since 1979, the Bank has been estimating the distribution of the income
changes brought about by the projects it helps to finance. Beneficiaries are
classified and results presented in a way similar to the one used in the analysis
of alternative expansion plans for electricity generation (Chapter 10). Esti-
mates proper are made according to methodological rules similar to those
presented in Part I and Part II of this study. The Bank has thus accumulated
practical experience in estimating the distribution of income changes gener-
ated by the type of projects it analyzes most frequently.
The first two sections of this chapter draw on the Bank's experience to
summarize the different degrees of difficulty involved in these estimates. The
presentation will be limited to projects whose costs and benefits correspond to
goods and services that are the subject of commercial transactions. Conse-
quently, we will exclude those such as environmental effects (noise, pollu-
tion) or public goods (recreational parks, public lighting), whose valuation
could hardly be based on directly observable data on prices and quantities. In
all cases, the presentation will be limited to the distribution by beneficiaries
according to income levels.
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COSTS AND FINANCING
Estimating the distributional effects made it clear that working methods had
to be modified to meet the requirements of a more demanding project analy-
sis. The last section of this chapter summarizes the experience acquired while
implementing a new set of tasks, one never before undertaken on the scope
implied by the operations of a multilateral financing organization.
16.1 Project Costs and Financing
Notwithstanding the risks inherent in generalizations, we can say that there
are no serious problems in estimating the distribution of the main income
changes brought about by project costs (in the financial sense), beyond those
existing for their valuation at efficiency prices. As presented in Chapters 9, 10
and 12, the cash flow from the project is the point of departure for identifying
the items that are mere financial transfers and allocating them according to
those affected. Finally, the transfers that explain the difference between mar-
ket and efficiency prices are recorded.
Difficulties may arise more from the availability of a set of "correctors" of
market prices than from the identification and quantification of the main
transfers. When the analyst uses accounting prices that have already been
calculated, it is difficult for him to go beyond the identification and quantifi-
cation of transfers that took place when they were estimated. For this reason,
when the distribution of income changes generated by projects is sought, it is
necessary to take the appropriate measures at the time the accounting prices
are estimated. Thus, for example, when input-output techniques are used,
particular attention has to be paid to the breakdown used when preparing the
matrix for non-produced inputs and transfers (or matrix F in accordance with
the notation used in Part II). When valuation is direct, as could be the case for
imported inputs or regional labor, the income changes recorded will be limited
by the level of detail with which the analyst may make the estimate. For
example, if in order to approximate the efficiency price of labor, we assume
that it is equal to wages in alternative employment, for distributional purposes
no more income changes can be taken into account other than those resulting
from the wage difference for the hired worker plus, if necessary, some addi-
tional effect due to contributions to the social security system.
The main difficulties in quantifying the amount of the transfers caused by
financing, both long and short-term, have already been mentioned in Chapter
9. With regard to long-term financing, the main problem is expressing the
loan repayment flow in real terms in those cases where there is no adjustment
clause for inflation. Doing so will inevitably involve a margin of error that is
unpredictable and always present in any financial analysis. The error will be
bigger when fixed nominal interest rates are involved and smaller when they
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IDB's EXPERIENCE
are variable, since the latter will at least reflect to some extent the prevailing
rate of inflation, i.e. a posteriori, variable nominal interest rates will result in
a real rate that changes less abruptly than a fixed nominal rate agreed on
before the start of a period of change in the inflation rate.
Short-term loans will be less affected by this since inflation rates fluctuate
less in the short-run, and the transfer per unit of loan amount will depend
more on the policy for real interest rates. However, estimating total transfers
resulting from these loans presents another problem whose origin lies in the
way in which financial statements are often prepared. Short-term financing
requirements are calculated on the basis of estimates for the sources and uses
of funds. Not only do these already include possible errors originating in long-
term financing but in addition, they normally assume that the financial bal-
ances of one year substitute for short-term credit the next. This normally
results in estimates that after a certain moment show diminishing require-
ments for short-term funds over time. Conversely, experience shows that in
response to low real interest rates in relation to the alternative private profit-
ability of funds, firms will resort to more short-term borrowing and less use of
their own funds than projected in the sources and uses of funds presented in
the project document. In these cases, it may be preferable to derive short-term
financing from firms' customary practices in the form of, for example, coeffi-
cients per unit of gross production value of the good in question.
Estimating the distribution of income changes originating in financing not
only requires quantifying the amount of the transfer but also identifying who
the beneficiaries are at both ends of it, i.e. who grants it and who receives it.
One end will always be easy to identify because it will consist of a person or
group of persons forming part of the project, for example, the industrial firm
in the example of Chapter 9 or the farmers in the example in Chapter 12. The
other end of the transfer will not be as easy to identify.
Let us assume first that the supply of funds is infinitely elastic at the
prevailing interest rate and that, disregarding intermediary financial costs, the
discount rate used is greater than this interest rate. Under these circumstances,
all financing for the project will be additional, the transfer will be received by
the project and granted by savers, and can be distributed by income sectors
according to the respective marginal propensities to save. However, the real
situation is usually the opposite. Supply is very inelastic to the interest rate,
there are no financial markets in which the interest rate adjusts the supply and
demand of funds, interest rates are regulated by the monetary authority and
are lower than the private profitability of marginal investment, and credit is
subject to a rationing mechanism. Consequently, any transfer implied in the
financing will come from its alternative users. The final impact of the transfer
will depend on the use which would have been made of these funds, and on its
"degree of transferability" through prices, as opposed to retaining it as firms'
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OUTPUTS
profits. In this situation it is practically impossible to determine who grants
the transfer.
Summing up, as far as project costs and financing are concerned, the main
difficulties created by the estimation of distributional effects are found in
estimating accounting prices and in identifying who grants the transfer that
may accompany a loan. The remaining difficulties are well known and affect
cost benefit and financial analyses in general. Estimating distributional effects
only puts them on the spot. In the case of accounting prices, the difficulty has
to be solved at the estimating level. This involves additional work to that
required to obtain accounting price ratios at efficiency prices, due to the
greater disaggregation required in the matrix of non-produced inputs and
transfers.
16.2 Project "Output"
The topics mentioned so far affect, to a greater or lesser extent, all projects
without distinction. Conversely, estimating the distribution of income
changes originating in the "output" flow is more specific to the type of
project, and depends on the nature of these "outputs" and on the procedure
traditionally followed to estimate the respective CVs. The rest of this section
briefly discusses, for some types of projects, specific aspects that affect esti-
mating the distribution of income changes originating in the "output" flow.
A first group of projects is the one in which the main individuals affected
are farmers and benefits are estimated on the basis of comparing "representa-
tive" farm budgets in situations with and without the project. Since the
techniques used and the goods produced depend on the size of holdings, it is
customary for such farm budgets to be prepared according to farm size and
type of technique used. The latter are characteristics that determine the net
income levels from farming activities, so that classification by size and tech-
nique also provides one for income yielded by the farm. Irrigation projects or
those for rural access roads are examples of this type of project.
Two aspects which affect estimating the distributional effects are worth
mentioning. The first is identifying the farm's net income with that of its
owner, which may result in an estimation error whenever a person is, for
example, the owner of a small farm affected by the project and of many others
in or outside the project area. The second, already discussed in Section 7.3,
has its origin in the lack of data on the marginal producers displaced by the
additional supply. This leads to using the equality between price and average
cost at efficiency prices for these producers, i.e. pQ = c' in terms of the
notation used in that section.
The first problem only affects the estimate of the distributional effect
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IDB's EXPERIENCE
through the classification of beneficiaries, while the second affects analysis at
efficiency prices and through this the estimate of the distributional effect.
When the project does not affect final prices by changing the technique that
defines the production margin, and the error introduced by the two points
mentioned above is not substantial, an estimate of the distributional effect
based on comparing farm budgets in the situations with and without the
project will be a good approximation. If the project does affect final prices in a
significant manner, it will be necessary to estimate areas below the demand
function, a complication affecting all types of projects and stemming from the
measurement criterion (the CV). The problems that this may create for esti-
mating the distributional effect will depend on whether we are dealing with
consumer or intermediate goods. In the first case, it is necessary to have data
on expenditure on such goods according to income brackets, which can nor-
mally be obtained from surveys on family income and expenditure. As for
intermediate goods, the use of a range for the transfer through prices and
estimating the effect of this transfer on consumption expenditure by income
bracket, along with the errors involved, have already been discussed in Chap-
ters 7 and 10.
A second set of projects consists of those for which the quantification of
benefits at efficiency prices is effected mainly through willingness to pay for
additional consumption of a single and relatively homogeneous good supplied
by public or publicly-regulated monopolies, i.e. cases such as electricity and
drinking water. Here, the main additional data required by the distributional
analysis and specific to the type of project is residential consumption projec-
tions by income brackets, since this has a considerable effect on the final
result. The importance of this information does not lie only, and sometimes
not even principally, in the most general aspect of income elasticity of de-
mand, but specifically in the supply policy that determines access to the
service. Thus, projection of the quantity demanded by the medium and high-
income sectors can be made, for example, on the basis of population and
income growth rates and estimates of the income elasticity of demand.1 Con-
versely, since a considerable proportion of lowest-income people do not have
access to the good in question, projection of the quantity demanded by them
depends also on the connection policy determining investment in distribution
networks, and this is difficult, if at all possible, to forecast.
Road improvement projects in which the benefits are quantified by savings
in time, vehicle operation and maintenance costs, have special characteristics
beyond those regarding transfers and the incidence of firms' cost savings. Part
of the savings in time and operating costs of light vehicles correspond to
"pleasure trips" and it would be difficult to classify these savings according to
1. In reality, the problem is more complex. See Westley (1984b).
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IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
income brackets. In the case of passenger transportation, it would be neces-
sary to classify the occupants according to income brackets, and their trips as
business or pleasure. In both cases, data are required that are specific to the
project (route of the road) and may be costly to gather, particularly if it is
more than merely incorporating questions into an origin and destination sur-
vey. For these reasons, it is likely that many estimates will depend more on
the analyst's criterion for reasonable assumptions to be made and less on data.
16.3 Some Implementation Issues
Estimating the distribution of income changes generated by a project has been
and continues to be a learning process for the Bank, not only from the
theoretical and methodological points of view, but also regarding implemen-
tation. This section deals with what the author considers the most important
issues involved in executing a policy for estimating distributional effects.
First we will consider the individual project and its analysis, and second, the
issues concerning organization.
It is well known that project analysis begins during project preparation.
Therefore, it is important to take into account the estimation of distributional
effects right from the start of the project preparation, including the identifica-
tion of alternatives and the gathering of specific data. Subsequently, this
estimation should become an integral part of preparing financial flows by
identifying the main effects by beneficiaries classified according to the same
criteria that will be used in cost-benefit analysis. Only the allocation of
transfers that explain the difference between market and efficiency prices
should be left for the last step.
Concern for distributional effects of economic policy measures (part of
which are investment decisions), should also be reflected in gathering basic
data. Thus, censuses and surveys would include questions on income levels,
questions would be formulated in a way that is compatible with existing
complementary data, and surveys would be designed so as to avoid problems
of low statistical significance that arise when processing data classified ac-
cording to income levels. Many times, even though the analyst may try his
best to consider the distributional aspects while preparing a project, he will
find that the available data is insufficient. In that case, he has three alterna-
tives: to ignore the distributional effects, to estimate them inadequately (with
large margins of error), or to delay the formulation of the project in order to
obtain the relevant data. It is unlikely for the last alternative to be chosen.
It may also be necessary to research subjects directly related to distribu-
tional effects. If, for example, when estimating the impact of an increase in
the price of electricity purchased by industrial clients on consumer goods'
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IDB's EXPERIENCE
prices (see sections 10.4 and 10.5), an input-output approach is used, at least
two problems may arise:
(a) the transactions matrix is too aggregated for that purpose and/or electric-
ity production has been assigned to a sector that also includes other
services such as potable water, all of which could have been avoided; and
(b) household consumption is not disaggregated by income brackets.
To overcome these difficulties, partly due to inconsistency between the con-
cern for distributional aspects and data collection, specific tasks may be
required.
Another important issue to be considered is the margin of error involved in
these estimates. All project analysts know that the results of a conventional
cost-benefit analysis made on the basis of what we called here the operational
version of efficiency analysis, are subject to error. Estimating the distribution
of resulting income changes may uncover inconsistencies in the analysis and
possibly help to reduce error. However, error may subsequently be increased
by not estimating distributional effects as an integral part of project formula-
tion, and by the consequences of using inadequate data. As a result, the
estimate of distributional effects can only be considered indicative, rather than
a precise calculation.
Organizational problems are to be expected when introducing the require-
ment for an estimation of distributional effects. The first one to be considered
is the analyst's (and his supervisor's) reaction to change, as they will be forced
to take a second look at their traditional approach and modify their work
routines. This situation is made more serious by the fact that the traditional
teaching of cost-benefit analysis is based on the criterion that transfers have a
null value, all of which leads to an almost certain need for re-training and
specialized supervision in order to facilitate "learning by doing". At the same
time, there is extra work to be accounted for when estimating the effects of a
project by groups affected. While most of this extra work should take place,
as mentioned before, during the preparation of the project, it is more likely for
it to be pushed forward to the appraisal stage, provoking the problems just
described.
A second important point is how the analyst perceives the relevance of his
estimation of distributional effects to the project's future. In the Bank, the
estimates of distributional effects are not part of decision criteria. However,
there is a cumulative goal for all projects analyzed over a four-year period.
Consequently, the relation between an individual project and an accumulated
four-year result is distant, a situation that may be aggravated when the ana-
lysts do not actively participate (or have responsibility) in selecting or prepar-
ing the projects to be analyzed. Under these circumstances, good communica-
tion between those with an overall view of goal achievement and those in
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IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
charge of programming operations is essential. The analysts' participation in
this process helps to highlight the importance of the project analysis level as
well as to evaluate the expected results of alternative programs.
A third and last group of considerations is the potential for inconsistent
goals. For example, in a case like the one at the Bank, where lending goals for
broad economic sectors also exist, conflicts may arise between sector goals
and the objective of reaching a certain distributional effect. In a multilateral
financial organization, this conflict is intensified by the fact that the project
universe is defined by the member country's investment policies. This situa-
tion becomes more difficult during "adjustment" periods dominated by fiscal
considerations, during which the investment budget becomes a very important
"adjustment" variable. Under any circumstances, when multiple goals are
established, they must be consistent. Distributional goals are no exception to
the rule.
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APPENDIX A
THE CHANGE IN CONSUMER SURPLUS
AS AN APPROXIMATION OF THE
COMPENSATING VARIATION
A.I The Compensating Variation in Relation to Demand Functions*
Consider Figure A.I (a), which represents the consumer's indifference map
between good q and all the remaining goods, and the consumer's budget
constraint. Unlike Figure 2.1, and in order to simplify notation, the basket of
the remaining goods m is represented by the equivalent monetary income for
prices p™,
1
 This section is based on the presentation by Morales Bayro (1981).
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APPENDIX A
Initially, the consumer is situated at point A', consuming q0 of good q given
his monetary income Y0 and the price p0 of good q. The price of q relative to
the prices of the remaining goods is implied in the slope of the straight line
Y0A'. In this situation, the consumer spends (Y0 — 73) of his income on good
q and Y3 on other goods, obtaining a level of welfare represented by indiffer-
ence curve U0. Figure A.l(b) shows that point A, located on the individual
demand curve Dy, follows from the selection of consumption qu for price
Po = (*o ~ ^3)^0 and mcome *o- This demand curve Dy assumes that the
consumer's monetary income is constant at Y0.
Let us now suppose that a project increases the supply of q, reducing the
price to the consumer. Figure A. l(a) shows that if his monetary income is not
altered and the new price is implied in the slope of straight line Y0D', the
consumer will increase his consumption of q to q3 in order to maximize his
welfare at level U2. Figure A.l(b) indicates that the new level of consumption
q3, associated with the new price p, = (K, - Y3)/q0, corresponds to point D
situated on demand Dy, which assumes that the consumer's monetary income
is constant at YQ.
Since the final impact of the reduction in the price of q is the possibility for
the consumer to raise his level of welfare from U0 to U2, we want to obtain a
monetary measure of his welfare increase (U2 — U0). One of these measures is
the compensating variation. This is defined as the reduction (increase) in the
consumer's income needed, following the reduction (increase) in the price of a
good, in order for the consumer to obtain his original level of welfare. In
Figure A.I (a), the compensating variation of the reduction p0 — p} in the
price of q will be Y0 — Y2, since with this reduction in income, and at the new
relative prices, the consumer can obtain the initial level of welfare [/„. How-
ever, as his equilibrium positions would only be observable from his market
behavior, it is necessary to know the relation between the compensating
variation and the demand functions.
The first approximation of the problem consists in estimating the maximum
reduction in monetary income needed, after the reduction in the price of q, for
the consumer to be able to purchase the original consumption basket corre-
sponding to point A'. According to Figure A. l(a), if the consumer's monetary
income is reduced by (Y0 — K,), he could if he wished consume the initial
combination of q and other goods, since point A' is also located on the new
budget line that starts at K,. Consequently, since in reality, monetary income
continues to be Y0, the individual could consume the same as before and even
have the surplus monetary income (K0 — 7,). If applied to the additional
consumption of q and other goods, this would enable him to raise his level of
welfare from U0 to U2. As a result, the first approximation of the monetary
measure of his "additional welfare" would be the "surplus" monetary income(YO - y,).
268
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 b
y 
th
e 
In
te
r-
A
m
er
ic
an
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t B
an
k.
 A
ll 
ri
gh
ts
 r
es
er
ve
d.
Fo
r 
m
or
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
vi
si
t o
ur
 w
eb
si
te
: w
w
w
.ia
db
.o
rg
/p
ub
Figure A.I The Compensating Variation of a Price Reduction
and its Relation to the Demand Function
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APPENDIX A
In Figure A. l(b), if the individual consumes the same quantity q0 at the new
price /?,, he would reduce his expenditure in an amount equal to the area
pQARp{. In Figure A. l(a), this area can be expressed as follows:
Consequently, the first approximation of the increase in the consumer's wel-
fare corresponds to the ar&ap0ARpl = (Y0 — 7,) in Figure A. l(b).
However, if the consumer continues to react to changes in the conditions
affecting him, he will not remain at point A' (Figure A. l(a)) when his mone-
tary income is reduced to 7,. As illustrated in this Figure, the consumer will
decide that the best alternative within his reach is given by point C', since by
spending part of his income Y{ on consuming q2 units of q (instead of only qQ),
he can raise his level of welfare from U0 to I/,. This means that if the
consumer can freely choose his consumption basket, he will be at C' if his
monetary income is F, and at D' if his income increases to Y0. As a result,
additional income (Y0 — K,) is the equivalent in monetary units of additional
welfare (U2 — £/,), which is less than the additional welfare (C/2 - U0)
brought about by the reduction in the price of q.
In Figure A. l(a), the only way the consumer can be kept at the initial level
of welfare U0 through changes in his monetary income (given the new relative
prices), is by reducing his monetary income by the additional amount
(7, - Y2). Thus, if the price reduction (p0 - p{) is compensated by a
reduction in income (YQ — Y2), the consumer will move from point A' to point
B' located on the budget line that begins at Y2. As B' implies the same level of
welfare UQ as A', this means that the price reduction has been exactly compen-
sated by the reduction (Y0 — Y2) in the consumer's monetary income, since he
keeps exactly the same level of welfare U(] once he has chosen the best
combination of consumption (point B') within his reach, given the price and
income constraints.
If his monetary income were only Y2, the consumer would choose point B',
consuming q{ units of q and reaching a level of welfare f/0. Conversely, if his
monetary income rises to Y0, he will move to point D', consuming q3 and
raising his welfare level to U2. Consequently, as his monetary income con-
tinues in reality to be yo, we can consider that the increase (U2 — U0) in his
welfare level (resulting from the reduction in the price of q) can be compen-
sated by a reduction in his monetary income equal to
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CV AND CONSUMER SURPLUS
Transferring the analysis to Figure A.l(b), we see that the first element
(yo — Fj) of the gain in welfare (Y0 — Y2) is already implied in the area
pQARp\. Consequently, only the element (7j — Y2) needs to be identified. The
first step is to observe that in Figure A.I (a) if the consumer's monetary
income is only Y2 and the price of q is pp he will consume ql units of q. This
defines point B in Figure A. l(b) and implies that a demand function assuming
that the consumer's welfare level is constant at UQ, and known as the compen-
sated demand function, passes through points A and B.
In Figure A. l(a), the consumer does not alter his level of welfare U0 when
moving from point A' to point B' since the reduction in welfare due to the
reduction (73 — Y5) in the consumption of other goods is compensated exactly
by the increase in his welfare from consuming (q\ — q0) additional units of q.
In other words, in order to consume (q{ — q0) additional units of q, the
consumer is willing to forgo up to 73 - Y5 units of Y, called his willingness to
pay for (q\ — q0). Since the budget line which starts at Y2 and goes through
points E' and B' reflects his income and prevailing market prices, it follows
that even if the consumer were willing to forgo up to (Y3 — Y5) units of Y in
order to consume (q} — q0) of q, in reality he only has to forgo (Y4 — Y5).
Consequently, the difference between his valuation of additional consumption
<?j - q0 (his willingness to pay) and what he actually pays to obtain it can be
expressed as
As this magnitude is identical to the vertical distance A'E' in Figure A.I (a),
and this in turn is identical to (Y} — 72), we conclude that in the expression
(7, — F2) measures exactly the surplus that the consumer could obtain if he
increased his consumption of q by (<?, — q0) and to do so spent only income
equivalent to (Y4 — Y5) units of Y. Hence, if his monetary income were
reduced by a magnitude (Y{ — Y2), this would simply compensate that poten-
tial surplus and the consumer's welfare level would not change.
In Figure A.l(b), the area ABq}q0 below the demand function that assumes
the consumer's welfare level is constant at t/0, represents the maximum
amount that he would be willing to spend in order to consume (g, — q0)
additional units of q, since in this way he would at least not change his welfare
level. Similarly, the area RBq{q0 (defined by price /?,) expresses the actual
expenditure required for additional consumption (<?, — q0). Consequently,
area ABq^qQ corresponds to income (73 — 75) and area RBq\qQ to income
(F4 — F5), and the difference between them (area ABR) is equivalent to
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APPENDIX A
income (Y3 - Y4) = (K, - F2). It can then be concluded that the increase in
welfare (U2 — t/0) experienced by the individual due to the reduction in the
price of q, can be compensated by a (Y0 — Y2) reduction in his income, which
in Figure A.l(b) is represented by the areap0/4Bp,. Thus, the compensating
variation of the price reduction p0 — p} will be:
or
Therefore the change in the consumer's surplus is not an exact measure of
the compensating variation. In the example of Figure A. l(b), it overestimates
the compensating variation in area ABD. The reader will note that BD is the
change in the consumption of q resulting from a change in income Y0 — Y2 at
the new relative prices. The further to the right point D' is from B' the greater
the income elasticity of demand for q and the greater the ABD error will be for
the same change in income. If the income elasticity of q were nil, point D'
would be exactly above B', functions Du and Dy would coincide in the interval
[<7o> 9 J and me change in the consumer's surplus would be an exact measure
of the compensating variation. This situation is illustrated in Figures 2.1(a)
and (b). Conversely, if income elasticity were negative, point D' would be to
the left of B', Du to the right of D and the change in consumer's surplus would
underestimate the compensating variation. The situation is reversed when
there is a price increase. The change in consumer's surplus will underestimate
the compensating variation corresponding to a price increase when the income
elasticity of q is positive, and will overestimate it when this elasticity is
negative.1
A.2 The Significance of the Measurement Error
In the preceding section, we demonstrated that a change in the consumer's
surplus caused by a price change is not an exact measure of the corresponding
compensating variation (CV). Consequently, it is important to know how big
the measurement error is that results from using the change in consumer
surplus as an approximation of the CV. To do this the expression for the
1. Since the CV of a reduction p0 -) p, is equal to the equivalent variation of the increase
P\ ~> Po'tne equivalent variation is underestimated (overestimated) when the CV is overestimated
(underestimated).
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CV AND CONSUMER SURPLUS
change in the consumer's surplus corresponding to a price change will be
compared with that of the respective CV.
Starting from the elasticity of demand for q with respect to its own price,
the change in the quantity demanded for a change in price A/? will be
[A.I]
The change in the corresponding consumer's surplus (ACS) will be
[A-2]
and substituting [A.I] in [A.2] finally yields
The corresponding compensating variation can be estimated by calculating Ac?
on the basis of the price elasticity of the compensated demand function (E^q).
This will be2
[A.3]
in which
Eqy = income elasticity of demand for q
a = expenditure on q as a proportion of total expenditure
Using [A.3] and following a procedure similar to the preceding one results in
2. See, for example, Henderson and Quandt (1971).
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APPENDIX A
Table A.1 Ratios between the Change in Consumer's Surplus
and the Respective Compensating Variation8
a = 0.02
fw = 0.50
£„ = 0.90
a = 0.04
£„ = 0.50
£„ = 0.90
Egy = 0.80
1.0004
1.0004
1.0008
1.0008
£Qy = 1.00
1.0005
1.0005
1.0010
1.0010
Eqy = 1.20
1.0006
1.0006
1.0012
1.0012
a. Price reduction = 5%.
It is now possible to calculate the ratio between the change in consumer's
surplus and the respective compensating variation for different values of E^
and a. Table A. 1 indicates that for acceptable values of these parameters, the
error in estimating the CV of a price change is not significant. However, the
ratios between the ACS and the CV to which Table A. 1 refers, correspond to
calculations of the ACS made on the basis of the real demand curve. In
practice the economist will work, at best, with estimates of the demand
function so that not even the sign of the error in estimating the CV will be
known.
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APPENDIX B
INTERPERSONAL AGGREGATION
IN EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
The objective of this Appendix is to show, from a different point of view than
the one expressed in Chapters 1 and 2, that so-called efficiency analysis
includes a distributional value judgment that is not always explicit.1 Let
Ur(xv x2, ..., xn) be the utility function of consumer R and Up(xl, x2, ..., xn)
that of consumer P, in which jc, are the goods and services on which the utility
level depends. The consumers maximize their utility function subject to their
budgetary constraints (shown only for R)
1. Dasgupta and Pearce (1972, Chapters 1 & 2) gives a detailed discussion of the approach
used in this Appendix. See also Pearce and Nash (1981, Chapter 3). The mathematical formula-
tion of the consumer equilibrium model can be consulted in Henderson and Quandt (1971).
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APPENDIX B
in which Yr is the income of./?, and p{ the market price of good or service xi.
This is equivalent to maximizing function
The conditions necessary for this constrained maximum are
[B.I]
in which U\ is the partial derivative of V with respect to xi (i.e the change in
Ur per unit of change in x(, whereas all the other variables remain constant)
and X is the Lagrange multiplier. It can be shown that
i.e., that it is the marginal utility of income or change in the level of utility per
unit of change in income when prices remain constant.
From equation [B.I] it follows that
and the increase in the utility level attributable to the consumption of an
additional unit of xt at (a constant) price p, will be
When efficiency prices are used, the "willingness to pay" criterion indi-
cates that the net increase in "total welfare" attributable to the increase in
consumption dxl = dx\ + dx? will be equal to
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INTERPERSONAL AGGREGATION
This assumes that the increase in "total welfare" AW will be
and that Xr = \p. In other words, an additional unit of income is considered
equally valuable for both consumers and the total welfare change is propor-
tional to the sum of the individual welfare changes.
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APPENDIX C
AGGREGATING AREAS BELOW
ELECTRICITY DEMAND CURVES AND
THE USE OF AN AVERAGE TARIFF
This Appendix presents a simple way of calculating an "average" tariff for
consumers located in different consumption blocks that will allow us to ob-
tain, using a pseudo aggregate demand curve, reasonable approximations of
aggregates of areas below individual demand curves (willingness to pay and
compensating variations).
If the variable tariff charge (/?) increases by a proportion a for all con-
sumers, and the change brought about in consumption does not change the
block in which the consumer is, his willingness to pay for the energy that he
no longer consumes can be expressed linearly as
in which
WPt = willingness to pay of consumer / for energy Ag( = g® — g\
pQ. = variable tariff charge for consumer / before the tariff increase
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USE OF AN AVERAGE TARIFF
a = proportion of increase in the tariff for consumer i, that is
&?»£/= electricity consumption of i at prices p® and p\, respectively
The willingness to pay for all the energy that is no longer consumed is
[C.I]
This could be calculated by using an "average" tariff p complying with
[C.2]
From [C.I] = [C.2] we deduce that
[C.3]
is the correct formula for the average price p to be used for calculating the
consumer's willingness to pay for energy AG = S( Ag,. Since the price
elasticity of demand of consumer / is
Ag, will be
[C.4]
and substituting [C.4] in [C.3], the latter can be rewritten as
[C.5]
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APPENDIX C
If EI is the same for all the consumers in the group, expression [C.5] is
reduced to:
[C.6]
Expression [C.6] was the one used to calculate the average price in Table
10.2. This is valid for a uniform increase in the variable component of the
tariff provided that:
(a) a linear approximation of the willingness to pay of each consumer is
acceptable;
(b) the effect of a tariff increase does not change the block that the consumer
is in; and
(c) all individual demand functions have the same price elasticity at prices/??.
The average price p obtained with equation [C.5] also allows for sums of
compensating variations to be calculated on the same set of assumptions. The
compensating variation of the tariff increase to consumer i (CK;) can be
approximated as
and the sum of the CVf for an equal percentage increase a for all consumers
will be
[C.7]
The "average" tariff sought should verify
[C.8]
From [C.7] = [C.8] it follows that
[C.9]
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USE OF AN AVERAGE TARIFF
Substituting [C.4] in [C.9] we now obtain
[C.10]
and if Et is equal for all the consumers in the group
[C.ll]
One problem arises when using expression [C.6] for the average tariff: new
customers and "old" customers adjust differently to price increases. The new
customers will adjust faster, since the price increase preceded their connection
to the grid. In other words, it is logical to expect them to choose the electrical
equipment after taking the new tariffs into account and, consequently, their
adjustment will be closer to that indicated by the long-run price elasticity.
Conversely, consumers connected to the grid prior to the tariff increase will
only be able to adjust more slowly over time. Therefore connecting a con-
sumer whose demand function is identical to that of an existing consumer will
result in different Ag. for the same price increase (see expression [C.3]) and
the passage from equation [C.5] to [C.6] will not be possible.
One way of avoiding the problem raised by different speeds of adjustment is
to treat the following components separately: (a) the consumption of "old"
customers prior to the tariff increase, that adjusts slowly; (b) the change in
consumption of those customers who adjust faster; and (c) the consumption of
the new customers, who can probably make the long-run adjustment before
being connected. Such a level of refinement has not been introduced in this
work.
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APPENDIX D
COMPARING EXPANSION PLANS
AND THE LONG-RUN
MARGINAL COST TARIFF
Determining tariff/?, which maximizes the net benefits at efficiency prices B
at time t, can be presented as a problem of maximizing the difference between
willingness to pay WPt for energy Gt and the cost of supplying it, C,, i.e.
The necessary condition for this maximum will be
equality between the price and marginal cost. However, when dealing with an
investment plan, the problem can be presented as determining the constant
tariff over timep that maximizes the present value of stream Bt, i.e.
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THE MARGINAL COST TARIFF
The necessary condition for this maximum will be
which implies
[D.I]
The above condition can be interpreted as the equivalent in a dynamic context
to equality between price and marginal cost, subject to the condition that p
must be equal in each period t.l
Price/?, which maximizes PV[Bt], is the same as the one that maximizes
[D.2]
the change in the present value of benefits on the basis of an initial price p0
since the Bt(pQ) are constant. Now, equation [D.2] can be written as
that is,
The procedure followed in Section 10.3 is an approximation of the maxi-
mum of PV[AB,]. Since a price increase was involved in those sections, the
objective was to approximate the maximum difference between the present
values of the cost saving and the value of the reduction in energy consump-
tion. In addition, the analysis was carried out subject to the additional condi-
tion that the tariff structure was constant, since the percentage increases were
the same for each type of tariff.
To find the tariff that maximizes PV[Bt(p)], a similar procedure can be
followed on the basis of [D. 1]. The first step is to calculate the present value
1. The problem could also be expressed as that of finding vector \pt] that maximizes PV[B^,
which would require a considerably more complicated algorithm for its solution. This approach
would be made even more difficult by consideration of the difference between the short-run and
long-run adjustments. Furthermore, the usefulness of a system of signals that changes each year
is doubtful.
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APPENDIX D
of the saving (increase) in costs corresponding to a certain initial AG and to
calculate the tariff p0 + Ap which verifies
Then, knowing the price elasticity of the demand function(s), the AG(Ap)
corresponding to this price change can be calculated and the preceding exer-
cise repeated until AG = AG(Ap).
This procedure may be more effective for finding the tariff increase that
maximizes the present value of benefits subject to the constraint of a constant
price over time, in particular if the marginal cost is insensitive to different
projections of demand Gf - AG. However, the procedure used in Section
10.3 has an advantage: it can be used when there is a maximum acceptable
tariff increase that is lower than that required for the condition [D.I] to be
met.
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APPENDIX E
THE CALCULATION OF
PARAMETERS q AND q'
In Chapter 14, the formulas for Pfmv were deduced by using a yield in perpetu-
ity q', when in practice alternative investments will not generate a perpetual
income stream. The problem is how to calculate a q' for the alternative project
that yields an equivalent result. The present value of the changes in income
generated by the marginally displaced project can be written as
[E.I]
in which Im — Tm is the present value of investment costs valued at efficiency
prices. The hypothetical project that produces income in perpetuity q on the
basis of an investment at efficiency prices equal to lm — Tm, but which is
carried out in year zero, and whose present value is PK(ACm), will be
[E.2]
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APPENDIX E
Using expression [14.5], and recalling that by definition
expression [E.2] can also be written as
[E.3]
Now, from [E.I] = [E.3] it follows that
from which q can be found as
[E.4]
Then, since
we obtain
Now substituting [E.4] in the above expression we arrive at
[E.5]
It should be pointed out that the value of q obtained from [E.4] is not the
internal rate of return (at efficiency prices) of the marginally displaced
project. In Table E.I, the internal rate of return is 10.6% while the resulting
value of g is 5.8 % for a discount rate of 5 %.
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PARAMETERS q AND q'
Table E.1 Flows of a Hypothetical Project
Year
Source
(If- if)
By
Total
0
-50
-
-50
rf =
1
-70
-
-70
5%
2
-
40
40
/«/? =
3
-
40
40
10.6%
4
-
40
40
<7
5
-
40
40
= 5.8%
Present
Value
-116.67
135.09
18.42
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SUBJECT INDEX
A
Accounting price: defined, 30-31; distri-
bution of income changes and, 257,
259; for non-traded goods (input-
output numerical example), 196-98;
for non-traded goods (input-output
technique formulas), 192-96; for non-
traded goods (input-output techniques),
189-92; non-traded goods and long-
run marginal cost structures and, 198-
200. See also Foreign exchange (ac-
counting prices of); Investment
(accounting prices of); Labor (account-
ing price for); Prices
Agricultural credit project (project pro-
duces consumer goods) example, 103-
5
B
Benefits figure: deriving the total (cost-
benefit analysis), 3-8; Pareto's princi-
ple and, 9-15; reaction to efficiency
analysis and, 15-19. See also Distribu-
tional entries
C
Capital costs (industrial project analysis),
132-33, 149
Charges (electricity). See Tariffs (elec-
tricity)
Compensated Pareto improvement, 17
Compensating variation (CV), 84, 117;
accounting price of foreign exchange
and, 31, 33, 35-38, 41, 42, 48-49;
"average" tariff and estimating aggre-
gates of, 278-81; change in con-
sumer's surplus as an approximation
of, 22, 267-74; defined, 4-5, 21; effi-
ciency price of labor and, 75, 77; elec-
tricity expansion plans and, 172, 173,
174; equivalent variation and, 21-24;
import substitution and, 63, 65; inter-
personal distributional weights and,
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SUBJECT INDEX
250, 254; irrigation project analysis
and, 202, 205, 207, 215, 220; labor
analysis and, 89, 95; labor supply and,
73, 74; non-traded goods valuation
analysis and, 98, 105, 107, 108;
project output and, 259, 260; unskilled
labor (input-output techniques) and,
223, 224; willingness to pay concept
and, 24-29,271
Competition: demand function and per-
fect, 42; non-traded goods valuation
and, 100, 101, 103
Construction costs (industrial project
analysis), 132, 133
Consumer goods: efficiency price of la-
bor and non-traded, 81; import substi-
tution and, 62; non-traded goods valua-
tion and, 103-10,112
Consumer surplus (change in), approxi-
mately equal to the compensating vari-
ation, 22-24,267-74
Consumption: accounting price of for-
eign exchange and, 35, 43, 44, 45, 47,
48, 53, 54; accounting prices of invest-
ment and, 232-33, 234, 236, 237,
238-39, 241, 244, 246, 248; efficiency
price of labor and, 76; efficiency price
of labor and reduction in, 77-79; elec-
tricity expansion plans and, 151, 153,
155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 164,
169, 170, 176, 177, 182, 183, 184-85;
explicit welfare function and, 18; im-
port substitution and, 63, 65; interest
rate as discount rate and, 121; interper-
sonal and intertemporal distributional
weights and, 249, 250-53; intertem-
poral allocation and, 117-19, 121; in-
vestment and increase in, 20; irrigation
project analysis and, 205, 215; non-
traded goods valuation analysis and,
112-15; situations that create changes
in, 20-21; social discount rate and,
123,125-26
Consumption numeraire: foreign ex-
change numeraire and, 68-70
Cost-benefit analysis: compensating vari-
ations (CVs) and, 4-5; defining, 3-4;
distributional value judgements analy-
sis and, 9-19; equilibrium exchange
rate and, 31-32; indirect effects and,
70; individual discount rate concept
and, 4-5, 7, 8; interpersonal compari-
sons criteria and, 6-7; intertemporal
comparisons criteria and, 4-5; invest-
ment and consumption and, 20; judg-
ing if allocations are harmful or benefi-
cial and, 3-4; as a method of
comparing alternative resource alloca-
tions and, 3-4; Pareto optimum and, 9;
potential Pareto improvements (PPI)
and, 13-15, 16, 17; principles to de-
rive total benefits figure and, 3-8;
strict Pareto improvements (SPI) and,
9-13, 17. See also Electricity generat-
ing system (expansion plan cost-benefit
approach); Industrial project cost-
benefit analysis; Irrigation project cost-
benefit analysis
D
Data requirements, distributional effect
of electricity generating system expan-
sion plans and, 182-85
Debt service (industrial project analysis),
136. See also Loans
Demand, 42; accounting price of foreign
exchange and, 31, 32, 50, 54; compen-
sated, 271, 273; compensating vari-
ations and, 267-74; compensating
variations and willingness to pay and,
24-25, 271, 278-81; efficiency price
of labor and excess, 75, 77; electricity
expansion analysis and energy, 151-
52, 156-57, 159, 160-63, 164, 165,
166, 174, 182, 183, 184; for exported
goods (traded goods valuation), 58-60;
for imported goods (traded goods valu-
ation), 56-58; import substitution and,
60; import substitution and foreign ex-
change, 65; labor analysis and, 94;
non-traded goods valuation and, 97,
98-102; numeraire example and, 71;
project generation of excess, 30; wel-
fare economics and, 20
Depreciation, 133
Discount rate: accounting prices of in-
vestment and, 233; assumption of
equality between rate of return (mar-
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SUBJECT INDEX
ginal) and, 71; concept of individual,
4-5, 7, 8; efficiency price and, 31; in-
dustrial project analysis and, 133, 135,
138, 147; interest rate as, 119-23; in-
terpersonal distributional weights and,
252, 253; internal rate of return, profit-
ability and, 285-87; intertemporal al-
location and individual, 116-19, 127;
numeraire use and, 70; profitability
and, 127; rate of return of marginal in-
vestment and, 127; social, 123-27
Distributional effects: accounting prices
of investment and, 231, 233, 234, 235,
236, 239, 241, 242, 245, 246, 248;
data collection and concern for, 262;
electricity expansion plans analysis
and, 152-53, 159, 168, 171-82; for-
eign investment and, 145; industrial
project analysis and, 139-43; irrigation
project analysis and, 107, 216-20; im-
plementation issues and the estimation
of, 261-63; non-traded inputs and,
100; public sector funds and, 153
Distributional value judgements: ac-
counting price of foreign exchange
and, 35-38; accounting price of un-
skilled labor and, 85, 89; efficiency
analysis and Pareto's principle and, 9-
15, 275; net economic effect and, 156;
reaction to efficiency analysis and, 15-
19; willingness to pay and, 20. See
also Interpersonal welfare compari-
sons; Interpersonal distributional
weights
Domestic price: accounting price of for-
eign exchange and, 33,45, 51, 52; for-
eign trade incentives and disincentives
and, 55; traded goods valuation and,
59. See a ho Prices
E
Economies of scale, 100
Efficiency price: accounting price of for-
eign exchange and, 45, 51, 52, 53, 54;
accounting prices of investment and,
231, 232, 234, 235, 236, 238, 241;
benefits and, 260; defined, 31; effi-
ciency analysis and, 7, 8, 15; electric-
ity project and, 166, 171; exported
goods demand increase and, 60; for-
eign exchange numeraire and con-
sumption numeraire and, 68; imported
goods demand increase and, 56, 57,
58; import substitution and, 62, 65; in-
dustrial project analysis and, 131, 132,
133, 134,141,144, 145, 147; interper-
sonal distributional weights and, 251,
275-77; of labor, 75-81, 82; non-
traded goods and, 189; non-traded
goods valuation and, 98, 102, 110;
price and cost and, 259; project costs
and, 257; project increases exports
and, 67; unskilled labor and, 227; will-
ingness to pay and CVs and, 28. See
also Prices
Electricity generating system (expansion
plans cost-benefit approach): alterna-
tive plan formulation and, 154-66;
analysis data requirements and, 182-
85; background on cost-benefit analy-
sis and industry considerations and,
150-53, 183; comparison of, 166-71;
consumption and, 151, 153, 155, 156,
157, 158, 159, 160, 164, 169, 170,
176, 177, 182, 183, 184-85; customer
categories and, 159-60; defining low-
income level and, 153; demand and,
151-52, 156-57, 159, 160-63, 164,
165, 166, 174, 182, 183, 184; distribu-
tional effects and, 152-53, 156, 159,
168, 171-82; Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank and, 256; model (WASP II)
for, 152, 154, 165, 172; price changes
and, 150, 151; price of electricity and,
157-58, 164, 176; production process
and, 150-51, 174; tariff increases and
distributional effects and, 171-82; tar-
iffs and, 151, 154-55, 157, 158, 159,
160-63, 164, 165, 166-68
Equilibrium exchange rate: accounting
price of foreign exchange and, 33, 34,
35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 44, 45, 47, 51,
52-53, 54; defined, 31-32; electricity
expansion plans analysis and, 174; for-
eign exchange as a numeraire and, 68;
traded goods valuation and, 56, 57, 58,
59-60, 61; "uncommitted public in-
come" numeraire and, 71; unskilled la-
299
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 b
y 
th
e 
In
te
r-
A
m
er
ic
an
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t B
an
k.
 A
ll 
ri
gh
ts
 r
es
er
ve
d.
Fo
r 
m
or
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
vi
si
t o
ur
 w
eb
si
te
: w
w
w
.ia
db
.o
rg
/p
ub
SUBJECT INDEX
bor analysis and, 224. See also Foreign
exchange (accounting price of—
APRFE)
Equivalent variations, 21-24
Expansion plans. See Electricity generat-
ing system (expansion plans cost-
benefit approach)
Exports, 115; accounting price of foreign
exchange analysis and, 32-40, 43-51,
53, 54; agricultural (accounting price
of unskilled labor analysis), 90, 94, 96;
electricity expansion plans analysis
and, 171, 174; industrial project analy-
sis and, 131; project increased demand
for, 58-60; project increases in, 66-67;
project increases demand for imports
and, 57; unskilled labor analysis and
agricultural, 223, 224
F
Financial flows (industrial project analy-
sis), 134-39, 143^*9
Financing, distributional effects and,
257-59
Foreign exchange (accounting price of—
APRFE): accounting prices and effi-
ciency prices definitions and, 30-31;
domestic production of marginal im-
ported goods and, 51-52; electricity
expansion plans and, 171, 172; equi-
librium exchange rate definition and,
31-32; foreign exchange numeraire
and, 68, 69; importing of intermediate
goods and, 42-43; income transfers
generated by additional exports and,
40-42; industrial project analysis and,
129, 130, 132, 144, 145, 147; invest-
ment project that increases exports
and, 32-40, 43-51; irrigation project
analysis and, 210, 211, 212, 216, 220;
labor analysis and, 82, 88, 89, 96;
main conditions summary and, 54;
non-traded goods and, 190, 191-92,
193, 197; remittances of labor wages
and, 82; transport and trade margins
and, 52-53; unskilled labor analysis
and, 277. See also Equilibrium ex-
change rate
Foreign exchange numeraire: from con-
sumption numeraire to, 68-70; "un-
committed public income" numeraire
and, 71
Formal sector: electricity expansion
plans analysis and, 174; irrigation
project and analysis and, 220; labor
analysis and, 84, 85, 93
Funds, industrial project and flow of,
129-34. See also Financial flows
G
Goals (inconsistent), 263
Government revenue and expenditure,
distributional weight for, 255
I
Implementation issues, estimating distri-
butional effects and, 261-63
Imported inputs (industrial project analy-
sis), 129,132,133
Imports, 115; accounting price of foreign
exchange and, 32, 33, 34, 39-40, 42-
43, 47, 48, 50, 51-52; electricity ex-
pansion plans analysis and, 171, 174;
foreign trade incentives and disincen-
tives and, 55; income changes and,
257; irrigation project analysis and,
210-12, 215; project increases demand
for, 56-58
Import substitution: foreign exchange nu-
meraire and, 69; industrial project
analysis and, 129; traded goods valua-
tion and, 60-66; "uncommitted public
income" numeraire and, 71
Income transfers, accounting price of for-
eign exchange and, 40-42
Industrial project cost-benefit analysis:
distribution of income changes and,
139-41; distribution of net income
changes and, 141-43; effects of
changes in financing and, 143-49; fi-
nancial flows and, 134-39; overview
of principles involved in, 128-29; val-
uation of real flows and, 129-34
Inflation rate: adjustment clause for, 257;
interest rate as discount rate and, 121
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SUBJECT INDEX
Informal sector: electricity expansion
plans and, 172; labor analysis and, 84,
85,91,95
Input-output techniques: accounting
prices for non-traded goods and, 189-
92; accounting prices for non-traded
goods (cost structures) and, 198-200;
accounting prices for nontraded goods
formulas and, 192-96; accounting
prices for non-traded goods (numerical
example) and, 196-98; breakdown
used in, 257; problems with, 262; un-
skilled labor and, 222-27
Inter-American Development Bank: esti-
mating distributional effects and, 256-
57; implementation issues and, 261-
63; project costs and financing and
distributional changes and, 257-59;
project output and, 259-61
Interest rate: as discount rate, 119-23;
financial analysis and, 257, 258; indus-
trial project analysis (financial flows)
and, 134, 135, 139, 149
Intermediate goods: accounting price of
foreign exchange and imported, 42-
43, 50, 54; non-traded goods account-
ing price analysis and, 193, 195, 196;
non-traded goods valuation and, 110-
15
Interpersonal welfare comparisons, 27-
28; accounting price of foreign ex-
change and, 31; accounting prices of
investment and, 233; cost-benefit anal-
ysis and, 6-7, 8, 11; import substitu-
tion and, 65; in efficiency analysis,
275-77; irrigation project analysis and,
221. See also Distributional value
judgments; Interpersonal distributional
weights
Interpersonal distributional weights: ac-
counting price of skilled labor and, 84;
changes in government revenue and
expenditure and, 255; consumption
and, 249, 250-53; disregarding, 249;
use of, 253-55. See also Distributional
value judgments; Interpersonal welfare
comparisons
Intertemporal comparisons: cost-benefit
analysis and, 4-5; deriving weights
for, 117; discount rate and, 116-19,
121, 127
Intertemporal distributional weights,
251-53
Investment, 200; cost-benefit analysis
and, 20; cost structure construction
and, 199; discount rate and project for,
116-27; electricity expansion plans
and, 151; foreign, 145-47; industrial
project analysis (capital costs) and,
132-33, 139, 145, 147; industrial
project analysis (stocks) and, 131; irri-
gation project analysis and, 202;
project that increases foreign exchange
by increasing exports and, 32-40
Investment (accounting prices of), 250;
concept of, 232-33; correct formula
for profitability and, 285-87; exam-
ples, 241-48; formulas for calculating,
234-37; public sector and, 254; rein-
vestment of benefits and, 237-41; UN-
IDO presentation and, 231, 235, 236,
238
Investment funds, 231, 238, 241, 248
Irrigation project cost-benefit analysis:
analysis of project and, 201-7; income
changes generated by project and,
216-21; value of inputs (broken down
into non-produced inputs and transfers)
and, 207-16
Irrigation project (project produces con-
sumer goods) example, 105-10
L
Labor (accounting prices for): accounting
prices of investment and, 245, 246; im-
ported labor, 82, 83; income changes
and, 257; industrial project analysis
and, 129, 133, 141; industrial project
example of, 93-96; irrigation project
and, 220; non-traded goods accounting
price analysis and, 190, 191-92, 193,
196; skilled labor, 81-84, 129, 133,
196, 222; social security contributions
and, 92-93, 94, 95; unskilled labor,
84-92, 93, 129, 133, 141, 172, 174,
190, 191-92, 193, 196, 220, 245, 246;
unskilled labor and input-output tech-
niques and,222-27
Labor (efficiency price), 75-81
Labor migration, 83, 86-91, 94, 95
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SUBJECT INDEX
Labor supply, 72-74; 94
Loans: accounting prices of investment
and, 242-44; industrial project analysis
and, 134-39, 141, 144; irrigation
project analysis and, 202; short-term,
258
Low-income individuals (defining), 153
M
Marginal cost tariff, 282-84
Medical insurance scheme, 92-93
Migration (rural-urban), 83, 86-91, 94,
95
N
Non-traded goods: electricity expansion
plans and, 174; input-output tech-
niques and accounting prices for, 189-
200
Non-traded good valuation: non-traded at
the margin (defined), 97-98; prices
and, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 106, 108,
110, 112, 128; project demand for
non-traded inputs and, 98-102; project
produces consumer goods and, 103-
10; project produces intermediate
goods and, 110-15
Non-traded inputs: distributional effects
and, 100; industrial project analysis
and, 129; irrigation project analysis
and, 207, 212, 215
Non-traded outputs, valuation of, 216
Numeraire: consumption and foreign ex-
change as, 68-70; "uncommitted pub-
lic income" as, 71
O
Organizational problems, estimating dis-
tributional effects and, 262
P
Pareto's principle: accounting price of
foreign exchange and, 37; compensat-
ing variations and willingness to pay
concept and, 28-29; cost-benefit anal-
ysis and project comparisons and exe-
cution and, 9-15, 16, 17; effective
compensation and, 17; interest rate as
discount rate and, 120, 122. See also
Potential compensation criterion
Passenger transportation, 261
Pension scheme, 93
Port costs: import substitution and, 61,
62, 66; project increase in exports and,
66
Potential compensation criterion: ac-
counting price of foreign exchange
and, 35-37; accounting price of skilled
labor and, 83; accounting price of un-
skilled labor and, 89; discount rate
and, 120-22; efficiency price of labor
and, 77. See also Pareto's principle
Potential Pareto improvements (PPI). See
Pareto's principle; Potential compensa-
tion criterion
Present value: accounting price ratios for
non-traded goods and, 193-94, 197,
199; accounting prices of investment
and, 233, 234-35, 236, 237-38, 245;
cost-benefit analysis and, 6, 8, 15, 16;
current costs (industrial project analy-
sis) and, 131; electricity expansion
plan investment, 166; interpersonal
distributional weights and, 253, 254;
irrigation project analysis and, 202,
207; loan repayment (industrial project
analysis) and, 135, 136, 138, 144, 145
Prices: changes in, 150, 151; compensat-
ing variations and equivalent variations
analysis and, 21-24; compensating
variations and willingness to pay and,
24-29; electricity, 151, 157-58, 164,
176; import substitution and, 60-66;
increase in demand for imported goods
and, 56-58; increase in demand for ex-
ported goods and, 58-60; industrial
project analysis and, 129, 131, 132,
133, 134, 135, 137-38, 141, 144, 147,
149; irrigation project analysis and,
209, 215; of non-traded goods, 189;
non-traded goods valuation and, 97,
98,100, 101, 102, 106, 108, 110, 112,
128; obtaining monetary measure and
changes in, 20; project "output" and,
260. See also Accounting price; Do-
mestic price; Efficiency price
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SUBJECT INDEX
Private sector: accounting prices of in-
vestment and, 254; electricity expan-
sion plans analysis and, 153, 176
Profitability: accounting prices of invest-
ment and, 232, 236,242,244,285-87;
discount rate and, 119, 127; industrial
project analysis and, 144, 145; non-
traded goods valuation and, 100, 101,
103
Profits (industrial project analysis), 133,
137, 139, 145, 147
Project appraisal, 17; discount rate and,
116
Project costs, distributional effects and,
257-59
Project implementation, 261-63
Project output, distributional effects and,
259-61
Projects: cost-benefit principles to derive
total benefits figure and, 3-8; Pareto's
principle and comparisons and execu-
tion of, 9-19. See also Without project
concept; names of specific project
analysis, i.e., Industrial project cost-
benefit analysis, etc.
Public sector: accounting prices of in-
vestment and, 254; electricity expan-
sion plans analysis and, 153
R
Rate of return, 133; accounting price of
non-traded goods and, 194, 198; ac-
counting prices of investment and,
234, 241, 285-87; assumption of
equality between discount rate and, 71;
discount rate and marginal investment,
127; efficiency analysis and, 7; effi-
ciency price and, 31; interpersonal dis-
tributional weights and, 250; nume-
raire use and, 70
Remittances, 82, 83
Resource allocation, cost-benefit analysis
and, 3-4
S
Savings: accounting prices of investment
and, 233, 237, 239, 240, 241, 245;
interest rate as discount rate and, 119,
121
Skilled labor, 222; accounting price of,
81-84; accounting price of non-traded
goods and, 196; industrial project anal-
ysis and, 129, 133. See also Labor en-
tries
Social discount rate, 123-27. See also
Discount rate
Social security system contributions, 92-
93, 94, 95, 257
Stocks (industrial project analysis), 131
Strict Pareto improvements (SPI). See
Pareto's principle
Supply: foreign exchange equilibrium
and, 54; of labor, 72-74, 94; non-
traded goods valuation and, 97, 102;
project generation of excess, 30
T
Tariffs (electricity), 151, 154-55, 157,
158, 159, 160-63, 164, 165, 166-68;
aggregating compensating variations
and willingness to pay and the use of an
"average", 278-81; distributional ef-
fects and, 171-82; marginal cost and,
282-84
Tariffs (trade): accounting price of for-
eign exchange and import, 34; import
substitution and import, 60, 62
Taxes: accounting price of foreign ex-
change and, 35, 41, 47, 50, 54; ac-
counting price of non-traded goods
and, 191, 192, 193, 194; electricity ex-
pansion plans and, 171; exported
goods demand increase and, 58, 60;
imported goods demand increase and,
57-58; import substitution and, 62, 65;
industrial project analysis and, 129,
131, 132, 139; interest rate as discount
rate and income, 121; irrigation project
and, 210, 211, 215; labor analysis and,
83, 88, 94, 96; project financing (cost-
benefit analysis example) and, 15;
project increases exports and, 67; un-
skilled labor analysis and export, 224,
226
Technical assistance (industrial project
analysis), 132, 133-34
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SUBJECT INDEX
Technical change (examples of non-
traded goods valuation process), 103-
10; irrigation projects as, 202
Trade costs: accounting price of foreign
exchange and, 33, 47, 52-53, 54; im-
port substitution and, 61, 65; industrial
project analysis and, 132, 133; irriga-
tion project and, 207, 208, 209, 210,
211; labor analysis and, 94; non-traded
goods accounting price analysis and,
193; project increase in exports and,
66; traded goods valuation and, 58, 59;
unskilled labor and, 224
Traded goods valuation: defining, 55-56,
exported goods demand increases and,
58-60; imported goods demand in-
creases and, 56-58; import substitution
and, 60-66; project increases exports
and, 66-67
Trade incentives and disincentives, 54,
55, 56, 60, 66
Transportation (passenger), 261
Transport costs: accounting price of for-
eign exchange and, 33, 47, 52-53, 54;
import substitution and, 61, 65; indus-
trial project analysis and, 129, 132,
133; irrigation project and, 207, 208,
209, 210, 211; labor analysis and, 94;
non-traded goods accounting price
analysis and, 193; project increase in
exports and, 66; traded goods valua-
tion and, 58, 59; unskilled labor analy-
sis and,224
U
"Uncommitted public income" nume-
raire, 71
Underemployment, 84, 89, 90, 91, 94,
95
Unskilled labor: accounting price of, 84-
92; accounting price of non-traded
goods and, 190, 191-92, 193; account-
ing prices of investment and, 245, 246;
electricity expansion plans and, 172,
174; industrial project analysis and,
129, 133, 141; irrigation project and,
220. See also Labor entries
W
Wages: accounting price of non-traded
goods and, 191, 192; accounting price
of skilled labor and, 82, 83; accounting
price of unskilled labor and, 84, 85,
88, 89; efficiency price of labor and,
75, 77, 79; electricity expansion plans
and, 172; irrigation project analysis
and, 220; supply of labor and, 72-74;
"reservation," 89, 90
WASP n model (electricity generating
system expansion plan analysis), 152,
154, 165, 172
Willingness to pay: accounting price of
foreign exchange and, 35, 37-38, 41,
42, 43, 52; an "average" tariff to esti-
mate, 278-81; as valuation criterion,
276; compensating variations and, 20,
24-29; defined, 271; electricity expan-
sion plans and, 155-56, 168, 170,173;
import substitution and, 63, 65; mar-
ginal cost tariff and, 282-84; traded
goods valuation and, 58
Without project concept, 30; accounting
prices of investment and, 242; effi-
ciency analysis example and, 15; in-
dustrial project analysis and, 139; irri-
gation project and, 207; project
increases demand for exported goods
(trade goods valuation) and, 59; project
"output" and, 259; project produces
consumer goods examples and, 103,
105, 108. See also Projects
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